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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to understand how shifts in global economic power affect the policies 
and practices of multilateral development banks (MDBs). The study proposes three 
hypotheses. First, the “business” of development lending has changed radically in recent 
years as a result of the rise of middle income economies that now have a variety of 
options for sovereign borrowing—a reality thus far largely overlooked in academic 
research on MDBs. Second, a key factor defining the operational characteristics of the 
20-odd MDBs in existence is the relative balance of power between borrower and non-
borrower shareholders in MDB governance. Third, the financial pressures inherent in 
MDBs’ organizational models limit the options for MDB operations and shape how they 
will react to evolving market conditions.  
 
To test these hypotheses, the study examines several inter-related areas of MDB history 
and current operations, using as cases the World Bank (controlled by non-borrowing 
countries), the Inter-American Development Bank (control divided between borrowers 
and non-borrowers) and the Andean Development Corporation (controlled by borrowing 
countries). The analysis of the MDBs is complemented with case studies of Colombia 
and Ecuador, two countries with extensive borrowing histories with all three MDBs, to 
understand the demand side of development lending from the point of view of borrowing 
country government officials.  
 
The thesis finds compelling evidence in support of all three hypotheses, which suggests 
that the prevailing academic view that MDBs can be understood by focusing on the 
organization itself while ignoring the views of borrowers is not sufficient to understand 
the complexities of multilateral lending. MDBs are not all-powerful, but rather one 
resource among many at the disposal of governments to further their development, with 
varying competitive characteristics that impact the demand for their loans by borrowing 
countries in the current global context.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In academic literature as well as general public perception, the World Bank and other 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) have long been viewed as domineering 
organizations able to impose themselves upon developing countries. Since the mid-1990s, 
however, a number of developing country governments have found themselves in strong 
financial positions, due to the huge rise in global private capital flows and high foreign 
exchange income from rising commodity prices and growing export industries. Whether 
these trends represent a cyclical upswing or a more fundamental shift in the world 
economy remains to be seen. But there is little doubt that the demand for multilateral 
lending from many major developing countries is undergoing a structural change. 
Economies such as China, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and Turkey—which together 
accounted for 43% of the World Bank’s loan portfolio in 2009—now have strong fiscal 
accounts, low public debt levels, high international reserves and well-established access 
to international capital markets.  
 
Little attention has been paid in academic literature to how this sea change in economic 
conditions for many developing countries might impact MDB lending. Scholarship has 
instead focused on how MDB lending decisions are influenced by geopolitical 
considerations of powerful shareholders, by bureaucratic pathologies within MDBs or by 
changing ideologies on development, among other factors. All of these approaches 
implicitly assume that lending fluctuates only due to decisions taken by the MDBs or 
their principal shareholders, while the preferences of borrowing countries are not 
relevant. This may have been justifiable in the 1980s, when access to capital by 
developing countries was highly restricted, but is unlikely to be realistic in the current 
global context.   
 
 
 
9 
The thesis takes this insight about the importance of borrower country demand as a point 
of departure for analyzing multilateral development lending. How are changing economic 
conditions in developing countries impacting MDB lending trends, and why? What do 
countries look for from MDB loans, and what might make them choose to take out a loan 
or not? Is this change in borrower need impacting the finances of MDBs, and is that in 
turn leading them to change their behavior to continue being attractive as a source of 
loans? Academic research is as yet silent on these issues, despite their far-reaching 
implications for the activities of MDBs and on international development more broadly. 
The thesis does not suggest that the “supply side” analysis prevalent in the existing 
literature is misguided—the empirical results of numerous studies clearly show that they 
have considerable merit—but rather that fully explaining MDB activities in the present 
day requires complementing these analyses with a better understanding of the preferences 
of borrowing countries. 
 
In developing a demand-side approach, I propose a theoretical framework considering 
multiple MDBs and suggesting that differences in operational characteristics between 
them may be partly explained by the balance of power between borrowing and non-
borrowing country shareholders. The vast majority of scholarship related to MDBs has 
focused exclusively on the World Bank, and little attention has been paid to the 20-odd 
other MDBs, despite their considerable importance to many countries. Are different 
MDBs being affected in different ways by the changing global economic context? Do 
borrowing countries prefer working with some MDBs over others in different situations, 
and if so, why? To systematically compare MDBs, the thesis develops a new typology 
based on shareholding structure. This governance structure directly influences the 
characteristics of loans that most directly impact borrower demand—i.e., financial cost 
and required bureaucratic procedures. MDB shareholder arrangements are divided into 
three types: (1) domination by wealthy non-borrowing countries (at the World Bank); (2) 
more balanced influence of borrowing and non-borrowing countries (at the Inter-
American Development Bank, IADB); and (3) control by borrowing countries (at the 
Andean Development Corporation, CAF). The operational characteristics of each MDB 
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derived from these shareholder arrangements, I suggest, strongly condition the 
preferences of countries to borrow from them.  
 
A third new approach taken by this thesis is to take seriously the fact that MDBs are, 
among other things, organizations with a unique financial structure that deeply shapes 
that way they act. MDBs are, after all, banks—a fact that much scholarship overlooks. 
The MDB model, first created with the World Bank in 1944 and since replicated in 
roughly 20 other organizations, has proved remarkably popular in good measure because 
it is mostly self-financing: MDBs raise money on capital markets very cheaply, then on-
lend at a slightly higher but still attractive financial terms, and use the margin to pay 
administrative costs. They require only minimal and occasional budgetary contributions 
from member governments. The world has come to expect MDBs to provide 
development finance and a number of critical global public goods (such as development 
expertise, disaster relief and environmental coordination) that are financed almost entirely 
through the income that MDBs earn from their operations, and not by contributions from 
governments. How have the financial imperatives facing MDBs affected their 
development mission? Does the need to access capital markets impact their activities, and 
if so, how? Is declining demand for lending of some MDBs hampering their ability to 
finance themselves? Are MDBs changing their behavior and competing to make more 
loans for financial rather than developmental reasons?  
 
The subsequent sections of this introductory chapter review existing academic theory and 
empirical research on international organizations and MDBs (1.1), and then develop 
testable hypotheses based around the three issues discussed above (1.2). The next section 
(1.3) outlines the empirical research strategy to be pursued in the subsequent five 
chapters, while the final section of the introduction (1.4) provides an outline of the 
governance structure of the three MDBs analyzed in the thesis. 
1.1   Theoretical Framework for Analyzing MDBs 
 
The following section lays a theoretical foundation on which I subsequently build 
hypotheses to test in the analytical chapters of the thesis. The first sub-section provides a 
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definition of MDBs, and the next gives an overview of the academic literature analyzing 
the activities of MDBs and discusses its relevance for the current research project. Based 
on this discussion, I then develop a new theoretical framework for understanding MDBs 
that focuses on the balance of power between shareholding countries and the increasing 
importance of demand-side considerations in the MDB-country relationship. As well, I 
build on aspects of sociological theory to explain actions taken by MDBs to secure the 
resources they need to survive and thrive.  
1.1.1 Defining an MDB 
 
Multilateral development banks are a unique group of international institutions created in 
the wake of World War II. One useful definition, adopted by this thesis, is as follows: 
 
“Multilateral development banks are international financial intermediaries whose 
shareholders include both borrowing developing countries and donor developed 
countries. They mobilize resources from private capital markets and from official sources 
to make loans to developing countries on better than market terms, they provide technical 
assistance and advice for economic and social development, and they also provide a 
range of complementary services to developing countries and the international 
development community.” (IDS, 2000, p. 4) 
 
The first MDB created was the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD, the principal component of the World Bank), followed in later years by other 
MDBs in various parts of the world.  About 20 MDBs currently exist—one global MDB 
(the World Bank), several large regional MDBs and several sub-regional MDBs (IDS, 
2000). The essential characteristic of the IBRD, and one which has been replicated in all 
other MDBs, is that it channels capital to developing country governments at a lower cost 
than they could access themselves on the private markets. The mechanism for doing this 
coordinates among a group of national governments in such a way to produce an outcome 
that was not possible through the functioning of private markets. Shareholder 
governments commit a certain level of capital to the organization, a small percentage of 
which is actually transferred (“paid-in capital”), while the majority is to be made 
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available if needed (“callable capital”). The MDB can then use i) this capital, ii) the 
creditworthiness of the totality of member countries, and iii) its own market reputation to 
raise capital on private markets at favorable rates. This capital is in turn lent on to 
borrowing country governments at terms (usually) better than they could get on their 
own.  
 
One key trait that has made the MDB model so attractive to member governments is that 
it is largely self-financing. Administrative costs are paid for by the interest and charges 
from MDB financial operations, and wealthy countries are not required to contribute to 
these costs, other than occasional increases to the capital of the organization if its 
shareholders wish to expand lending capacity.1 The guarantee capital of any of the MDBs 
never been called on in their history, and the percentage of paid-in capital has steadily 
declined. Hence the direct cost to wealthy countries is small, while the benefits they 
receive—furthering their geopolitical, economic and developmental agendas through an 
international organization—are considerable (on the direct financial costs of the World 
Bank to shareholders, see for example Gilbert et al., 1999; Kapur, 2002; and Mohammed, 
2004). The need for MDBs to i) secure access to financial markets to access needed 
capital and ii) maintain relevance to borrowing countries so as to generate sufficient loan 
income are key factors underpinning this thesis. The ability of each MDB to successfully 
undertake these two tasks, in light of their particular shareholding composition and 
operational characteristics, are the main topics to be explored in the subsequent chapters.  
1.1.2 Overview of Scholarship on International Organizations 
 
The following sub-section provides an overview of several pertinent theoretical 
approaches heretofore applied to MDBs in academia, and discusses their advantages and 
shortcomings for the current research project. Based on this discussion, I then develop a 
new theoretical framework for understanding MDBs that focuses on the balance of power 
between shareholding countries and the increasing importance of demand-side 
                                                
1 Shareholders do regularly contribute to concessional lending windows for the poorest countries of some 
MDBs, namely the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) and the IADB’s Fund for 
Special Operations (FSO), which do not generate net income, as well as to trust funds established for 
specific purposes. 
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considerations in the MDB-country relationship. As well, I build on aspects of 
sociological theory to explain actions taken by MDBs to secure the resources they need to 
survive and thrive as organizations.  
 
The existing academic literature posits a wide range of theoretical viewpoints to explain 
MDB activities, which is to be expected. Situated as they are at the junction of 
international politics, the global economy and the development prospects of millions of 
the world’s poor, it would be surprising indeed if a single theoretical model were 
adequate to satisfactorily explain MDB behavior. Approaches include realist 
considerations of power politics and donor interest (Krasner, 1981; Dreher et al. 2009a 
and 2009b; Kilby, 2006 and 2011, among many others), a rationalist focus on the rules of 
the game and incentives among main actors in MDB activities (Mosley et al., 1995; 
Gutner, 2005; Vaubel, 2006), or more sociology-based constructivist interpretations of 
norms, professional self-image or organizational adaptation (Barnett and Finnemore 1999 
and 2004; Babb, 2003). A growing number of scholars are combining constructivist and 
rationalist approaches (Chwieroth, 2005; Nielson et al., 2006; Weaver, 2008). These 
theoretical approaches all have considerable merit, as the evidence found in their support 
suggests. The purpose of the present thesis is not to argue against their validity, but rather 
to draw attention to what I see as three important theoretical and empirical gaps, that if 
filled will offer a more complete understanding of how and why MDBs act in the way 
they do.  
 
First, it is notable how little existing research considers MDB activities from the point of 
view of the borrower. The vast majority of research on MDBs from all three theoretical 
traditions mentioned above presupposes that all countries eligible to borrow from an 
MDB will always want to do so, and the important question to be asked is what factors 
might lead an MDB to award a loan to a country or not. That is, they focus almost 
entirely on the “supply side” of MDB activities, whether it be the geopolitical interests of 
powerful MDB shareholders, the tensions between shareholders and MDB staff or the 
bureaucratic tendencies and pathologies of MDBs themselves, among others.  
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In light of the spectacular growth of many large developing countries in recent years as 
well as the explosion of international capital flows, the scenario of a constant demand 
function by borrowers is unlikely to be realistic now. Many large developing countries 
that have been major borrowers from MDBs in the past have in recent years found 
themselves in much stronger fiscal positions and also with a great many options for 
sovereign borrowing, often at very low interest rates. If, for example, China does or does 
not receive loans from the World Bank, one suspects that this has a lot more to do with 
China’s own calculations rather than any decision by the World Bank’s board. Hence, a 
more realistic and complete picture of how MDBs function in the global context of the 
21st century requires understanding the role played by borrower demand. Why, when a 
country has a choice, might it borrow from an MDB or not, and why might it prefer 
borrowing from one MDB over another?  
 
That broad economic shifts are impacting development lending is not news to the MDBs 
themselves. Since 2000, for example, the World Bank has published numerous strategy 
papers and undertaken several major reforms specifically in an effort to maintain its 
attractiveness as a development lender for middle-income countries, including the Cost of 
Doing Business studies (World Bank, 2001a and 2007a), the Middle-Income Country 
reviews and strategy (World Bank, 2001b and 2004a), the Investment Lending Reform 
(World Bank, 2009a) and the recently-approved Program for Results (World Bank, 
2011a), among others. More policy-oriented researchers and journalists who follow 
development issues have also noted these changes, including among others the Center for 
Global Development (2005), Mallaby (2005) and Einhorn (2006).  
 
However, academic research has as yet not reacted in a significant way to the increasing 
importance of borrower demand. The overwhelming focus of recent academic papers on 
MDBs has been the role played by major industrialized shareholders in influencing which 
countries receive loans (for example, Harrigan et al., 2006; Kilby, 2006 and 2011; Dreher 
et al. 2009a and 2009b; and Babb, 2009). The assumption underpinning all these 
studies—that countries always want MDB loans and the issue is only whether the MDB 
deigns to loan to them—seems in need of an update in light of changed global realities.  
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The only academic research that explicitly considers the role of demand are Mosley et 
al.’s (1995) fascinating study of World Bank structural adjustment loans in the 1980s and 
Ratha (2005) and Knack et al.’s (2012) statistical analysis of demand for World Bank 
loans. Mosley et al. (1995) use in-depth qualitative analysis and game-theoretic modeling 
to analyze the bargaining process between recipient countries and the World Bank in the 
design and implementation of structural adjustment programs. In this case the leverage of 
borrowers came not from reduced financial demand or other options for borrowing, but 
rather their awareness of the incentives and limitations faced by World Bank officials in 
their efforts to impose policy conditionality. Ratha (2005) and Knack et al. (2012), by 
contrast, do explicitly consider variations in demand, by bringing to bear statistical tools 
to model demand for World Bank loans with aggregate economic indicators as 
independent variables. While none of these studies directly address the questions posed in 
this thesis, they do provide very useful insights that I propose to build on, particularly in 
the country case studies (following Mosley et al.’s lead in attempting to understand the 
complex political economy motivations of borrowing governments) and in the statistical 
analysis of MDB lending trends (building on Ratha’s and Knack et al.’s statistical 
framework and applying it to three different MDBs, instead of just one).  
 
A second shortcoming of existing literature is a single-minded focus, on the one hand, on 
the World Bank, and on the other on the United States and a handful of other powerful 
countries as the only powerbrokers of importance at the World Bank. That the World 
Bank is hugely important as a development institution and as a lender to developing 
countries—with a loan portfolio of nearly US$200 billion—cannot be disputed. But other 
MDBs operate in the world, and in many regions they lend as much or more than the 
World Bank. Thus it seems appropriate to branch out research to these other MDBs, and 
seek to understand how their activities and characteristics compare to those of the World 
Bank. Some academic and policy research has moved in this direction (for example 
Nelson, 2000; Gutner, 2002 and 2005; Neumayer, 2003; Adams, 2005; Kilby, 2006 and 
2011; and Lim and Vreeland, 2011, among others), but considerably more needs to be 
done. 
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While these studies are positive steps to branching academic research out beyond the 
World Bank, most focus on one institution and do not make significant effort to 
understand whether, how and why they might differ from one another. Exceptions 
include Krasner (1981), but that study makes no pretense of being an in-depth piece of 
comparative research, and rather takes different MDBs as a simple example of realist 
geopolitical considerations. Babb’s study of the World Bank and the major MDBs (2009) 
focuses mainly on the role of the U.S. in shaping MDB policy, and groups all the MDBs 
together as “the banks” without any meaningful attempt to differentiate among them. The 
only academic studies to date that systematically compare the activities of different 
MDBs to one another are Gutner’s (2002) book on environmental projects by different 
MDBs in Europe and Nelson’s (2000) comparison of civil society policies at the World 
Bank and IADB.  Policy-oriented work has considered variance of different MDBs 
(notably IDS, 2000 and Griffith-Jones et al., 2008), but an analysis of the political 
economy factors shaping the structure and activities of different MDBs, as this thesis 
proposes, is lacking.  
 
Another tendency in the existing literature is an almost exclusive focus on the United 
States, or most the G7 countries, as the only shareholders of interest when considering 
MDBs. However, as Lyne et al. (2009) point out in relation to the World Bank, the U.S. 
is far from being the only shareholder able to influence an MDB. Gutner (2002) makes a 
similar point in her study of MDBs in Europe, as does Copelovitch’s (2010) study of the 
IMF. Lyne et al. highlight the “complexity” of principals and take seriously the formal 
composition and rules of MDBs as a means of explaining a shift in social policy lending 
through the collective preferences of all shareholding countries. This is a valuable 
contribution. In many countries in the world, the United States and the G7 countries have 
no particular political or economic agenda. Powerful shareholder countries cannot 
possibly be involved in the myriad different projects taken on by the World Bank or other 
MDBs—they don’t have the time or the interest. Reducing MDBs to the interests of one 
or two major shareholders is unlikely to take us very far in understanding their 
multifaceted character and actions. At the same time, following the lead of Lyne et al. 
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(2009) would be extraordinarily difficult to operationalize, considering the high number 
of shareholders in each MDB—how does one realistically aggregate and weigh the 
preferences of the World Bank’s nearly 200 shareholders on every issue of interest?  
 
Some scholars (including Kapur, 2000; Stone, 2008; and Babb, 2009) would argue that 
analyzing formal voting rules and shareholdings in the style of Lyne et al. (2009) and 
Gutner (2002) is misguided because, as they suggest, many decisions made at MDBs and 
other IOs are done through the exercise of informal power, especially by the U.S. While 
it is undeniable that the U.S. does have informal levers of power in these institutions 
(through its dominant economic, political and military position in the world), these do not 
render formal mechanisms and voting power irrelevant. This thesis shows that formal 
voting rules and power are critically important variables in determining characteristics of 
each MDB, a point that is further substantiated by the bitter ongoing disputes among 
countries about even very small changes in voting share. Further, what several of these 
scholars term as “informal” U.S. power at the IADB and World Bank is in fact its formal 
veto power over changes to the Articles of Agreement and capital structure, and its threat 
to use that veto if other shareholders do not accede to its demands in areas where it does 
not have a veto.2 Thus, while informal power likely does exist in the governance of 
MDBs, formal voting structures and power remain fundamental to explaining their 
policies and actions, as this thesis will demonstrate. 
 
Third, it is notable how little existing research even mentions, much less analyzes 
seriously, the character of MDBs as financial institutions. With a very few exceptions (for 
example, Kapur, 2002; Mohammed, 2004; McKenzie, 2004; and Bulow and Rogoff, 
2005), most researchers appear to be either unaware or discount the importance of the 
self-financing character of MDBs, and what this might imply for their operations. Yet this 
trait is one of the reasons MDBs have been so successful: they impose very little direct 
fiscal costs to wealthy countries, and undertake the provision of what is generally 
considered a global public good, i.e. development assistance. This trait also makes MDBs 
particularly difficult to control—shareholder countries do not, in the end, have the 
                                                
2 For more details on shareholding and voting structures, see Section 1.5 of this chapter. 
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“power of the purse” in the same way that they do over other international bureaucracies, 
such as the United Nations. The main lending windows of most MDBs3 fund themselves 
from the proceeds of their loans and raise resources to lend on private capital markets, 
and thus do not depend on regular budgetary allocations from shareholders. So in a very 
real sense, MDBs must act in part as “profit”-seeking, or at least revenue-seeking.4 This 
can go part way to explaining the motives of the MDB “agent”, which as constructivists 
point out is often a weakness of principal-agent models: “The problem with applying 
principal-agent analysis to the study of IOs is that it requires a priori theoretical 
specification of what IOs want. Principal-agent dynamics are fueled by the disjuncture 
between what agents want and what principals want. To produce any insights, those two 
sets of interests cannot be identical” (Barnett and Finnenmore, 1999, p. 705). 
 
The literature arising out of organizational sociology addressing how organizations cope 
with resource constraints can help analyze how MDBs may react to evolving financial 
pressures in ways that are not necessarily in line with the interests of some or all of their 
principals. Several authors—notably Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and more recently 
Barnett and Coleman (2005)—emphasize that the drive to ensure necessary external 
resources can strongly shape the strategies and activities taken by an organization as well 
as individuals within it, even if these strategies and activities are not always in line with 
the organization’s mission. For an MDB, the critical external resources needed to ensure 
organizational autonomy and survival are: i) an ability to float its bonds on private capital 
markets to raise capital for lending and ii) a portfolio of income-generating loans. This 
thesis does not pretend that resource capture is the only factor motivating MDB agents—
more constructivist-oriented issues such as, for example, the evolution of development 
norms and professional self-image of MDB staff also likely play a role, as discussed for 
example by Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, Woods, 2006 or Weaver, 2008. But it would 
be surprising indeed if the changing ability of MDBs to ensure these two essential 
                                                
3 This is not the case for concessional lending windows, IDA and FSO, as will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4.  
4 All MDBs are formally non-profit organizations. The constituent agreements of all three MDB studies 
here do permit year-end dividend divisions to shareholders, although in practice this does not occur. See 
Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of net income uses.  
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resources did not have an important impact on their activities, and this has thus far been a 
topic of minimal academic research. 
1.2   Hypotheses 
 
This study proposes a new framework for understanding variance among MDBs, based 
on the three points discussed above.  It maintains that borrowing country preferences are 
increasingly important in understanding MDB activities, and must be brought into the 
forefront of analysis. The study attempts to categorize MDBs in a way that systematically 
explains aspects of their operational characteristics or “competitive advantages” that 
might influence borrower demand according to the composition of their shareholding 
countries. Extending the concept of complex principals described by Lyne et al. (2009) in 
a way that makes it simpler and more realistic to operationalize, I suggest that the balance 
of power between non-borrowing and borrowing shareholders in each MDB shapes how 
otherwise similar organizations operate, in ways that impact the demand for their services 
by borrowers.  
 
While all countries have their own particular interests and agendas, the dichotomy 
between borrowing and non-borrowing countries seems particularly important in the 
context of an MDB, defining two important groups of shareholders that will tend to have 
opposing interests. Borrowing governments will want MDBs to supply loans and 
advisory services at as low a cost as possible, with minimum bureaucratic hassles and 
conditions. Non-borrowing countries, by contrast, will seek to impose their own ideas 
about development on borrowers, implement strict control on how resources are spent, 
and reduce the risk of MDB financial difficulties that they would have to pay for out of 
their guaranteed capital. The relative power of those two groups, I suggest, is a critical 
variable shaping the competitive advantages of different MDBs from the point of view of 
borrowing countries. Further, the insights from organizational sociology and the 
bureaucratic imperative of securing essential resources suggests that MDBs are not 
simply passively being buffeted by the winds of changing economic contexts or 
shareholder power, but actively seeking to adapt and survive.   
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Based on this discussion, the study seeks to test the following three over-arching 
hypotheses, the first of which focuses on the internal dynamics of MDBs while the 
second two address how MDBs relate to borrower countries and the wider external 
environment in which they operate. The two sets of hypotheses are linked, in that the 
causal relationships defining the internal dynamics of each MDB in turn condition its 
relations to borrowers and the external environment.  
 
I. Shareholders and internal MDB dynamics 
 H1: The balance of power between borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders 
causally defines key MDB operational characteristics that impact borrower demand, 
including loan cost and approval requirements, such that: 
- The more non-borrowing countries have control over an MDB, the lower will 
be loan prices, but the more intrusive will be its loan approval requirements 
- The more borrower countries have control over an MDB, the higher will be 
loan prices, but the less intrusive will be its loan approval requirements 
II. MDBs, borrowers and the external environment 
 H2: As a function of a borrowing country’s reduced need for MDB loans and 
greater access to alternative sources of capital, these MDB operational characteristics will 
become increasingly important in explaining their demand for MDB loans, as opposed to 
supply factors. 
 H3: The imperative of securing resources required for MDB organizational 
survival (i. sources of capital and ii. borrowing country clients) will lead MDBs to 
modify their operational strategies, organizational structure and even membership to 
ensure survival. 
 
These three hypotheses are clearly falsifiable by evidence gathered during research. 
Should the hypotheses turn out to be false, it may suggest that other aspects of 
institutional design are more important than the ones I highlight. Evidence could also 
suggest that the entire institutionalist approach is misguided, and that realist or 
constructivist viewpoints are more germane. Perhaps, for example, major shareholding 
countries are actively engaged in manipulating MDB actions on a more micro level than I 
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imply for reasons of geopolitical interest, or that new strategies for MDBs are almost 
entirely driven by development economists re-conceptualizing their role in a changing 
environment. Thus, whatever the result, testing the hypotheses should provide relevant 
evidence in favor or against the hypotheses outlined above. 
1.3   Research Agenda 
1.3.1 Delineating the Area of Research 
 
In broad terms, the project will examine financial trends of MDBs and of borrowing 
countries, and attempt to correlate the behavior of MDBs to those trends in a way that 
provides evidence for or against the three hypotheses. A logical first step, then, is to 
choose a set of MDBs that vary in size and shareholder composition, operating in the 
same marketplace for development lending. The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) 
region provides a particularly useful case of a single marketplace with multiple MDBs 
with which to test the hypotheses, for a number of reasons: 
 
• LAC has three different levels of MDBs—one global (World Bank), one regional 
(IADB) and three sub-regional (CAF, Banco Centroamericano de Integración 
Económica and the Caribbean Development Bank). All these MDBs lend for a 
variety of different types of projects to many countries within the region. 
• The three largest of these MDBs—World Bank, IADB and CAF—offer a 
continuum of balance of power between non-borrowing and borrowing 
shareholders. The World Bank is controlled by non-borrowers (63% of votes in 
2009), the CAF by borrowers (96.9% of policy-deciding voting shares) and the 
IADB roughly evenly split between the two (50.02% borrower and 49.98% non-
borrower, though with the U.S. holding veto power over changes to the capital 
structure) (Figure 1.1). Thus they offer an excellent test case for the hypotheses by 
providing variation among shareholding arrangements. 
• LAC is a major market for multilateral lending (US$13.6 billion in IBRD lending 
in 2010 by the World Bank, 24% of the global total and the most of any region in 
the world). Thus, if MDBs are facing financial pressures due to a changing world 
economy, it would be felt in LAC. 
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• LAC as a region has moved from a position of extreme dependence on MDB 
lending (the 1980s and parts of the 1990s) to one of relative strength (2001-2008). 
This change over time could provide a useful contrast with which to highlight 
both the changing demands of borrowing countries as they become less dependent 
on MDBs as well as the changing strategies of MDBs themselves to hold onto 
financially important client countries. 
 
Figure 1.1. Borrower vs. Non-Borrower Voting Shares, 2009 
 
Source: World Bank, IADB and CAF annual reports, 2009. 
 
1.3.2 Organization of the Thesis 
 
Having selected the LAC region and the World Bank, IADB and CAF, this study 
undertakes several inter-linked research projects in each chapter to gain traction on the 
three hypotheses outlined above. Chapter 2 takes a more historical approach to 
understanding how the MDB model evolved for each of the three MDBs, converging on a 
relatively similar organizational structure in response to external pressures. The 
subsequent chapters then attempt to understand how, within this broader “family 
resemblance”, the three MDBs differ from one another. Chapter 3 addresses this using 
statistical analysis of lending trends, while Chapters 4 and 5 use more qualitative 
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techniques to understand the operational characteristics of each MDB that result from its 
shareholding structure, which are driving these lending trends. Chapter 6 also attempts to 
understand the causes of the same lending trends, but with a focus on the perspective of 
borrowing countries.  
1.3.3 Summary of Chapters  
 
Chapter 2. Financial Pressures and Organizational Convergence in Multilateral 
Development Banks 
 
The first research chapter of the thesis takes a historical approach to understanding how 
the three MDBs were initially created, analyzing the influence of financial pressures and 
shareholder interest. In this chapter, financial pressures are not those caused by changing 
borrower demand—the main issue of interest for the rest of the thesis—but rather by the 
need for each MDB to secure access to sufficient capital resources needed to make loans. 
As will be illustrated, the need to raise capital forced all of the MDBs to fundamentally 
change their operational style and even shareholding structure in ways that the founders 
had not intended, providing evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. Understanding the 
financial foundations of the MDBs provides a window into a little-analyzed but 
fundamentally important aspect of MDBs, and also sets the stage before moving forward 
to more recent years in later chapters, when issues of borrower demand and differential 
operational characteristics of each MDB becomes increasingly important. The evidence 
used in this chapter is gathered from both primary and secondary sources, including 
annual reports, interviews and speeches, policy documents, media stories and scholarly 
articles and books.  
 
Chapter 3. Lending Trends by Multilateral Development Banks in Latin America, 1991-
2010 
 
This chapter uses statistical methods to seek evidence for testing the first and second 
hypotheses, by examining trends in sovereign lending commitments by the three MDBs 
over a period of 20 years among five countries in Latin America. Several sub-hypotheses 
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are derived on how lending trends might be expected to behave during different economic 
conditions, based on characteristics of each MDB and borrower preferences, and then 
tested with multivariate regression methods. A number of control variables are also 
included in the regressions. The results lend support for the idea that borrowers do 
differentiate between MDBs in certain economic circumstances, and that they appear to 
do so in ways that are largely consistent with the hypotheses. However, the analysis does 
not purport to establish direct causal links—rather, it simply shows that the outcomes are 
generally consistent with what the hypotheses would predict. Further, statistical methods 
are unable to fully disentangle supply-side from demand-side effects in MDB lending 
trends. The subsequent chapters will take up these two issues in more detail, using mainly 
qualitative research techniques. 
 
Chapter 4. The Politics of Loan Pricing at Multilateral Development Banks 
 
Most academic research on MDBs pays scant attention to the fact that the main reason 
countries borrow money from MDBs is simply that they offer inexpensive loans. Hence, 
when examining factors that might shape borrower demand among different MDBs, price 
should obviously be high on the list. This chapter explores how and why prices for loans 
from the World Bank, IADB and CAF differ. One might assume that factors affecting 
price are relatively mundane and technical, but they are in fact highly political and 
directly related to the composition of shareholders in each of the three MDBs, as 
suggested by Hypothesis 1. These political economy factors result in loan prices different 
from what one might expect. To analyze these issues, the chapter relies on pricing data, 
MDB documents related to loan cost and income allocation, annual reports, credit rating 
agency reports and extensive interviews with MDB financial staff, MDB shareholders 
and credit rating agency analysts.  
 
Chapter 5. Non-Financial Characteristics of MDB Lending 
 
While price is clearly a key factor impacting the demand for MDB loans, it is far from the 
only one. Governments that wish to borrow from an MDB must also contend with an 
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array of procedures and requirements that do not exist when borrowing from a private 
financial institution or issuing a sovereign bond on domestic or international capital 
markets. These include lengthy processing times and bureaucratic hurdles, environmental 
and social safeguards that in some cases are above and beyond national law, and tightly 
controlled procedures for how the proceeds of loans can be spent by the borrower. As 
internal studies by the MDBs themselves reveal, these non-financial bureaucratic hassle 
factors are impacting loan demand, especially in recent years as many countries find 
themselves in stronger economic positions. What’s more, these factors vary widely in 
each of the three MDBs, and evidence suggests this variance is directly linked to 
shareholder interests and relative power, again supporting Hypothesis 1. Research for this 
chapter is based on extensive interviews with MDB shareholder representatives and MDB 
staff, MDB policy statements and studies and some analysis and reports from MDB 
watchdog non-governmental organizations.  
 
Chapter 6. Case Studies of Borrower Demand: Colombia and Ecuador 
 
The previous two chapters established that a number of important MDB operational 
characteristics are clearly linked to varying shareholder interest, as posited by Hypothesis 
1. The implicit assumption in these chapters, and in Chapter 3, was that these 
characteristics are indeed important in shaping borrower demand when countries are in a 
position of relative economic strength, as suggested by Hypothesis 2. However, this is a 
key point to establish with direct evidence, which is the main task undertaken by the two 
case studies. The two countries were chosen because i) both have a long history of 
borrowing from all three MDBs; ii) they have both faced difficult economic times in the 
recent past but are currently in a strong position (thus showing variance over time); and 
iii) they exhibit very different political inclinations, which helps isolate the role that could 
be played by policy stance and/or geopolitical position. The evidence gathered—derived 
mainly from interviews with high-level past and current government officials in charge of 
multilateral borrowing—suggests that the assumptions about the importance of MDB 
characteristics were indeed valid in the ways assumed in the previous chapters. However, 
the case studies provide interesting evidence on how a government might prioritize these 
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characteristics for reasons specific to a country’s political and economic juncture, and 
also points to other MDB characteristics that might need to be taken more into account in 
future research. Further, evidence from these cases suggests that MDBs are actively 
engaging in strategic actions and behavior to maintain lending relationships in the face of 
softening demand, which further supports Hypothesis 3 and also could provide a fruitful 
path for further research into MDBs as they face a changing world economic context.  
1.4 Shareholder Composition and Voting Rules 
 
Before moving on to the content chapters of the thesis, it is first important to provide a 
brief overview of the shareholding structure and basic voting rules for each of the MDBs 
to be analyzed. The below section is not intended as a comprehensive analysis of voting 
rules in each MDB—some of which are extraordinarily arcane—but rather a basic outline 
to set the stage for later analysis.  
1.4.1 World Bank 
 
The main lending branch of the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), is governed by the Board of Governors with representation 
from each member country (usually in the person of finance ministers or central bank 
governors). The Board of Governors meets once a year, during the Annual Meetings of 
the World Bank and IMF in the fall of each year. While the IBRD Articles of Agreement 
give the Board of Governors complete control over the IBRD, it normally only addresses 
a small number of high-level issues. These include changes in capital structure and voting 
power, modifications to the Articles of Agreement, admission of new members or 
suspension of existing members, and determining the allocation of annual net income. 
The day-to-day running of the IBRD, including approval of all lending operations and the 
vast majority of policy decisions, is delegated by the Board of Governors to the Board of 
Executive Directors, which sits in permanent session at the World Bank headquarters 
(normally board meetings are held twice a week). The voting power of countries on the 
Board of Governors and Board of Executive Directors is exactly the same.  
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Voting power in the IBRD is allocated roughly in line with each country’s financial 
contribution to capital.5 The relative balance of power between borrowing and non-
borrowing countries on the IBRD board has not changed substantially in the past 30 years 
(Figure 1.2). Borrowing countries have seen a marginal increase in voting power over 
recent decades, but still only have a bit more than 1/3 of the total votes. Thus non-
borrowing countries can easily control all decisions decided by a simple majority, which 
includes essentially all changes to operational and financial policy and the approval of all 
individual loan or non-loan projects. Several issues require more than a simple majority 
for approval, according to the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement (1989), including among 
others:   
 
• Any amendments to the Articles of Agreement require 85% of voting shares (Art. 
VIII (a)). 
• Increasing the number of EDs requires 80% of voting shares (Art. V, Section 
4(b)) 
• An increase in capital requires 75% of voting shares (Art. II, Section 2(b)) 
 These specific situations reveal which areas are of most concern to the major 
shareholders, most notably the U.S. For example, the provision on reforming the Articles 
of Agreement was originally 80% of voting power, but during the 1989 General Capital 
Increase the U.S.’s share would fall below 20%, and as a condition of the U.S. agreeing 
to the capital increase, the Articles were modified to ensure the U.S. retains an effective 
veto (Kapur et al. 1997). Likewise, while the U.S. cannot by itself block changes to the 
number of EDs or the IBRD’s capital, it must only find one or two allies among major 
shareholders to do so. Further, the U.S. has up to now had the “unwritten” right of 
appointing the president of the World Bank (while European nations get to name the head 
of the IMF). While the president does not vote in board meetings, he (or she) does have 
very significant power to shape the World Bank’s agenda, policies and operations, and to 
control what is or is not presented to the board.  
 
                                                
5 The correspondence is not entirely exact, however. For example in 2009, the U.S. contributed 17.4% of 
paid-in capital, 16.8% of callable capital, and had 16.36% of voting power. 
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The number of chairs for the Board of Executive Directors is another way in which 
developed countries magnify their influence. On the 24-member board, only eight 
countries currently have their own chair on the board: the five largest shareholders (US, 
UK, France, Germany and Japan), as well as Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China. All other 
chairs represent groups of countries, which must elect their ED and every two years. In 
practice, the ED generally comes from the wealthiest country in the group, or is 
alternated between the two wealthiest countries. These frequently turn out to be non-
borrowing countries, which end up supposedly representing the interests of a large group 
of borrowing countries. By mixing the two types of countries together in a single chair, 
borrowers have an even more complicated task to exercise what little formal power they 
have.  
 
Figure 1.2. IBRD Voting Shares, 1980-2009 
 
Source: World Bank Annual Report 2009, 2000, 1990 and 1980. 
 
IBRD EDs also serve as the EDs for the other main components of the World Bank 
Group—IDA, IFC and MIGA—although their voting power is not the same in each 
organization.  The focus of this thesis is mainly on the interaction between MDBs and 
client country governments in development operations, hence IFC (the World Bank 
Group’s private sector lending division) and MIGA (an agency that offers guarantees to 
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private investors) are not discussed here. Nor is the IDA a main focus of analysis. IDA 
countries by definition have a very high level of financial needs, meaning their demand 
for MDB loans is generally unchanged (hence it is not relevant for Hypothesis 2). As 
well, IDA is not designed to be financially self-sustaining as the IBRD, but is funded with 
regular contributions from non-borrowers and the IBRD itself (hence it is not relevant for 
Hypothesis 3). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that countries with no eligibility to borrow 
from either IBRD or IDA have a total of 59.6% of voting power in IDA, compared to 
40.4 percent for all borrowers.  
 
In summary, it is evident that the IBRD and IDA are thoroughly controlled by non-
borrowing countries. Even on issues requiring only a simple majority, borrowers would 
have to organize an entirely unified front, and then convince at least one or two major 
donors to side with them to achieve 50% of the votes. And even this complicated task is 
made more difficult by the fact that in the Board of Executive Directors, where most 
decisions only requiring a majority are taken, borrowing countries are invariable 
“represented” by EDs elected by a group of both borrowing and non-borrowing countries. 
And on major issues decided by the Board of Governors, special majority rules make it 
harder still for borrowing countries to outvote non-borrowers. Hence, the World Bank is 
clearly controlled by non-borrowing countries. 
1.4.2 IADB 
 
The organizational structure of the IADB is very similar to the World Bank—which is no 
surprise, as the IADB was the second MDB in existence and the World Bank was the 
only model to copy. As well, the IADB was created largely under the direction of the 
U.S. government, which viewed the World Bank’s structure as a useful one for exercising 
its interests. Here again, high-level decisions are made by the Board of Governors at its 
annual meeting, while day-to-day decisions on projects and policy are delegated to the 
Board of Executive Directors that sits in continuous session at the IADB headquarters. 
The only organizational difference of note (and a minimal note, at that) is that the policies 
and projects of the concessional and non-concessional lending windows of the IADB are 
governed by the same board, rather than separate ones with separate voting power, as at 
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the World Bank. And like the World Bank, voting power allotted as a function of 
financial contribution to the IADB’s capital base.6  
 
The distribution of voting power among shareholders is quite different at the IADB, 
however. While the U.S. has always been the largest shareholder, borrowing countries 
have always had a combined voting power of more than 50% in the IADB (Figure 1.3). 
This share was considerably higher when the IADB was first created in the 1960s, but 
began to be diluted in the 1970s when new non-borrowing members were admitted for 
financial reasons, as discussed in Chapter 2. To ensure that new members did not threaten 
the power of regional member countries, the Articles of Agreement (Article VIII, Section 
4 (b)) were modified as part of the negotiations of the 8th general capital increase (1995) 
to state that the voting share of regional borrowing members would not fall below 
50.005% and the U.S. share would not fall below 30%.  
 
For most policy and project decisions, a simple majority on the Board of Executive 
Directors is required—giving borrowing countries controlling power, if they act together. 
Non-borrowing countries could likely pressure at least one borrower to side with them in 
an important vote, because of the wafer-thin majority. However this absolute majority has 
evidently proved significant in the past, as one example reveals. In the mid-1980s, the 
U.S. Reagan administration perceived the IADB to not be sufficiently compliant to U.S. 
interests, and held up the 7th capital increase for three years, insisting that it be given veto 
power in the Board of Executive Directors. Borrowing members, backed by IADB 
President Ortiz Mena, refused, and as a result the IADB’s lending dropped precipitously. 
Finally an agreement was reached in 1989, wherein the voting rules stayed intact, but 
individual EDs were given authority to delay certain projects (see Tussie, 1995). The fact 
that both sides were willing to bring the IADB to the brink of financial collapse, 
especially during the height of the Latin American debt crisis, testifies to the importance 
of the borrowers’ majority on the board.  
 
                                                
6 As with the World Bank, the correspondence is not exact. For example, the U.S. had 30.006% voting 
share, but 30.03% paid-in capital and 28.82% of callable capital. 
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Despite the relatively high weight of borrowers on the IADB in most policy and project 
decisions, non-borrowing shareholders—most especially the US—have several other 
ways to exercise their power. The Articles of Agreement (1996) call for special majorities 
on many more issues and at a greater level of detail than in the World Bank, and in each 
case the U.S. is given veto power by requiring a 75% majority of votes. The U.S. has full 
veto power over the same three issues listed above for the IBRD, as well as, among 
others, the following decisions that for the IBRD require only a simple or at most 2/3 
majority: 
 
• Admission of new non-regional members (Art. II, Section 1 (b)) 
• Changes in commissions charged on non-concessional IADB loans (Art. III, 
Section 12) 
• Decisions on investments (Art. VII, Section 1 (iii)) 
• Decisions on allocating annual net income (Art. VII, Section 4 (a)) 
• Approval of every FSO (concessional) lending operation (Art. IV, Section 9 (b)) 
• Establishing a quorum in the Board of Governors (Art. VIII, Section 2 (e)) 
The U.S. is also widely considered to have informal veto power on the choice of IADB 
presidents, which it reportedly used to force through the election of the current president 
over the objections of many regional members (see Bank Information Center, 2010). 
Further, the number 2 official has “by tradition” been chosen by the US, and has always 
been an American citizen (sometimes one who speaks no Spanish and has no background 
in the region).  
 
The IADB thus offers considerably more formal voting power to borrowing country 
shareholders than the World Bank, most notably a bare majority on the boards of 
governors and executive directors. At the same time, non-borrowers—mainly the US—
have ensured veto power over numerous important issues in the governance of the IADB, 
at a far greater level of detail than at the World Bank. Thus more balanced arrangement, 
though still with veto power by non-borrowers over key issues, means the IADB is in an 
intermediate governance position compared to the other two MDBs. 
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Figure 1.3. IADB Voting Shares, 1980-2009 
 
Source: IADB Annual Reports 2009, 2000, 1990, 1980.  
1.4.3 CAF 
 
The basic organizational structure of the CAF appears on the face of it to be quite similar 
to the other two MDBs described above. It is also governed in the final instance by an 
Assembly of Shareholders (equivalent to the Board of Governors of the World Bank and 
IADB), which in turn delegates a large share of oversight responsibilities to the Board of 
Directors. Country shareholders are represented on these two bodies through the 
ownership of capital shares. But these broad similarities hide a number of fundamental 
differences, both in organization and shareholder structure. 
 
The most important and obvious differences are, first, that the CAF is now and has 
always been governed almost entirely by the countries that it lends to, and second, that it 
is considerably more egalitarian in its governance. It was originally created in 1970 by 
the six7 nations of the Andean region, which were the same countries that the CAF lent 
to, and it functioned thus for 20 years. A unique two-tier shareholding structure was 
created that both allowed for different countries to contribute capital in accord with their 
economic weight, and at the same time ensured that this unequal economic weight did not 
                                                
7 Chile was a founding member, but withdrew in 1977 under the Pinochet regime. It has since returned as a 
minority shareholder.  
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translate into unequal representation in the CAF’s governance. In the framework of 
Koenig-Archibugi’s (2002) typology of global governance arrangements, this results in 
an MDB with very similar “publicness” and “delegation” attributes to the World Bank 
and IADB, but dramatically different “inclusiveness”—the CAF is and has always been 
much more egalitarian in its decision-making structure than the other two MDBs.  
 
Each of the five member countries purchased an “A” share, at a cost of US$1.2 million.8 
The bulk of the CAF’s capital was made up of “B” shares, which were distributed equally 
among Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. However, Ecuador and Bolivia purchased only 
about 1/3 as many “B” shares, in recognition of their much smaller economies. The 
Constituent Agreement has always stipulated that each A share has the right to designate 
its own representative on the Board of Directors (one each), while B shares vote to elect 
representatives in proportion to their financial contribution. Voting rules have always 
mandated that A shares have considerably more weight than B shares in all voting in both 
the Shareholder Assembly and the Board of Directors of the CAF, thus giving Bolivia 
and Ecuador more voice and vote than their financial contribution—in sharp contrast to 
the arrangements of the IADB and World Bank. The exact voting rules have varied over 
the years, the details of which need not concern us here. In all cases, A shareholders have 
had a proportionately larger voting power than B shares. Importantly, this has included 
unanimous approval of A shareholders to modify the Constituent Agreement. 
 
CAF shareholding began to widen in the early 1990s, in the interests of diversifying both 
the CAF’s source of funds and clients (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4). Mexico was the 
first non-regional country to associate with the CAF in 1991, and by 2010 a total of 13 
non-regional countries had entered into association with the CAF.9 Until 2009, all new 
members were incorporated as “C” shareholders, which were permitted a capital share 
and voting power much lower than the A/B shareholders. These shareholders voted in 
Assemblies according to their financial contribution, and were not permitted to purchase 
                                                
8 Each A share originally cost US$1 million, but Chile’s share was divided equally among the five 
remaining shareholders when that country withdrew.  
9 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, 
Spain, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. Both Italy and Guatemala had signed letters of intent by mid-
2010, but had still not joined as of November, 2012.  
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either A or B shares—thus keeping their influence to a minimum. For all major decisions, 
the CAF General Regulations stipulate that the votes of at least four A shareholders 
continues to be required (CAF, 2008, Chapter III, Articles 15, 16 and 17).  On the Board 
of Directors, C shareholders could jointly elect two out of 13 directors (Chapter IV, 
Articles 23 and 24), while five are appointed by A shareholders and five elected by B 
shareholders. The 13th director is elected by a group of private banks that are also B 
shareholders since 1989.  
 
In 2005, shareholders approved a reform to permit any country within Latin America and 
the Caribbean to become an A shareholder (Chapter X, Article 59). In 2010, Brazil, 
Panama, and Uruguay had done so—for the first time expanding the CAF’s full 
membership beyond the Andean region. These countries have full A shares and thus 
voting power equal to the original members. Argentina followed in 2011. The CAF has 
also begun expanding C shareholders beyond the Latin American region, for the obvious 
purpose of shoring up its capital. Spain purchased C shares in 2002, and now accounts for 
over half of the CAF’s guaranteed capital (though a much smaller portion of paid-in 
capital). Portugal purchased a small number of C shares in late 2009, and again 
contributed a much larger share of guarantee capital. Italy has reportedly signed a letter of 
intent to purchase C shares in the future. As of 2011, only Spain was represented on the 
Board with 3.1% voting power, sharing representation with Trinidad and Tobago. 
Notably, non-Latin American countries—the only non-borrowers associated with the 
CAF—are not eligible to purchase A/B shares. In a 2009 magazine interview, CAF 
President Enrique García stated that developed countries would never be allowed to have 
more than 15% of shareholding power (O’Shaughnessy, 2009). This policy is not in the 
Constituent Agreement or CAF regulations, but is evidently an unwritten rule followed 
by the organization’s shareholders when considering new members.  
 
Thus, the CAF’s shareholding structure serves to attract the capital needed for the MDB’s 
growth while at the same time providing greater equity in voice and vote among 
shareholders of differing economic strength, compared to other MDBs. A further point in 
this regard is that the president of the CAF has always been a national of either Bolivia or 
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Ecuador, the two nations with the smallest share of the CAF’s capital. Non-borrowing 
members are permitted only on a very limited basis, clearly (from the CAF’s point of 
view) mainly for the usefulness of their guaranteed capital, which could be considered 
stronger than that of borrowing members with lower bond ratings.  
 
Aspects of the CAF’s governance structure are also notably different from the World 
Bank and IADB. While the Shareholder Assembly meets normally once a year, as with 
the Board of Governors of the other two MDBs, the Board of Directors meets only when 
called on for special purposes, rather than sitting in permanent session. Instead, the vast 
majority of policy and lending decisions are taken by an Executive Committee presided 
over by the CAF’s executive president (Chapter IV, Article 27 (h)), and are then 
approved with minimal fuss by the Board during twice or thrice annual meetings. As 
described in Chapter 5, this organizational structure is much more streamlined than either 
the IADB or World Bank, and gives considerably more autonomy to the CAF’s 
administration vis a vis its shareholders.  
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2 FINANCIAL PRESSURES AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONVERGENCE IN 
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
 
As will be seen in subsequent chapters, shareholding arrangements embed a series of 
characteristics that make each multilateral development bank (MDB) more or less 
attractive from the point of view of borrowing countries, when those borrowing countries 
are in a position to choose. Before moving on to that analysis, however, it is instructive to 
examine how MDBs arrived at their operational model, and how shareholder interest and 
financial pressures played a role in that process. The chapter seeks to understand how the 
combined influences of shareholder interest and the realities of securing the resources 
needed to operate pushed each of the three MDBs to move toward similar organizational 
structure and policies, despite the intentions of the founders. Thus, the chapter will gather 
evidence related to Hypothesis 1 (the role of shareholder interest) and Hypothesis 3 (the 
role of financial imperatives).  
 
Broadly speaking, the evidence indicates that shareholder interests did indeed play an 
important role in establishing the initial goals of each MDB and in strongly shaping the 
strategies used to secure the necessary funding to undertake their mission. However, it 
also points to the fact that financial imperatives in many cases undermined the original 
intentions of founders, necessitating each MDB to move in unexpected directions as a 
result of pressures exerted by the need to obtain resources with which to operate. In a 
sense, this chapter tells a story of convergence toward a single financial model for MDBs, 
one that has been replicated at least 20 times around the world and which continues to be 
attractive today.10 Once that model was established, and especially during times when 
demand-side considerations are more relevant to borrowing countries, greater 
divergences within this model become more apparent, a phenomenon to be analyzed in 
later chapters. 
                                                
10 For one example, the recently created European Financial Stability Facility raises money by issuing 
bonds on private markets, based on a guarantee commitment by member nations. See EFSF, 2012.  
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The research finds that the tensions between the original development goals of the 
founders and the realities of running a sustainable financial institution in each case led to 
far-reaching changes in MDB operations. This, in turn, was strongly conditioned by the 
relative power of the countries backing each MDB—their own interests as well as the 
perception of other countries and private markets toward them. What is more, the changes 
in each MDB all moved in a similar direction, converging on a model of MDB activity 
much more similar to one another than their founders had planned. Essentially, the model 
relied much more on accessing funds from private bond buyers than originally intended, 
and with that came a number of exigencies to keep the capital markets buying their bonds 
at rates low enough to be able to on-lend to developing countries at attractive rates, with 
enough of a margin to cover administrative costs and make the entire model function. 
Thus, if one presupposes: i) the limited willingness of governments to provide budgetary 
resources to MDBs and ii) a built-in desire for organizational survival, then there seems 
to be almost an “ideal type” of MDB, toward which all will tend to evolve. 
 
This chapter does not provide a general history of the MDBs. Rather, the focus is on: (i) 
how the interests and relative power of the countries behind them led to their respective 
strategies of mobilizing resources; and (ii) how that in turn directly impacted their 
operations. The periods to be examined are the World Bank 1947-1963, the IADB 1960-
1975 and the CAF 1970-1993. While the time frames vary somewhat, in each case this 
encompasses the early phase of organizational life cycle: conception, birth and 
adolescence. Each case concludes with a turning point that deeply shaped the MDBs we 
see today—their “mature” form. 
 
The analysis is based on primary documents—mainly annual reports, proceedings from 
board of governor meetings, speeches of key officials and journalistic accounts, 
supplemented with secondary sources. In the case of the World Bank, secondary sources 
are relatively more important, as it has been the topic of considerable scholarly research. 
The IADB is the subject of a much smaller body of research, and most material in that 
section is based on primary sources and some journalistic accounts. In the case of the 
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CAF, secondary sources are minimal and the proceedings of board meetings are not 
publicly available.11 Hence that section is derived mainly from speeches of CAF 
presidents, annual reports, documents from the Andean Community and some journalistic 
accounts.  
2.1 The World Bank: From New Deal to Wall Street and Part Way 
Back Again12 
 
The idea of a multilateral development bank began at least as early as 1890, when a 
number of Latin American countries pushed for the creation of a specialized bank to 
facilitate capital flows to the region (U.S. Department of State, 1940; see also Helleiner, 
2006 and 2009 for a thorough analysis of this episode and its implications for the 
evolution of “development” in the post-World War II era). The U.S. expressed support 
for the concept—driven in part, as Helleiner (2006) notes, due to concerns of growing 
influence by the Nazis and the trend toward more radical statist economic policies in the 
region—but despite repeated requests by the Latin Americans no action was taken until 
1939, when a conference was held in Washington to hammer out a concrete plan. The 
proposed bank called for member governments to contribute half of their capital share in 
cash and half as a guarantee, with voting rights apportioned according to the level of 
contributions. The exact origins of this form of organization, with shareholder 
contributions and proportional voting power, are not entirely clear (and would be an 
interesting topic to investigate), but it obviously arises out of corporate governance 
practices. The new bank was to make short- and long-term loans, function as a 
clearinghouse for international payments, assist in currency stabilization, accept deposits, 
and much else besides (Ibid.). This grandiose design led to considerable opposition 
among the financial community and in Congress, which was sufficient to ensure no 
further action (see Helleiner, 2006, p. 955).  
 
                                                
11 The author has contacted the public affairs office of the CAF, which supplied scans of all annual reports 
not available on the Internet (dating back to the CAF’s inception) as well as several collections of speeches 
and official histories that are not otherwise available. However they specified (and this was later confirmed 
in interviews with higher-level staff) that board proceedings are not made public under any circumstances. 
12 The research on the World Bank in this chapter relies heavily on Mason and Asher, 1973, and Kapur et 
al., 1997. In many instances, I have returned to their original sources, notably in the case of the World Bank 
Oral Histories (WBOH), to verify and seek further information. 
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In 1942, a U.S. Treasury team under the leadership Harry Dexter White, who had worked 
intensively on the earlier inter-American proposal, took up the ideas again with a view to 
planning the post-war economic order. Cognizant of the opposition that arose from one 
all-purpose institution, White proposed instead to create a fund for monetary issues 
(which became the IMF) and a separate “International Reconstruction Bank” to facilitate 
credit flows for reconstruction after the war.13 White’s proposed mechanism was 
emphatic about facilitating private lending, while direct lending was to be secondary 
(Mason and Asher, 1973). Similar to the inter-American proposal, all member countries 
would pay in a determined amount of cash and gold (20%), and would guarantee the 
remaining capital subscription to be called on if necessary to meet the bank’s obligations. 
Total capital was set at US$10 billion. The bank would be governed by government 
shareholders with voting power directly proportional to their contributions—just as a 
private corporation. Perhaps not coincidentally, this scheme afforded the U.S. a dominant 
voice in controlling policy.  
 
There is no record of any opposition to this arrangement at Bretton Woods, where most 
of the debate focused on the design of the IMF. In fact, the US’s original plan called for 
no member to have more than 25% of voting power, but because several countries wanted 
to limit the size of their subscription, the U.S. raised its subscription to make up the 
shortfall and ended up with 37% of voting shares (Bittermann, 1971). The main 
discussions about the bank at Bretton Woods were of emphasis. European participants 
wanted the bank to specifically focus on reconstruction, and they favored the use of loan 
guarantees. Less developed countries—led by Latin America—instead wanted the bank 
to highlight its development role, and to make greater use of direct loans, since many 
would have had to pay higher rates even with guarantees (Kapur et al., 1997 and 
Helleiner, 2006). The U.S. facilitated compromises to include a balance of both positions 
in the final agreement.  
 
                                                
13 See Helleiner, 2006 and 2009 for a thorough analysis of how the creators of the World Bank envisioned 
its role as a development promoter.   
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Because the UK was facing serious balance of payments problems, the UK delegation—
led by John Maynard Keynes—insisted that the member currency portion of paid-in 
capital would only be used for lending with the explicit consent of the country 
(Bittermann, 1971). This meant that when the bank eventually opened for business, its 
resources were extremely limited,14 and would be forced to raise capital on private 
markets much faster than it might have otherwise. Thus, right away the tension between 
the ideas of founding governments and their willingness to actually contribute usable 
resources pushed the new bank in unexpected directions. 
2.1.1 Wall Street Moves In 
 
The Truman administration—still under the influence of Roosevelt’s New Deal ethos—
viewed the newly created International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD)15 primarily as a tool of government, not Wall Street. This was manifested in 
locating it in Washington DC, over the objections of several European countries, who 
favored New York. As Treasury Secretary Fred Vinson wrote at the time, referring to the 
World Bank and IMF, “It must be remembered that these are not ordinary institutions 
with ordinary stockholders. They are cooperative enterprises of governments and their 
chief business is with governments…They should not become just two more financial 
institutions” (1946, p. 626). The U.S. intended to keep a tight reign over the Bank’s 
administrators by making them subservient to a board of executive directors representing 
member countries, which would sit in permanent session and vote on all decisions. 
Again, Vinson explained the logic: “If final authority is vested in the administrative 
officials, the Executive Directors become little more than an advisory body. In my 
opinion, this would be contrary to the manner in which it was intended to operate the 
Fund and the Bank” (Ibid., p. 627).  
 
Being subjected to the changing whims of politicians, however, did not suit the early 
leaders of the World Bank, who were recruited from Wall Street and saw their 
independence from politics as essential to gain market confidence. John J. McCloy, a 
                                                
14 Essentially it was limited to the U.S. portion of paid-in capital, and the 2% each member was required to 
pay in gold (the rest being in non-convertible local currency).  
15 This is still the formal name for the main lending window of the World Bank. 
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lawyer with strong connections to the New York financial community, was persuaded to 
accept the job in late 1946.16 Before doing so, McCloy set as his conditions that the board 
make a clear statement ensuring that management would be allowed a generally free hand 
in running operations, and the board would confine itself to a supervisory role. The board 
agreed, and McCloy took the post.17 McCloy brought with him Robert Garner to serve as 
his vice-president, a hard-nosed New York banker, and U.S. executive director Eugene 
Black, former vice-president of Chase National Bank of New York. Thus right at the start 
of its operations, in the interests of establishing a “serious” financial institution free from 
political meddling, McCloy ensured a far greater degree of staff autonomy from the 
executive directors than originally envisioned at Bretton Woods, a balance of power that 
continues to the present day. As The Economist magazine noted with satisfaction at the 
time, “From the Bank the first President and the first U.S. Executive Director have gone, 
and been replaced by nominees of Wall Street” (1947a, p. 638).  
 
As noted above, it was generally assumed at Bretton Woods that the IBRD would 
primarily offer guarantees for governments borrowing from private sources. However, it 
soon became clear that guarantees would not be feasible, for several reasons.  In the first 
place, New York investors themselves were unenthusiastic about guarantees (Mason and 
Asher, 1973). As well, IBRD staff quickly realized that even with a guarantee, many 
countries would still be paying considerably more for money then if the IBRD borrowed 
itself and lent it on, which didn’t make sense. A further consideration was that the 
regardless of the guarantee, the markets would offer differing interest rates to different 
clients, which the IBRD feared could impact its own credit rating. As Eugene Black 
commented later, the IBRD backed away from guarantees because “If we had too many 
of these things [guarantees] kicking around, it would be harmful to the establishment of 
the market for World Bank bonds themselves” (WBOH, 1961b, p. 22). 
 
                                                
16 The first IBRD president was Eugene Meyer, who resigned after only a few months on the job due to 
battles with the executive directors. 
17 Robert Garner recalled that during the negotiations, McCloy told the board that “if the directors were not 
fully in agreement with that, we would go on back to New York that afternoon. Then the directors went 
into executive session and after lunch they said they were fully agreeable. So the deal was made.” WBOH, 
1961a, p. 4. 
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But if the Bank would be making loans rather than guarantees, it faced a serious shortage 
of capital. The only lendable resources available to the IBRD at its launch were the U.S. 
paid-in capital and the 2% paid in gold by other members—a total of US$727 million. 
While that was a considerable sum, it paled in comparison to the reconstruction needs of 
post-war Europe. Just the first two loan applications alone, from France and Netherlands, 
totaled US$1.035 billion. As a result, turning to the markets was a clear necessity right 
from the start. The Economist highlighted this reality in May 1947: “The French loan 
alone obviously earmarks a substantial portion of the total stock of dollars. Hence the 
Bank must soon determine its ability to obtain more dollars, which of course can only be 
done by borrowing in the American market…Consequently, extensive explorations are 
under way with the market” (1947b, p. 760).  
 
Private financial markets, however, had every reason to be wary of lending to this 
unknown financial creature. Not only was it new, but it was specifically designed to lend 
to foreign countries, many of them poor and with a long history of defaults—hardly a 
business model to gain Wall Street’s trust. Thus the initial forays of IBRD staff to New 
York were not a resounding success. Recounting his first trip to meet investment bankers 
in New York, Richard Demuth said, “There was an amazing discrepancy between the 
attitude of the bankers and the expectations of Bretton Woods …In general, it was 
thought of as a do-good institution, as a wild idea, without any respectable support” 
(WBOH, 1961c, p. 10-11). 
 
The intensive preparatory work of the IBRD leadership, as well as their personal contacts 
and good reputation on Wall Street, paid off when the IBRD’s first two bonds were 
publicly issued on July 15, 1947. Totaling US$250 million—the exact amount of the 
IBRD’s first loan, just issued to France—the bonds were rated as investment grade by 
Standard & Poors and Fitch, and were oversubscribed by noon of that day (Mason and 
Asher, 1973). Despite this success, future prospects for regular bond issues were far from 
certain. The following year, an article in The Economist noted that “Since its [the 
IBRD’s] dollar resources cannot be allowed to run down completely, the remaining scope 
for dollar loans is modest and will remain so unless Wall Street can be induced to absorb 
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another issue of the IBRD’s bonds. There is very little prospect of this at the moment” 
(1948, p. 502). The IBRD would not issue again in the New York market until 1950. 
Establishing a regular presence as a borrower would take more than good marketing—it 
would require demonstrating that the IBRD would operate in a way that made it a safe 
investment. This, in turn, would fundamentally shape the IBRD’s lending. 
2.1.2 Wall Street Concerns Shape Early Operating Policies  
 
McCloy’s team made no bones at all about the principles that guided the early lending 
operations of the IBRD. In presenting the second annual report to the Board of Directors 
in September 1947, McCloy stated that “the Bank must attach importance to the views of 
the American investor and must conduct its activities in such a fashion that its bonds will 
be considered a sound business risk by the United States financial community” (Mason 
and Asher, 1973, p. 54). A few years later Garner—who was in charge of operations at 
the time—stated that “The Bank must convince the private investors who buy its bonds 
that it is operating on sound banking principles. Otherwise, we might be cut off from one 
of our main sources of funds for lending” (World Bank, 1952). 
 
In the three years between Bretton Woods and the IBRD’s first loan to France in May 
1947, U.S. policymakers drew up the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction. This 
removed what had been the IBRD’s primary purpose—post-war reconstruction—and also 
removed what would have been its most creditworthy borrowers. Thus the IBRD was 
quickly pushed into the unknown territory of “development.” Between August 1947 and 
the end of 1949, the IBRD made only three loans, two to Chile for US$28 million and 
one to the Netherlands for US$12 million. This was driven by the inability to raise more 
money on the market, and also by the desire to establish exacting technical standards for 
loan approval that would be seen as prudent by potential bond investors. “We had then to 
show that we were going to make some sound loans, that we were not going to give the 
money away. Until we did that and until we acquainted people with what the other 
safeguards were, the Bank had no credit,” said Black, reflecting on this period (WBOH, 
1961b, p. 7).  
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A key aspect of how the IBRD established and guarded its credit standing with the 
markets was the kind of loans it made. The Articles of Agreement call for lending only 
for “specific projects”, although (with characteristic vagueness) this could be bypassed in 
“special circumstances.” The specific project ethos became an obsession with the early 
IBRD.18 One of the great advantages of the specific project, as one early staffer openly 
admitted, was that it looked good to the markets. “The market likes the idea of specific 
projects,” said one. “There's a feeling that if you know exactly where the money goes, it 
must be a sound thing” (WBOH, 1961d, p. 41). The IBRD strongly emphasized only 
projects that would generate income, and hence increase its chances of getting repaid. 
This meant physical infrastructure with direct impacts on economic production. “I think 
that if we got into the social field in the Bank then the bond market would definitely feel 
that we were not acting prudently from a financial standpoint,” said one early staffer 
forthrightly. “If you start financing schools and hospitals and water works, and so forth, 
these things don't normally and directly increase the ability of a country to repay a 
borrowing” (WBOH, 1961e, p. 63-4). This led to a very heavy emphasis on electric 
power, transportation infrastructure and large-scale irrigation works, which were seen as 
sound, bankable projects (Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1. IBRD Lending by Sector, 1947-1961 
 
Source: World Bank annual reports 1947-1961.  
                                                
18 This is despite the fact that the almost complete fungibility of money in a borrowing government’s 
accounts made the “specific project” a myth. See, for example, Feyzioglu et al., 1998. 
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Hand in hand with the specific project lending style, the IBRD also evolved an extremely 
rigorous and intrusive system of resource disbursement. In choosing which countries to 
lend to, the issue of need or income level played a minimal role, while a country’s 
perceived credit risk was a major factor. “The general idea was quite clear even at that 
early stage that the Bank could lend only if it were satisfied that it could get its money 
back. Therefore, a study of the economy of the country was pretty fundamental,” said an 
early staffer (WBOH, 1961d, p. 5). Thus, the IBRD’s extreme intrusiveness began right 
from the start, specifically to reassure its bond buyers that it was keeping a close eye on 
their resources. As a result, lending was slanted heavily toward more creditworthy 
borrowers, rather than poorer countries. Out of US$5.7 billion in IBRD loan 
commitments between 1947 and 1961, US$2.6 billion (45%) went to Europe or Australia 
and a further US$1.4 billion (25%) to larger and more advanced developing countries,19 
while only US$1.7 billion (30%) was dedicated to poorer developing countries.20 
2.1.3 An Embarrassment of Riches and the Birth of IDA 
 
As a result of the operational policies described above, the IBRD reputation as a “sound” 
financial institution grew. The spread between IBRD and U.S. government bonds of 
similar maturities fell from 0.74% in 1947 to 0.25% in 1952 (Mason and Asher, 1973), 
and the IBRD began accessing capital markets outside of the U.S. to reduce dependence 
on the U.S. market (WBOH, 1961b). However, the IBRD’s increasingly solid financial 
situation and excellent reputation in the credit markets had no impact on the tough 
conditions for borrowers. As early as 1950, even The Economist was calling for it to 
relax: “Recent experience has shown that its rigid approach and conditions of lending (for 
which there is something to be said on other grounds) do not provide a flexible means of 
handling the infinite variety of projects that must emerge from any programme for the 
opening up of under-developed countries. It resembles commercial banks in the United 
                                                
19 This includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iran, Israel, Mexico, South Africa and 
Uruguay. 
20 This includes: Burma, Ceylon, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, and Thailand. Of this, 
nearly US$1 billion went to Pakistan and India, an area of key geopolitical interest to the United States and 
the United Kingdom, the IBRD’s two most powerful shareholders.  
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States in that it is too intent on the collateral or security aspect of any operation” (1950, p. 
546).  
 
But Black and Garner, true believers in the virtues of market discipline, fended off calls 
for change, invariably pointing to the fickle opinion of the all-important bond market. 
There was some justification for this position in light of the IBRD’s long-running battle 
to be granted the coveted AAA rating by the ratings agencies, which was finally granted 
in 1959. Other evidence, however, suggests that while the IBRD’s operating style may 
have been a necessity to access resources in the first years, it had simply become 
ingrained behavior by the end of the 1950s. One high-level staffer noted that by 1961, 
bond holders no longer “scrutinize the day-to-day lending operations the way they used 
to,” adding that if the IBRD wanted to start lending for things like water distribution, “I 
don't think these things would have the slightest affect on its credit” (WBOH, 1961f, p. 
65). But the caution and preoccupation with bond buyers had planted deep roots in the 
IBRD’s organizational culture.  
 
By the end of the 1950s the IBRD’s financial strength was remarkable, with net income 
increasing each year and reserves growing from US$4 million in 1948 to US$288 million 
in 1964.  As a result, the IBRD faced rising criticism to ease the terms of its loans and to 
ramp up lending to address development concerns. These issues—along with an evolving 
external geopolitical environment—would come together in the late 1950s and early 
1960s in a way that would lead to major changes in the IBRD’s structure. Since the late 
1940s, the United Nations had called for greater lending volumes to developing countries 
at easier terms than offered by the IBRD. A 1951 report, calling for billions more to be 
lent annually for development, states that “In view of the need of under-developed 
countries for capital, the Bank cannot be said to be meeting the challenge of the 
circumstances…The Bank has not adequately realized that it is an agency charged by the 
United Nations with the duty of promoting economic development” (UN, 1951, p. 82-3). 
The report then goes on to propose the creation of an International Development 
Authority in the UN for the express purpose of overcoming the many limitations of the 
IBRD.  
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As could be expected, the IBRD vigorously fought the proposal, and because of its 
financial autonomy, the UN could do little to change its policies. As one IBRD staffer 
charged at the time with negotiating with the UN put it laconically: “They [the UN] are 
the central global body, and they feel they ought to be able to exercise authority over all 
the other international agencies. On the other hand, the Bank has the money” (WBOH, 
1961c, p. 20). But by the late 1950s, the panorama had changed considerably. The 
Eisenhower administration—faced with the movement of the Cold War to “Third World” 
countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia—began to come around to the view that 
more resources were needed to help fight the communist threat than the IBRD could 
provide. However, the U.S. insisted that the new lending body be housed at the IBRD, 
rather than the UN, for the obvious reason that it had veto power at the IBRD because of 
its governance structure proportionate to shares rather than one country, one vote as in the 
UN. Most developing countries naturally objected, but since the U.S. would be putting up 
most of the funding, they could do little about it.  
 
The IBRD leadership had by this time resigned itself to the inevitability of what would 
come to be called the International Development Association (IDA), but staff ensured 
that it would be implemented in such a way that it would not negatively impact the 
IBRD’s credit. One key point was that while IDA would be run by the IBRD, it would 
have completely separate financial accounts. The point, according to a high-level staffer 
at the time, was “to emphasize to the world, especially to the investors in IBRD bonds, 
the completely different financial status of the two institutions… This was to, as I say, 
assure investors in Bank bonds that their interest in the Bank would not be diluted by the 
diversion of funds into the softer IDA channels” (WBOH, 1961g, p. 34). In reality, this 
was (and remains) an elaborate fiction, since from the start the same staff worked on both 
IBRD and IDA loans in all countries around the world.   
 
IBRD staff soon saw that IDA had its uses. For a start, it allowed the IBRD to offload 
many of its riskiest borrowers (notably India and Pakistan) to IDA, thus dramatically 
improving the quality of the IBRD’s portfolio. The IBRD’s share of high-risk loans fells 
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sharply after IDA was created, from a peak of 27.3% in 1963 to 20% in 1967 and 15% in 
1975, “presumably resulting from the introduction of IDA”, commented an internal report 
(cited in Kapur et al., 1997, p. 933). Eugene Rotberg, a long-serving treasurer of the 
World Bank, described the importance of IDA to the Bank as follows: “It’s more of a 
safety valve to permit economic and financial support to countries which are not credit-
worthy but, if it were not available, would probably get some Bank lending at the margin 
and, in so doing, I believe jeopardize the financial credibility of the Bank” (WBOH, 
1994, p. 31). Further, IDA provided a useful means for easing pressure on the allocation 
of IBRD net income. By 1964, reserves had grown so large that the IBRD feared the U.S. 
Congress would try to redirect it to the UN. Hence the IBRD began making allocations 
out of net income to IDA—thus keeping the resources “in house” due to the extensive 
overlap between IBRD and IDA operations.  
2.1.4 Summarizing Findings 
 
The first decade and a half of the World Bank clearly demonstrates the strong role played 
by the confluence of financial imperatives and the relative power of shareholders in 
shaping the world’s pre-eminent development institution. The IBRD was originally 
founded as a New Deal-type organization, controlled by member governments and with 
fundamentally political aims. However, the model designed at Bretton Woods was 
quickly overturned. Because of its limited available resources and the need to make direct 
loans instead of guarantees, the IBRD had to turn to private capital market almost 
immediately to raise resources. To do so, the Wall Street-led leadership demanded and 
were granted management ascendency in controlling bank policy over the executive 
directors, who represented shareholder governments.   
 
The advent of the Marshall Plan further relieved pressure on the IBRD from U.S. and 
European shareholders, giving it the breathing space needed to institute rigorous 
operational policies the new leaders saw as necessary explicitly to maintain the good 
graces of Wall Street. This included the “specific project” ethos that restricted lending to 
“profitable” projects, a focus on creditworthiness as opposed to country need to 
determine lending allocations, deep investigation and involvement with borrowing 
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country macro-economic policy and a fixation with generating IBRD income and 
building up reserves. Whether or not the extreme focus on market perception by the early 
IBRD staff was justified or not is debatable. But unless the U.S. and other major 
shareholders would have been much more generous in their contributions early on, then 
the IBRD faced the choice of either turning to the markets or remaining insignificantly 
small. And if the IBRD was to access the markets on a regular basis, then logically it 
would be obliged to institute operational policies that ensured a track record of 
repayments and organizational finances sufficiently strong to win the approval of ratings 
agencies and investors who had little or no interest in the IBRD’s development mission.  
 
However, the IBRD was not simply a financial institution focused only on credit risk and 
the financial bottom line, despite the attitudes of Black, Garner and their team. It was 
(and is) a deeply political organization, and this became evident in the late 1950s. The 
growing awareness among wealthy nations of poverty in the rest of the world and the 
social tensions it could lead to, as well as the unhappiness with the IBRD’s strict 
guidelines and limited capacity or willingness to lend more, led the U.S. and Europeans 
to support the creation of IDA. The advent of IDA began shifting the World Bank’s 
operations more toward social aspects of development and poverty alleviation, rather than 
just heavy infrastructure.  But the obsession with running the World Bank in a way that 
would please bond markets was by then deeply ingrained and would only change going 
forward at a very slow pace.  
 
Thus the schizophrenic character of the World Bank—proclaiming its allegiance with the 
poor and emphasizing its social mission, while at the same time keeping a constant 
watchful eye on its financial bottom line—began to evolve. The specific dynamics of this 
schizophrenia were different in each subsequent MDB due to different shareholder 
composition as well as international circumstances, as shall be seen in the two cases 
below, but the basic underlying tension is found in all.    
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2.2 Inter-American Development Bank: Something New Under the 
Sun? 
 
The creation of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was in many ways a 
direct result of the conservative lending policies of the World Bank outlined above, 
coupled with the changing strategic views of the United States toward Latin America. Of 
the 38 countries that joined the IBRD at its creation in 1946, 16 were from Latin America 
(and three more joined the following year), suggesting that the region had considerable 
interest in the success of the new development bank and the expectation that it would be 
relevant to their region. These expectations were soon frustrated. Latin American 
countries were clamoring for large amounts of external capital to build up their domestic 
industries, but the IBRD could not (or would not) supply either the quantity or type of 
lending the region desired. In the 14 years between 1947 and 1961, the IBRD lent a total 
of US$1.3 billion to all of Latin America, and about half of that total went to only four 
countries, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico (World Bank, 1962). In line with the 
IBRD’s concerns about funding specific projects that would generate returns, fully 90 
percent of IBRD lending was for electric power and transportation, with the remainder 
for large-scale mechanized farm operations, mining and logging. Not a single loan was 
dedicated to state-run or private domestic industry—the main preoccupation of Latin 
American governments at the time—or for any social projects such as water supply, 
housing, or education (Ibid., 1962).  
 
A series of conferences were organized by the Organization for American States (OAS) 
in the mid-1950s to address the region’s external financing needs discussed creation a 
new regional development bank. Conference participants criticized the World Bank for 
lending too little, not lending to countries that did not follow determined economic 
policies or had past-due debts to the private sector, restricting loans to only a few types of 
projects, requiring excessive project preparation and charging too high an interest rate 
(Broide, 1961). By contrast, the proposed new bank would use “Latin American criteria” 
in offering loans (Ibid., p. 60, author’s translation), and would support “certain operations 
that might not generate income to cover the financial service payments, but should be 
nonetheless granted as they are necessary to increase the productivity and quality of life 
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of Latin American countries,” such as sewage, housing and water supply (Ibid., p. 82, 
author’s translation). However, without U.S. support the proposed bank would never 
access adequate financing, and the agreement was never ratified. 
 
During the late 1950s, however, the US’s views on the region began to shift from one of 
(relatively) benign neglect to concern over the potential for instability and threat to its 
global strategic interests. Trouble began brewing in Cuba, with a growing insurgency led 
by Fidel Castro threatening the pro-U.S. dictatorship of Batista. Vice-President Richard 
Nixon’s disastrous tour of South America in early 1958, when he was greeted by angry 
mobs at all his stops and nearly assaulted in Caracas, brought home publicly the depths of 
antipathy felt toward the U.S. in the hemisphere. The Economist magazine directly linked 
these events with the U.S.’s change of heart about the proposed new bank: “This is a 
Latin American dream, regularly spurned as unrealistic by the United States until Vice-
President Nixon’s unfortunate experiences last year made the Administration realize that 
it might be a good thing to make a dream come true” (1959, p. 273). U.S. support for a 
regional development bank was announced in August 1958. 
2.2.1 From Idea to Reality 
 
Once the U.S. was on board, creation of the new bank moved ahead quickly, and it did so 
almost entirely on the terms dictated by the U.S. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. proposal hewed 
very closely to the model of the World Bank in terms of capital structure and overall 
operational policy. The new bank’s shareholder governments (the U.S. and 18 regional 
countries) each contributed a share of capital, part of it paid in cash and the majority of it 
on call as a guarantee. As with the IBRD, operational policy was decided by the Board of 
Directors and final governance issues by the Board of Governors, both governed by 
shareholders in proportion to their share of capital. The lendable resources of the bank’s 
Ordinary Capital (OC) would come from paid-in capital, the proceeds of previous loans 
and resources raised from private investors through bond sales or direct loans from 
governments. More creative techniques supported by some Latin American countries to 
endow the bank with greater resources—such as the ability to accept deposits and 
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temporarily make use of Latin American central bank reserves—were rejected (Broide, 
1961). 
 
Within this broadly similar model, however, the U.S. proposed innovations to address the 
concerns of the Latin American countries. The most notable was the creation of a 
concessional lending window—the Fund for Special Operations (FSO)—as an integral 
part of the new bank, to provide low-interest financing for countries not able to pay 
market-based rates of the ordinary lending window, and for specific projects considered 
less “bankable”. The IADB’s charter also permitted more flexibility than the World Bank 
to make loans directly to private industry without requiring a government guarantee, also 
an important demand of Latin American countries intent on developing their domestic 
industrial base (IADB, 1996). 
 
However, U.S. support came with a cost. Latin countries had a majority share on both the 
IADB’s Board of Governors (which would meet once a year) and the Board of Directors 
(which sat permanently to oversee operations). Hence, in theory borrowing countries 
could join together to out-vote the U.S. This contrasts with the IBRD, in which 
industrialized countries controlled 75.6% of total voting shares in 1960 (Figure 2.2). But 
with 42% of voting power, the U.S. needed to ally with only one of the larger countries to 
block any actions. As well, the U.S. demanded veto power over FSO operations, due to 
the fact that it contributed two-thirds of the initial resources of the concessional fund. 
And perhaps most importantly, the charter stipulates that for any increase in the capital 
stock of the bank or any changes in the charter itself, a “special majority” of 75% was 
required, giving the U.S. veto power over the future evolution of the bank (Ibid.). There 
is no record of dissent on this point during the convention, nor was there serious 
opposition to naming Washington DC to be the bank’s headquarters (Broide, 1961), 
which suggest that the Latin countries were well aware of the limits of the U.S.’s 
benevolence. 
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Figure 2.2. Voting Power at the IADB 
 
Source: Annual reports World Bank and IADB, 1960. 
2.2.2 Borrowers’ Honeymoon 
 
The dominance of the U.S. was not a cause of conflict in the early years of the IADB’s 
existence, for the simple reason that the intentions of both the U.S. and other member 
governments were relatively closely aligned. All parties involved wanted to ramp up the 
flow of external capital to Latin America and to undertake loans that the World Bank did 
not consider, in particular for social projects and industry. The early activities of the 
IADB must have come as a pleasant surprise to most of its borrowers. Concessional 
lending quickly assumed a large role in the new bank. The Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations funded FSO lending to the tune of US$2.275 billion between 1960 and 
1967.21 As a result of this generous amount of concessional resources, US$1.46 billion of 
the IADB’s US$2.43 billion in total lending commitments up to 1967 (63%) was at 
concessional interest rates, while the remaining US$863 million (37%) was at the regular 
lending rate. By contrast, of the World Bank’s US$7.2 billion in total global loan 
commitments over the same period, only US$1.7 billion (24%) was in concessional 
lending, compared to 76% at market-based rates.  
 
                                                
21 The U.S. created the Social Progress Trust Fund as another concessional lending window within the 
IADB under direct U.S. control in 1960, but by 1965 it had been merged into the FSO. 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
IBRD IADB 
%
 
Borrowing 
Countries 
Non-Borrowing 
Countries 
 
 
54 
Because of generous U.S. support, the IADB was considerably less exercised than the 
World Bank had been in its early years to ingratiate itself with private capital markets. As 
one early observer of the IADB noted, “The bank has not felt itself constrained, as its 
sister institutions have done, to tailor its operations to fit the assumed expectations of the 
prospective purchasers of its bonds” (White, 1975, p. 182). Also, the task itself was much 
less difficult than it had been in the late 1940s, because of all the work the World Bank 
had already done to ease market concerns about a multilateral bank. This was highlighted 
by the fact that the IADB’s first debt issuance in the U.S. was rated AAA with a 
minimum of fuss, and sold out in short order at the same terms as IBRD bonds in the 
same year (IADB, 1963). Thus, the very same conservative financial policies of the 
World Bank that in large measure led to the creation of the IADB allowed the new bank 
to immediately differentiate itself from its predecessor in ways that suited both its 
borrowing members and its dominant shareholder.  
 
The strong U.S. commitments of concessional resources gave the IADB considerable 
leeway, both rhetorically and operationally. The Economist magazine, in an article on the 
IADB’s creation, noted that the new bank’s goals included “rather striking new 
specifications for social reform” (1960, p. 241). The very first loan made by the IADB 
was for a water and sanitation system in Arequipa, Peru—a clear statement of the new 
bank’s intentions (IADB, 1961). Lending in the early years of the IADB followed these 
new priorities. Two-thirds of all lending commitments in the first four years of operations 
were for industry and social infrastructure, compared to only 4% by the World Bank in 
the same years to Latin America and 15% globally.22 By contrast, only 10% of total 
IADB lending was for electric power and transportation infrastructure, compared to 88% 
for the World Bank in Latin America and 70% globally.  
 
The IADB also showed in the early years a notable tendency to lend to all member 
countries, regardless of their economic or political policies or their relationship with the 
                                                
22 Compiled from World Bank and IADB annual reports, 1961-1964. World Bank includes IDA, IBRD and 
IFC. The difference between Latin American and world lending sectoral breakdowns for the World Bank 
may indicate a small degree of substitution effect, taking into account the IADB’s operations. Nonetheless 
the broader differentiation between the World Bank and IADB is striking. 
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U.S. Here again, this contrasts with the World Bank’s focus on creditworthy borrowers, 
as described in the previous section. One interesting case in point was Brazil, governed 
by a left-leaning administration from 1958 to 1964 that vocally opposed the U.S. The 
World Bank granted no loans to Brazil between 1958 and 1965, while the IADB granted 
numerous loans every year to Brazil, with no apparent objection from the U.S. Similarly, 
Colombia engaged in a heated dispute with the IMF in the mid-1960s over 
macroeconomic policies (Dell, 1972), which led a halt in World Bank lending during 
1965. Again, the IADB continued lending to the country throughout. It would seem that 
the U.S., intent on repairing relations with the hemisphere, was willing—for the time 
being—to resist the temptation to use its power in the IADB to further its own interests, 
and allow the IADB to build a reputation for autonomy and solidarity among Latin 
Americans. 
2.2.3 Failed Efforts to Diversify Financing Sources 
 
Concessional support from the U.S. remained strong up to the late 1960s, and the IADB 
could access U.S. capital markets at terms comparable to the U.S. for its limited private 
market needs. However, the IADB had considerably less success accessing resources 
from outside member countries, a problem which would grow in importance in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. No doubt looking at the successful experience of the World Bank in 
European capital markets, the IADB expected bond issues in European markets to be a 
major source financing. President Felipe Herrera, speaking at the first meeting of the 
Board of Governors in 1960, stated confidently that “I am convinced…that these 
possibilities [for bond issues] will be found not only in the financial centers of the United 
States, but also in the capital markets of Western Europe” (IADB, 1960). 
 
Herrera would soon be disabused of this notion. The IADB faced several obstacles to 
entering European markets, including regulations, high taxes (up to 2.5% per issue, 
compared to the tax-exempt status of World Bank bonds) and outright prohibitions 
erected by European governments against IADB bond issues in their markets (IADB, 
1965a). The key point was membership, as the IADB acknowledged in a 1965 study: 
“The IADB has found that these countries give preference to certain countries linked to 
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them politically or economically, or to international institutions of which the country is a 
member” (Ibid., p. 65, author’s translation). Europeans understandably viewed the IADB 
as dominated by the U.S., and they apparently had no interest in offering it the 
advantages enjoyed by international organizations such as the World Bank or the 
European Investment Bank, which they were members of and had a voice in. 
 
The only mechanism by which non-member countries offered significant capital was 
loans or credit lines tied to purchases of export goods. Essentially, developed countries 
were using the IADB to subsidize exports to Latin America. By 1968, Canada, 
Netherlands and the UK had committed US$95 million for the IADB to on-lend, almost 
all of which was restricted to purchase exports from those countries.23 Although the 
IADB accepted these tied capital contributions, it did so only grudgingly. President 
Herrera voiced his preference for other options in 1965: “Undoubtedly, the best system 
from our standpoint is prospective bond issues, direct government loans, or participation 
in sales permitting free use of additional contributions to our ordinary capital… We have 
made it clear that the Bank’s role in these transactions is not that of an instrument 
designed to promote exports by developed countries” (IADB, 1965b, p. 16, author’s 
translation and emphasis added).  
2.2.4 Something New—But Will it be Sustained? 
 
By 1968, the U.S. was looking at a dramatically different global panorama and economic 
circumstance than at the start of the decade. In Latin America, the initial panic triggered 
by the Cuban revolution had subsided. The U.S. was actively supporting the growing 
militarization of the region’s political systems, which limited the threat of communist 
takeovers. By 1968, right-wing military regimes had taken control in Argentina, Brazil, 
and the Dominican Republic, with Uruguay, Ecuador, Chile and Bolivia soon to follow. 
At the same time, Vietnam had become an expensive fiasco, domestic fiscal policy was 
escaping control, and the country was facing increasingly severe balance of payments 
problems. Support for foreign aid—particularly in the U.S. Congress—was on the 
decline.  
                                                
23 Only Sweden contributed untied funds for the IADB to lend out of OC resources, but just US$5 million. 
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In the face of these new developments, the U.S. began scaling back contributions to the 
IADB. After giving US$1.8 billion in concessional resources in the first eight years of 
IADB operations, it contributed only US$500 million in the subsequent eight years, and 
that only after long delays by Congress. The U.S. also began taking an active interest in 
halting lending to countries with which it had business disputes, notably nationalization 
moves against U.S. companies in Chile and Peru.24 In December 1970 the U.S. Congress 
passed HR 18306, which required that the newly-created National Advisory Council 
submit reports on the activities of all MDBs that the U.S. supported, justifying that their 
activities did not negatively impact U.S. foreign policy, particularly with relation to 
expropriations of the assets of U.S. companies (Dell, 1972). Leftist Peruvian President 
Juan Velasco in 1968 had nationalized a subsidiary of the U.S. energy giant Standard Oil, 
and in a speech at the 1971 IADB Board of Governors meeting in Lima, he railed against 
the U.S. for halting loans to his country because of the dispute—a rare public display of 
the tensions brewing at the IADB.25  
 
The declining concessional capital available from the U.S. government coupled with the 
growing interventionist attitude of the U.S. in lending operations, spurred IADB 
management to take a more proactive position about finding new sources of funding. The 
IADB management under President Antonio Ortiz Mena saw greater use of OC compared 
to FSO resources as a way to make the IADB less susceptible to U.S. pressure, as Ortiz 
Mena spelled out in a 1973 speech: “…it is perfectly clear that the Latin American 
countries as a whole have sufficient voting power to approve loans granted with the 
ordinary resources of the Bank. A very different case is that of the Bank’s operations 
financed with the resources of the Fund for Special Operations” where the U.S. had a 
veto on all loan approvals (IADB, 1973, p. 48). If the Latin countries wish to reduce the 
                                                
24 The only lending in those countries between 1969 and 1971 was, in the case of Chile, two small FSO 
loans to private universities; and in Peru, a US$30 million emergency loan after the earthquake and 
landslide of 1970. 
25 “We believe that the time has come for a calm and complete reappraisal of the real effectiveness of an 
institution which, like the Inter-American Development Bank, shows signs of being used as a tool for 
political pressure against countries which, like Peru, are determined to break with the past.” IADB, 1971, p. 
26. 
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power of the U.S. in IADB operations, then strengthening the OC window and depending 
less on FSO was the way forward.  
 
Ramping up non-concessional lending, however, required the IADB to have access to a 
steady stream of bond purchasers. This, in turn, required the IADB to pay much more 
attention than previously to convince the markets that its securities were a safe 
investment, much like the World Bank. Thus it comes as no surprise that by the early 
1970s, IADB financial policies increasingly began resembling the World Bank. In a 1972 
speech to the IADB’s Board of Governors, Ortiz Mena alluded to the need for the IADB 
to pay close attention to the views of bond holders when considering loan applications in 
light of the greater need to raise money on the markets: “…we should bear in mind that 
the financial soundness of the Bank and its loan portfolio is subject to constant appraisal 
when it has recourse to capital markets. Our Bank’s capacity to maintain its prestige in 
those markets redounds to the benefit of member states, not only in regard to the amount 
of resources it can mobilize but also in regard to their cost and other terms” (IADB, 1972, 
p. 157). 
 
The change was most dramatic in what types of projects the IADB supported in the first 
half of the 1970s compared to a decade earlier. The IADB’s early enthusiasm for lending 
directly to private industry—a Latin American priority—began to abate. This was no 
doubt in part encouraged by the default and write-off of two private sector loans in 1966 
in Argentina and Brazil, and a third in Chile in 197226—not something bond holders 
would be keen on seeing repeated. By 1970 direct private lending had dropped to only 
6% of total OC lending, and it was cut off entirely after that year. Loans to the private 
sector via national development banks (which offered greater repayment security because 
of public sector backing) fell from 46% of OC commitments in 1961-64 to 14% in 1970-
74. Social infrastructure lending also declined sharply. By contrast, the IADB rapidly 
scaled up lending to traditional infrastructure projects such as highways and electric 
                                                
26 US$8.4 million default in Brazil 1966 that spent several years in the courts; US$2.8 million default in 
Argentina in 1966 (leading to a US$1.8 million charge against reserves); and US$9.6 million default in 
Chile in 1972. 
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power (Figure 2.3). This new patterns is very close to the lending priorities of the World 
Bank, in sharp contrast to their divergence in the early 1960s (Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.3. IADB Commitments by Sector 
 
Source: IADB annual reports, 1961-64 and 1970-75. 
 
Figure 2.4. World Bank and IADB Commitments by Sector, 1970-1975 
 
Source: IADB and World Bank annual reports, 1970-75. 
 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
Industry Traditional 
Infrastructure 
Agriculture Social 
Infrastructure 
Other 
%
 o
f T
ot
al
 1961-64 
1970-75 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
Industry Traditional 
Infrastructure 
Agriculture Social 
Infrastructure 
Other 
%
 o
f T
ot
al
 
IADB  
IBRD 
 
 
60 
2.2.5 Branching Out to Non-Regional Members 
 
While these efforts to reshape lending policies undoubtedly helped assuage investors, the 
IADB faced another problem starting in the early 1970s: restrictions on entering the U.S. 
capital markets. With its growing balance of payments difficulties, the U.S. government 
had taken to limiting bond issues by both the World Bank and the IADB in the New York 
market (IADB, 1970a). The only other markets available for bond issues were in Europe 
and Japan, and as discussed above the IADB had serious difficulties in accessing those 
markets because these governments were not members of the IADB. In his farewell 
address to the Board of Governors in 1970, President Herrera suggested that financial 
pressures and the lack of alternatives were leading the IADB to reconsider its original 
intention of limiting membership to countries in the region: “In the case of non-member 
countries, this encourages us to seek other formulas designed to maintain an adequate 
additional flow of resources…including possible formal association of those countries 
with our organization” (IADB, 1970b, p. 67).  
 
Canada was admitted to the IADB with little controversy in 1972 (IADB, 1973), but the 
financial impact was minimal. A more thorny matter was the admission of a dozen 
prospective members from Europe and Japan. From the point of view of the IADB, these 
countries represented a critical financial lifeline, as noted by Ortiz Mena in 1973: “Their 
membership will facilitate our access to certain capital markets on more favorable 
conditions than at present…Furthermore, the diversification of sources will help diminish 
the possibility of sharp fluctuations in the flow of funds received by the Bank” (IADB, 
1973, p. 50). The move to bring in additional wealthy countries from outside the region 
did not sit easily with all borrowing countries. Peru’s representative to the IADB Board 
of Governors gave guarded approval to the expansion: “…we trust that before long we 
may be able to extend an equally cordial welcome to other countries of Europe and Asia, 
on the understanding that their presence will not imply political interference…” (IADB, 
1972, p. 7-8). Speeches by the representatives of Argentina, Venezuela and Peru at IADB 
meetings in 1973 and 1974 spoke of the need to “Latin Americanize” the bank, including 
an unsuccessful proposal to move its headquarters to Latin America. 
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Despite these misgivings, nine non-regional countries were admitted as new members on 
July 9, 1976: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Israel, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and Yugoslavia. The new non-borrowing members were granted two full seats 
on the Board of Executive Directors, although the total voting share of Latin American 
nations in OC operational decisions and in the Board of Governors remained above 50%. 
In return, the new members agreed to contribute US$745 million total additional 
resources: US$372 million to FSO and US$372 million in ordinary capital, of which 
US$61.5 million (16.5%) was in cash and the remainder on call. Equally important, new 
members granted the IADB full legal and tax status as an international organization, and 
facilitated the placement of bonds in their capital markets (IADB AR, 1976). The results 
were immediate. IADB debt issued in non-member countries had averaged US$53 
million per year in 1961-75, but that immediately jumped to US$252 million in 1976—
almost twice the previous record amount in one year (US$145 million in 1969) (IADB 
AR, 1976 and IADB AR, 1969). In 1977 the IADB floated its first public bond in Japan, 
which was to become a major purchaser of IADB debt in coming years, and borrowing 
also ramped up sharply in the German and Swiss markets (IADB AR, 1977). This new 
level was sustained going forward, with the IADB issuing on average US$221.5 million 
each year 1976-1980 (IADB AR, 1976 to 1980).   
2.2.6 Summarizing Findings 
 
The IADB was created directly in opposition to the World Bank. Its aim was to lend for 
development projects that the World Bank would not touch, especially social 
infrastructure and private industry; to offer more concessional resources; to reduce 
political influence in lending; and to generally take a less market-focused view of its 
development mission. It was successful in all these areas in the first years of its existence, 
specifically because of the very high level of resources committed to it by the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations, in reaction to U.S. fears of social revolt in the Americas. 
The IADB could also get away to a degree with being less focused on the views of bond 
buyers than the World Bank could when it began, simply because the World Bank had 
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already done much of the heavy lifting needed to gain market acceptance for MDB 
securities.  
 
But as U.S. support for concessional lending began to wane in the late 1960s, the model 
quickly began showing its limitations. The IADB found that it couldn’t get significant 
financial support from elsewhere in the world, as no other countries had any stake in the 
IADB. The only resources made available were linked to export finance, which suited the 
interests of wealthy nations but restricted the IADB’s operational ability and often did not 
suit the needs of borrowers. As U.S. capital markets began to tighten in the late 1960s, 
the IADB was forced to reconsider its organizational model. By 1970, it shifted its focus 
to non-concessional lending, which not only didn’t depend on U.S. contributions but also 
afforded Latin countries greater operational control due to voting rules. The shift to non-
concessional lending, however, necessitated greater access to private markets to raise 
capital. This in turn led to a dramatic change in lending patterns, away from social 
infrastructure and private industry and toward the type of power and transport projects 
favored by the World Bank to impress potential bond buyers. Also in a bid to access more 
resources and to counterbalance U.S. influence, the IADB sacrificed a degree of its Latin 
American character and allowed members from outside the region.  
 
Thus the evolution of the IADB between its founding in 1959 and the radical 
transformation in the mid-1970s puts in sharp relief how the pressures of securing the 
resources needed to function to a large measure dictated not only the bank’s operations 
but its very membership structure. The IADB began its life very different than the World 
Bank, but by the mid-1970s had moved much closer to the World Bank’s model of MDB 
operations. This was the direct result of the need to raise more resources on private 
capital markets in the U.S. and abroad, combined the evolving interests of the US, non-
member wealthy nations and Latin American members.  
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2.3 CAF: The Challenges of Going it Alone  
 
Like the IADB, the Andean Development Corporation (Corporacion Andina de 
Fomento—CAF) was envisioned by its creators to be a new sort of MDB, one that would 
undertake a different type of development activity than either the World Bank or the 
IADB. The specific role intended for the CAF was to promote economic integration 
among the six South American countries that formed the bank—Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. This effort at regional integration was part of 
the broader development strategy prevalent in Latin America at that time of inward-
looking development and deepening regional trade links. The Andean Group was one of 
the most notable of these efforts. The CAF was mooted right at the beginning of the 
negotiations to create the Andean Group, and the treaty creating it was signed on 
February 7, 1968—even before the 1969 Cartagena Agreement formally created the 
Andean Group.  
 
The operational structure of the CAF mirrored the examples of the World Bank and 
IADB in many important respects. It followed the model of a corporation, owned by six 
shareholders governments who contributed the initial capital and were the final arbiters of 
its policies. The CAF was designed to use its capital and other public or private resources 
it might raise to make loans, which would be paid back with sufficient interest to ensure 
the financial stability of the organization. Within this broad model, however, the CAF 
differed from the World Bank and IADB in a number of important respects.  
 
Most notable was the composition of the shareholding countries themselves: they were all 
developing countries expecting to borrow from the CAF, with no non-borrowing 
developed countries involved. As well, participating countries would have equitable 
control over the CAF, while still taking into account differences in wealth among the six, 
through the creation of different types of shares. The initial US$25 million in capital was 
divided into six “A” share worth US$1 million, purchased one each by all member 
countries. The remaining US$19 million would be in “B” shares, of which Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela purchased 22 percent, while Bolivia and Ecuador 
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purchased 6 percent. The voting rules of the bi-annual shareholder assembly as well as 
the composition and voting rules of the Board of Directors were written to ensure that the 
A shares of Bolivia and Ecuador gave those countries significant voice, despite their 
lower contributions. Most notably, either country could veto any changes to the CAF 
statutes or structure of the Board of Directors (Fresard, 1969). This relatively equitable 
shareholding governance arrangement is fundamentally different from the World Bank 
and IADB, in which relative economic and political power was reflected directly in the 
amount of capital and voting share of each member country.  
 
Another important difference was the administrative mechanics of the CAF compared to 
the other two MDBs. The differences between shareholders in the World Bank and IADB 
that led to heavy oversight and permanent sitting executive boards was non-existent in the 
CAF, since shareholders were all borrowing countries themselves and had very similar 
interests. This is clearly reflected in the administration. Rather than having all lending 
decisions approved by a full-time, in-house board of directors representing shareholders, 
the CAF board was designed to meet only twice a year to approve the broad outlines of 
its strategy. This arrangement was explicitly intended to allow the CAF to act rapidly and 
with a minimum of bureaucratic hassle, as noted by one of the original treaty negotiators: 
“…all these stipulations were included to avoid rigid situations that could slow down 
activities, and to provide the organization the maximum agility and flexibility” (Fresard, 
1969, p. 34, author’s translation).  
 
The orientation of the CAF’s financial services was also intended to be markedly 
different from the World Bank and IADB, filling a gap that—despite the repeated 
requests of borrowing governments in Latin America—neither of these two MDBs filled. 
Industry, and to a lesser extent agribusiness and trade support, were to be the explicit and 
exclusive focus of the CAF’s activities (Ibid.). Financial support could be supplied in a 
broader range of ways than other MDBs, including to “emit bonds or debentures, act as a 
guarantor of any type, provide collateral for obligations, and grant guarantees in share 
issues”, i.e. act as an underwriter (CAF, 1974, Art. 4).  
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2.3.1 Early Problems: Raising Resources and Finding Suitable Projects 
 
Among the many problems facing the CAF when it opened its doors for business in 1970, 
by far the most pressing was raising resources with which to operate. The six founding 
countries had committed US$25 million in capital, but this would only be paid in over the 
course of several years, making it essential that the CAF quickly find other sources of 
capital to intermediate. The expectation of the CAF’s creators and early administrators 
was that this capital would mainly come from outside the region. As the Chilean 
negotiator blithely stated, “…the majority of the resources that the Corporation will 
employ will not come from its own capital, but from traditional sources available in the 
developed world for the purposes of economic and social development” (Fresard, 1969, 
p. 33, author’s translation), evidently meaning soft loans from bilateral aid agencies of 
developed countries or other, larger MDBs. As well, the CAF—apparently thinking it 
would not be difficult to emulate the financial operations of the IADB and World Bank—
intended to issue debt on private capital markets in Europe and North America, as 
envisioned in its charter. 
 
Initial impressions seemed positive: U.S. AID provided a US$15 million soft loan in 
1971, and Canada soon followed suit with another US$5 million. Further financial 
contributions were expected from the World Bank and, especially, the IADB: “An initial 
participation of the IADB is expected with a loan on the order of US$12 million, which 
would not preclude further loans when these resources have been used and the necessities 
of the organization require it” (CAF AR, 1971, p. 33, author’s translation). The CAF sent 
out a financial mission to Europe, Japan and North America in 1971 to test the waters 
regarding access to other public and private sources of capital in the form of credit lines, 
bond issues and bank loans. The mission reported receiving a “favorable and positive 
impression on the aims of the organization” (Ibid., p. 34, author’s translation) in 
international financial circles. One of the stops was in Switzerland, where CAF officials 
met with the banking giant UBS to “understand the conditions under which the institution 
could in the near future place in the world capital markets a long-term bond issue” (Ibid., 
p. 34, author’s translation). 
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However, these optimistic plans soon came up against a much less forgiving reality, 
which must have come as an unpleasant shock to the CAF. U.S. AID’s US$15 million 
loan, which the CAF saw as just an “initial” contribution (Ibid., p. 34, author’s 
translation), was never increased, nor was the Canadian loan. Efforts to raise money from 
European governments were similarly limited, with the 1975 Annual Report reduced to 
playing up the fact that a CAF European mission had even been received by “high 
officials” at all (CAF AR, 1975, p. 16, author’s translation). Following the oil shock, the 
CAF was quick to send a 1975 mission to Arab countries in an effort to raise capital, with 
no success. The IADB was similarly uncooperative. After an initial loan of US$750,000 
for technical assistance purposes, no further resources were forthcoming. Various formal 
loan applications with the IADB continue to be discussed in annual reports until 1978, 
after which the topic is no longer mentioned. Similarly, hopeful mention is made in the 
1974 Annual Report of obtaining from the World Bank “technical and financial 
cooperation for the programs of the CAF and, eventually, a line of credit” (CAF AR, 
1974, p. 25, author’s translation), which never materialized. With U.S. enthusiasm for 
development aid dwindling, and the lack of any shareholding influence by the U.S. or 
European nations, developed country governments apparently saw little incentive to 
supply resources to the CAF. 
 
Progress was even slower with the private markets. Neither U.S. nor European capital 
markets showed any inclination to invest in CAF bonds. Following a 1974 mission to 
New York investment banks, the CAF concluded that “during 1975 there will be 
possibilities to raise US$15-25 million in a private placement, as a first step before a 
future public offer” (Ibid., p. 23, author’s translation). No such placement took place. 
Talks with European and Asian banks that same year were similarly fruitless. In an 
explicit effort to strengthen the financial image of the CAF in international capital 
markets, shareholders approved the creation of US$200 million in callable (or guarantee) 
capital in 1974 (Ibid.), following the model of the World Bank and IADB, but with no 
apparent impact. The first private financial participation from outside the region were a 
series of loans by Bank of America in 1973, 1974 and 1975, but these were at a high 
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interest rate (above 11 percent) and directly tied in with a U.S. Ex-Im Bank loan for 
specific U.S. export purchases (CAF AR, 1973, 1974 and 1975). Even with the huge 
boom in petrodollar lending to Latin America, it was not until 1977 that the CAF was 
finally able to conclude a sizeable bank loan, for US$50 million from a syndicate of 
European, Japanese and U.S. banks. With no developed country to back up its financial 
obligations—only six relatively poor Latin American countries, two governed by leftist 
administrations whose leaders regularly railed against the evils of capitalism—and an 
unclear mandate based on vague notions about regional integration and solidarity, 
financiers in developed countries could be forgiven for not being more enthusiastic about 
lending it money.  
 
Like the IADB in the 1960s, credit lines and loans tied to exports were the only 
significant financing offered by countries outside the Andean region: US$6 million each 
from Brazil and Mexico in 1973, US$10 million from Japan’s Ex-Im Bank in 1974, 
various projects purchases funded jointly by the U.S. Ex-Im Bank and Bank of America, 
and US$10 million by the Spanish Export Bank in 1977 (CAF AR, 1973, 1974 and 
1975). The CAF sought to avoid credit lines tied to exports, as they limited both the 
financial flexibility of the CAF and the procurement options facing borrowing projects. 
The 1973 Annual Report highlights “the necessity that [external] loans and credit lines be 
granted totally untied and in conditions that facilitate their use in programs compatible 
with the necessities of the CAF” (CAF AR, 1973, p. 20, author’s translation). 
 
As a result of these obstacles, the CAF was forced to rely much more heavily than it had 
originally expected on capital raised within the six member countries. By 1980, the CAF 
had raised a total of US$260 million from its members, compared to US$137 million 
from outside the sub-region (CAF AR 1970-1980). This is a far cry from the lofty 
expectations that the CAF would become a conduit for significant amounts of private and 
public capital from wealthy countries into the Andean region.  
 
If the CAF’s liability situation was difficult during its first decade, its asset side was 
equally so. Right from the start the bank ran up against the tensions between its mandate 
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for using lending to promote sub-regional integration and the desires of individual 
member governments. The CAF sent out an initial mission in 1971 to all member 
countries to put together a portfolio of potential projects. However, as that year’s annual 
report noted, “The most common characteristics of these projects and initiatives was their 
limited integration content. The majority had strictly national characteristics…” (CAF 
AR, 1971, p. 21, author’s translation). This problem was mentioned repeatedly in early 
annual reports (see for example CAF AR, 1973, p. 29). The solution was to partially relax 
the CAF’s standards in the interests of making loans. In an article describing this period, 
the CAF’s second president recalled that “pressured by the need to survive, the CAF had 
to move ahead with projects that were not strictly in accord with the restrictive 
parameters of its mandate” (CAF, 1990, p. 28, author’s translation).  
 
Figure 2.5. CAF Lending Commitments (millions 1973 US$) 
 
 Source: CAF annual reports, 1973-1984. 
Note: SAFICO refers to short-term trade finance of not more than 90 days.  
 
By partially relaxing its project lending requirements and initiating short-term trade 
finance lending (called SAFICO), the CAF began to build lending, with annual 
commitments rising from US$33 million in 1973 to US$107 million in 1976 (of which 
US$17 million was trade financing). However, lending reversed sharply in 1977, as a 
result of the withdrawal of Chile—now under the sway of Pinochet’s free market 
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“Chicago Boys”—from the Andean Group, as well as changing development strategies of 
member countries. After a temporary rebound in 1978, lending commitments continued 
to decline to 1981 (Figure 2.5). Equally troubling was the CAF’s operating results, with 
three years of net losses (1975, 1977 and 1978), reflecting not only to difficulties finding 
appropriate projects but also the CAF’s high cost of capital, which made it problematic to 
on-lend at terms that were both acceptable to borrowers and profitable for the CAF (CAF, 
1990). 
2.3.2 Changing Direction in the 1980s 
 
By 1981, the CAF’s finances were in a precarious state, with only US$15 million in loans 
committed that year. From this low point, the CAF began reorienting its strategy and 
rebuilding itself as a viable financial intermediary. Leaving behind an operational model 
that paid scant attention to its own bottom line, and hamstrung by a mandate to promote a 
sub-regional integration process that was at best stagnating, the CAF began the painful 
process of reinventing itself as an MDB much closer to the model of the IADB and 
World Bank. In the 1981 inaugural speech of President José Corsino Cárdenas, he called 
for the CAF to “adjust its institutional structure and launch new initiatives such that it can 
convert itself into…a true financial agent for its shareholders and an organization that 
does more than just survive” (CAF, 1981, p. 13, author’s translation).  
 
This meant, first and foremost, revamping the CAF’s operational activities to boost its 
attractiveness as a potential lender. The board approved a new Operations Policy in 1983, 
“broadening the realm of activities for the promotion, development and financing of 
projects, incorporating sectors such as physical integration [i.e., transport infrastructure], 
agricultural development, industrial rationalization, developing capital goods industries 
and conservation of natural resources…” (CAF AR, 1983, p. 7, author’s translation). The 
aim was to “overcome the limitations of the existing operations policy, designed basically 
for industrial programming and free trade within the Andean Group” and now “attend 
more directly the sectors that most contributed to the economic development of the 
countries such as agriculture, agroindustry, physical integration, and other areas 
previously not addressed by the CAF” (CAF, 1986, author’s translation). 
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Other shifts in lending policy were apparent beginning in the early 1980s. By 1982 the 
CAF had finally signed a cooperation agreement with the IADB (CAF AR, 1982), which 
allowed the CAF to co-finance several operations in the 1980s, providing a degree of 
security for the CAF to lend larger amounts for projects vetted and overseen by the 
IADB. As well, CAF loans increasingly went directly to governments or government-run 
companies and development banks, rather than the private sector—similar to the trend in 
IADB lending in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This provided a higher degree of 
security to the CAF in troubled economic times and allowed for larger loan amounts, and 
would have been welcome to borrowing governments in the extremely difficult panorama 
of the early 1980s.  
 
As a result, CAF lending stabilized and began growing again in the 1980s—an 
impressive feat considering the dire economic situation in Latin America at the time. 
Project loan commitments rose each year (apart from a brief downturn in 1989), climbing 
from US$40 million in 1982 to US$263 million in 1990 (CAF AR, 1980-1990). Perhaps 
as importantly, the CAF evidently began selecting projects much more carefully, as 
indicated by the reduction in cancelled projects from 43% of total value during 1971-
1980 to 10.6% in 1982-1986 (CAF, 1986). The overall financial stability of the institution 
was on a much more solid foundation, with net income up from US$1.8 million in 1980 
to US$15.2 million in 1986 and US$35 million in 1990 (Figure 2.6).  
 
The evolution of reserves is even more telling about the changing mindset of the CAF 
over the course of the decade. Reserves were actually in negative territory for much of 
the 1970s, after being used to cover operating losses in 1976 and 1978, and totaled a mere 
US$300,000 in 1980. The incoming administration in 1981 clearly understood the 
implications of reserve policy and began systematically building reserves each year. By 
1986, reserves totaled US$22 million, climbing to about US$100 million in 1990 (CAF 
AR, 1970-1990). Equally noteworthy is the fact that the administration convinced 
shareholders to allow the CAF to keep unallocated net income on its books as it began to 
accumulate in the 1980s, rather than redistributing it to shareholders as permitted by 
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Article 42 of its founding agreement. By 1990, accumulated and unallocated net income 
totaled US$28 million—useful to generate extra financial income from investments, 
provide a liquidity cushion and offer additional confidence to potential investors (Figure 
2.7).  
 
Figure 2.6. CAF Net Income (millions current US$) 
 
Source: CAF annual reports, 1974-1993. 
 
Figure 2.7. CAF Reserves + Retained Earnings (millions current US$) 
 
Source: CAF annual reports, 1974-1993 
Another critical action was for shareholders to double their paid-in capital, from US$100 
million to US$200 million, and to subscribe another US$200 million in callable capital. 
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This not only directly gave the CAF more financial resources, but also signaled to 
potential private and public sources of financing of the commitment of member countries 
to back the CAF. The new subscription was approved in 1983 (CAF AR, 1983), and 
authorized capital was increased again to US$1 billion in 1986 (CAF AR, 1986), US$200 
million of which was for “C” shares, with the explicit purpose of attracting 
shareholders—and hence more capital—from outside the sub-region: “…it is important to 
highlight the qualitative change that the presence of extra-regional partners would 
signify, as it will permit the institution to access capital markets utilizing the guarantee 
capital that the new partners would provide” (CAF, 1986). While the C shares had 
subordinated voting power, this move nonetheless reflected the CAF’s willingness to 
adapt its original model of a purely sub-regional organization to remain financially 
viable.   
2.3.3 Coming Into Its Own 
 
As was the case with the IADB in the 1960s and early 1970s, it was increasingly apparent 
to the CAF that official, bilateral sources of soft loans would be limited and fickle, and 
the more easily available credit lines tied to exports of developed countries severely 
restricted the CAF’s ability to fund different types of projects. The answer would be 
private capital markets, as President Galo Montano stated in a 1989 speech: “Our interest 
in freeing ourselves from the dependence on the type of resources that we currently 
channel has led us to study ways of raising resources on the international market” (CAF, 
1989, p. 10, author’s translation). The overhaul of operations and finances to stabilize the 
CAF and project a more conservative, financially reliable image positioned the CAF well 
when international capital flows to developing countries began to pick up again in the 
1990s.  
 
One point in the CAF’s favor from the point of view of potential creditors was the fact 
that no sovereign borrower had ever defaulted on a loan, even though four of the CAF’s 
five member governments were in default to international markets at some point.  Even 
when Peru suspended paying international debt and fell into arrears with the World Bank, 
IMF and the IADB in the mid-1980s, it continued servicing all obligations to the CAF. 
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This track record was due to two related reasons. First, and most obviously, the CAF was 
created and completely controlled by the very countries that it lent to. Second, the bulk of 
the CAF’s capital came from member governments themselves or their domestic markets. 
Hence governments would have had a very strong interest in ensuring that the CAF was 
repaid in a timely manner.  
 
Indications that others outside the region were beginning to take notice of the CAF’s 
unsurpassed repayment track record and the reforms to its operations came in 1989, with 
the first placement of a private bond (albeit only for US$2.5 million) with First Interstate 
Bank, followed the next year by a three-year, US$15 million bond placed privately in 
Japan at Libor +1% (CAF AR 1989 and 1990). This was a critical sign of confidence of 
the private markets in the CAF’s financial probity. In 1990 the CAF also received US$30 
million in untied credit lines from German and Dutch banks, and further untied loans 
from First Interstate for US$8 million (CAF AR 1990). In that same year, Mexico 
became the first member from outside the Andes to join the CAF, via the purchase of a 
portion of C shares, and the CAF authorized commercial banks from the region to sign up 
for a portion of B shares.27 In further recognition of the growing perception of 
shareholders about the CAF’s usefulness and reliability, authorized capital was increased 
by US$1 billion in 1990, to a total of US$2.05 billion (CAF AR 1990). 
  
The quantum leap in the CAF’s performance came with the arrival of Luis Enrique 
García as president in 1991. An IADB staffer for 17 years—including a stint as IADB 
treasury sub-director—García completed the transition of the CAF’s business model to 
one much closer to the IADB. He was clear about his goal right from the start, as he 
described in a later interview: “When I joined the CAF, particularly because of my 
experience with the IDB, I saw the future of the CAF as an institution relying essentially 
on CAF’s ability in the future to tap the international capital market. Because if it was 
only relying on the old capital or short term lines of credit or even loans from the IDB, 
the institution really had no chance to grow. So the challenge was to get to the capital 
markets.” (Latin Finance, 1998, p. 147). Thus, while the CAF was being pushed by the 
                                                
27 Three banks signed up the first year, and eventually a total of 23 banks joined the CAF (14 as of 2010).  
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realities of its organizational model and finances in the direction of the other two MDBs, 
García had the experience and clarity of vision to see that process through in a decided 
fashion. 
 
But for the CAF to raise significant resources on the markets at a price that permitted the 
CAF to on-lend at reasonable rates, “it was a must to have an investment grade rating,” 
García noted in the same interview (Ibid.). Immediately after taking charge in 1991, 
García traveled to New York to obtain a rating from Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. 
This was an ambitious request, considering that not a single borrower in Latin America 
had investment grade, and that four of the five government shareholders of the CAF were 
among the most notorious debt trouble spots in the world during the 1980s. The CAF also 
hired consultants from Coopers and Lybrand and a former World Bank vice president to 
review the CAF’s operations and make recommendations for overhauling internal 
process, and revised operational and financial policies “with the aim of broadening its 
sources of financing and adjusting to the new global dynamics” (CAF AR, 1992, p. 57, 
author’s translation).  
 
Doubling authorized capital in 1990 also helped in this goal, as did the expansion of 
membership beyond the Andean Community. Mexico joined in 1990, Chile returned in 
1992 and Trinidad and Tobago joined membership in 1993, although from the start 
García expressed his intention to bring in more developed countries as members: “I think 
a first step is to increase the number of C series shareholders. Not only the incorporation 
of other regional countries, but to fix as a goal the incorporation of industrialized 
countries. This will significantly facilitate the access of the CAF to international markets” 
(CAF, 1991, p. 17-18, author’s translation).  
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Figure 2.8. CAF Project Lending Commitments (millions current US$) 
 
Source: CAF annual reports 1989-1994.  
 
Standard & Poor’s issued the CAF an investment grade rating in 1993, soon followed by 
Moody’s and IBCA (CAF AR, 1993). During the same year, the CAF issued three public 
bonds for a total of US$289 million, US$200 million on the Eurobond market and US$89 
million Japanese “samurai” bonds (Ibid.). In one year the CAF raised more freely usable 
resources from outside the sub-region than it had in its entire previous two decades 
combined. Project lending commitments increased by more than a factor of 10 in the five 
years between 1989 ($103 million) and 1994 ($1.4 billion)—a truly remarkable growth 
rate (Figure 2.8). The benefits of the CAF’s reorientation toward the private markets were 
thus immediately made clear to all involved. 
2.3.4 Summarizing Findings 
 
Like the IADB, the CAF was founded explicitly to address the limitations of existing 
MDBs, by extending credit to private industry under a regional integration framework 
and avoiding the US’s increasing heavy-handed influence in the IADB. While the CAF’s 
borrower-only membership freed it of the political influence of wealthy countries, it also 
imposed serious limitations on raising resources. International capital markets showed no 
interest whatsoever in investing in the CAF, and bilateral/multilateral sources were also 
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wary, seeing little upside to supporting an MDB over which they would have no 
influence. Hence the CAF was forced to rely on resources raised from within member 
countries, which was of limited value to balance of payments-challenged Andean nations. 
As with IADB, the CAF found it could only access trade financing, and then only in 
limited quantities.  
 
The CAF’s first real efforts to reorient operational policy toward a more viable model in 
the early 1980s coincided with the advent of the debt crisis in Latin America, hitting its 
ability to both borrow and lend. Nonetheless the reforms of the 1980s did slowly turn the 
organization around, as it began to build a new image of financial probity that would 
open up access to new financing. Shareholders agreed to significantly broaden lending 
policy, dispensing with the obligation to seek projects related to integration. A concerted 
effort to build net income, which management was able to retain as reserves and 
accumulated income, provided a critical financial cushion to reassure would-be investors. 
Another key characteristic that would catch the eye of investors was the CAF’s perfect 
repayment record—a direct result of the fact that it was entirely controlled by the very 
same countries it lent to.  
 
The hard work of the 1980s combined with the arrival of President García in 1991 paid 
off in early 1990s, leading the ratings agencies in 1993 to grant the CAF investment 
grade status, a better ranking than any of its member countries. By then, the CAF had—
like the IADB in the 1970s—opened its membership to countries from outside its original 
region, with the specific intention of increasing access to resources and improving its 
financial stability but while still maintaining final authority among its founding members 
due to the share structure. The investment grade rating and support of new members 
directly led to the tremendous growth of CAF borrowing and lending that began in the 
early 1990s and has continued to the present. Crucially for the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis, however, the CAF—unlike the IADB—made the decision not to seek out 
industrialized non-borrower countries, which would have eased its market access but at 
the cost of diluting the political control of borrowers. 
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By 1994, the CAF’s initial parochial vision had given way to a much more open 
operational style designed to access private markets around the world and to provide 
whatever financial services its clientele required. Its original vision was simply 
unworkable, both in the projects it sought to lend to and in its strategy to raise resources. 
Rather than go out of business, the CAF undertook the reforms it needed to survive and 
thrive, moving it much closer to the financial model of the World Bank and IADB. 
Within this broader convergence due to financial pressures, though, the CAF’s unique 
membership structure permitted greater divergence than between the World Bank and 
IADB. Because it was created only by borrowing countries, the CAF’s limitations in 
accessing capital markets were to a degree offset—after the reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s—by greater flexibility and agility in lending procedures as well as the 100% 
repayment record that came with being a more egalitarian and cooperative MDB. 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
The experiences of the World Bank, IADB and CAF over the course of their creation and 
early years of operations sketched out in this chapter provide compelling evidence that 
political, economic and financial pressures combined to generate a sort of “ideal” 
financial-operational model for multilateral development banks, to which each of the 
three MDBs eventually conformed despite the original intentions of their creators. The 
reality that governments would not be willing to supply large amounts of budgetary 
resources for the MDBs to intermediate pushed all three to rely increasingly on private 
capital markets to raise resources. The perceptions and exigencies of bond buyers, in turn, 
pushed the MDBs to modify their operational procedures and even basic shareholding 
structure with the specific aim of securing a reliable source of funding. 
 
Of the three, the World Bank moved most quickly and decisively to incorporate market-
based criteria into its operations. This was due in part to the lack of any other options 
when it began operations, in light of the unwillingness of any shareholder except the U.S. 
to allow their capital contribution to be used, as well as the pressing need for resources in 
post-war Europe. By the time the Marshall Plan eased the pressure to lend, the Wall 
Street ethos was firmly in control, offering loans only to the most creditworthy borrowers 
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for projects expected to generate cash returns in the short term. It was not until the late 
1950s, flush with cash and facing growing complaints to lend more, that this 
organizational culture was diluted to a degree with the creation of IDA. Even this step 
back toward the development style intended for the World Bank by its New Deal 
founders was limited, and concerns of financial rectitude remained a high priority.  
 
The early trajectory of the IADB shows clearly that an MDB does not in theory require 
such strong subservience to the whims of potential bondholders, as long as it enjoys 
strong financial backing from one or more governments. Generous U.S. contributions of 
concessional resources allowed the IADB to take a different approach to development 
lending, one the emphasized lending much more in alignment with the priorities of 
borrowing countries, and with a less heavy-handed approach to issues like a country’s 
macroeconomic policy. Once this U.S. support waned in the late 1960s, the IADB 
radically reoriented its operations and very structure to ensure the resources it needed to 
continue serving as a lender and to keep U.S. policy pressure at arm’s length. By 
switching the types of projects it supported to a profile much closer to the World Bank, 
and also opening up its membership to countries from Europe and Japan, the IADB 
secured a dramatic increase in available financing, at the cost of its original vision for the 
kind of MDB it would be.  
 
The CAF’s evolution demonstrates the same point, but from a different angle. Its 
founders intended to differentiate their operations also, but apparently thought they could 
do so without any wealthy country backing it. The CAF eventually realized, however, 
that while having only borrowing countries as shareholders offered a notable degree of 
operational flexibility, finding financing to intermediate from outside its members was 
another question altogether. Thus by the 1980s it, too, had turned its focus to what it 
needed to do to gain access to greater external sources of finance. This meant reshaping 
policies on lending, rigorously building up net income and reserves (at the expense of 
offering less expensive loans to borrowers in the short term), and beginning the process 
of opening membership to other countries. As with the IADB, the original vision of an 
inward-looking sub-regional bank with limited membership concentrating on specific 
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types of projects was left by the wayside when that model proved ineffective, although in 
the case of the CAF this did not mean giving up control of the organization by borrower 
countries.  
 
Different combinations of shareholders can and does shape the trajectory an MDB might 
take, from its initial creation—thus providing evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. Each 
of the three MDBs analyzed here were created with different specific purposes in mind 
that obeyed the interests of their shareholders, and as such they initially developed 
differing operating styles and policies. However, that same combination of shareholders 
and their evolving interests also placed important restrictions on the ability of each MDB 
to secure the resources it needed to operate. The experiences of the World Bank, IADB 
and CAF outlined here suggest that whatever the composition of their shareholders, only 
with major financial support from a wealthy nation or nations is there a possibility of 
establishing a different kind of MDB from the ones we see today. In the absence of that 
support, MDBs of necessity must access private financial markets to raise the resources 
they need to effectively operate. This is in fact one of the great strengths of the MDB 
model: it is to a large degree self-financing, requiring very little direct fiscal contributions 
from member countries. The flip side, however, is that it also requires MDBs to keep a 
very close eye on the whims of private capital markets when shaping their operational 
and financial policies—compelling evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. At the same 
time, these organizations are guided by the mission of promoting “development”—a 
fundamentally political mission. Needless to say, these two sets of priorities do not 
always sit easily with one another, and the experiences outlined in this chapter suggest 
that financial considerations usually have the last word.  
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3 LENDING TRENDS BY MULTILATERAL 
DEVELOPMENT BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA, 
1991-2010 
 
The main goal of this thesis is to analyze how different compositions of shareholder 
power in a multilateral development bank (MDB) can influence its organizational 
characteristics, which in turn can shape demand for loans on the part of borrower 
countries. The intuition is that demand-side considerations are increasingly relevant in a 
global context characterized by growing economic strength of many developing countries 
once highly dependent on MDBs. Many developing country economies such as China, 
India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru now have stronger fiscal accounts, low public 
debt levels, high international reserves and well-established access to international capital 
markets. One would imagine that demand considerations—rather than supply-side issues 
that have heretofore dominated the academic literature on MDB activities—are much 
more important for countries like these than in past years. 
 
This chapter utilizes the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1, suggesting that 
differences in lending commitments demanded by MDBs borrowers may be partly 
explained by the balance of power between borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders 
(Hypotheses 1 and 2). This governance structure influences the terms of the loans—i.e., 
financial cost and required bureaucratic procedures. Depending on economic conditions, 
borrowing countries will put different weights on these factors. Lending commitments—
the dependent variable of interest in the analysis—is hypothesized to vary systematically 
as a function of both: prevailing economic conditions among borrowers and the type of 
shareholding arrangement in each MDB (and hence its operational characteristics).  
 
The World Bank, IADB and CAF each represent a different breakdown between 
borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders. The World Bank is controlled by wealthy 
non-borrowing countries (63.1% of voting shares controlled by non-borrowers in 2010), 
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the IADB has more influence by borrowing countries but is still ultimately under the final 
control of non-borrowers (50.02% of votes controlled by borrowers, but the U.S. with 
veto power over capital increases, membership and changes to the Articles of 
Agreement), and the CAF is controlled by the same countries that borrow from it (97.1% 
voting shares controlled by borrower countries). 
 
The chapter is examines lending commitments by each of the three MDBs for a common 
set of borrowing countries in Latin America during the period 1991 to 2010, using a 
multivariate, large-N analysis in a panel framework with observations across the different 
borrowers and over time. Based on seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE), 
the coefficient estimates of the different MDB regressions are compared to test the 
hypotheses on systematic differences between the three cases. 28  
 
The comparison of only three cases cannot prove a causal relationship between MDB 
governance structures, borrower preferences and lending, nor can it fully disentangle 
supply from demand side factors. However, it can test whether the lending patterns 
observed are consistent with what the theoretical discussion leads one to expect. The aim 
is to demonstrate that a demand-oriented interpretation of MDB lending is at least as 
plausible as the supply-side analysis prevalent in the current literature. The causal link 
between shareholder arrangements and a number of key MDB characteristics, as well as 
the link between these characteristics and borrower demand, will then be examined in the 
subsequent three chapters.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the empirical puzzle, while 
Section 3.2 discusses the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3 provides the econometric 
analysis of lending commitments by the World Bank, IADB and CAF in five Latin 
American countries, and Section 3.4 concludes.  
 
                                                
28 The theoretical design, case choice and data gathering in this chapter were done entirely by the thesis 
author, while the multivariate regression design was led by Dr. Katharina Michaelowa of the University of 
Zurich. Interpretation of the statistical results was done by both the author and Dr. Michaelowa.  
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3.1 Empirical Puzzle 
 
Before moving on to analyze what might be driving variation in lending patterns by 
different MDBs over time, it is useful to first consider whether this is something worth 
explaining at all. It could be that lending remains relatively constant or that it moves in 
ways that are predictable and easily explained. As can be seen in the figure below, this is 
clearly not the case, at least for lending by the three MDBs discussed here in five Latin 
American countries. Annual lending commitments fluctuate widely year by year for each 
of the MDBs.  
 
Figure 3.1. Annual Lending Commitments by World Bank, IADB and CAF to Five 
Andean Countries, 1990-2010 
 
Source: Annual Reports of World Bank, IADB and CAF, 1980-2009.  
Note: Five countries are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
 
How is one to explain these patterns? Why do the lending commitments of all three 
MDBs fluctuate so markedly? Why since the early 1990s has the regional IADB lent 
consistently more than the global World Bank? Why has lending by the relatively little-
known CAF grown so dramatically, to the point where it lent more than either the World 
Bank or IADB in the last decade? As discussed in more detail in the introductory chapter, 
existing academic research seeking explanations for MDB lending trends have focused 
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almost entirely on the supply side of the equation. That is, studies have almost entirely 
considered the question from the point of view of why the MDB may or may not offer a 
loan, with explanations ranging from realist considerations of power politics and donor 
interest (Harrigan et al., 2006; Dreher et al., 2009a, 2009b and 2010; Babb, 2009; and 
Kilby, 2006 and 2011, among many others), a rationalist focus on incentives among main 
actors in MDB activities (Mosley et al., 1995; Gutner, 2005; Vaubel, 2006), or more 
sociology-based constructivist interpretations of norms and staff self-image (Barnett and 
Finnemore, 1999 and 2004; Babb, 2003; Woods, 2006; and Weaver, 2008). 
 
In light of the spectacular growth of many large developing countries in recent years as 
well as the explosion of international capital flows, explanations of MDB lending that 
ignore demand seems unlikely to be realistic now. Countries that have been major 
borrowers from MDBs in the past have in recent years found themselves in much 
stronger fiscal positions and also with a great many options for sovereign borrowing, 
often at very low interest rates and in domestic currencies. MDBs still offer these 
countries resources generally at better financial terms than they can get from the markets, 
but the loans also come with a variety of strings attached that these countries may object 
to. Hence, a more realistic and complete picture of how MDBs function in the current 
global economic context requires understanding the role played by borrower demand. 
This chapter builds a series of hypotheses based on this perception, and attempts to test 
them with statistical methods.  
3.2 Hypotheses 
 
This section summarizes the link between shareholder composition and the characteristics 
of MDB loans of interest to borrowers, and uses it to build testable hypotheses. The over-
riding premise is that factors associated with MDB loans combine to form a total “price” 
faced by borrowers for MDB loans, which includes both financial costs as well as 
bureaucratic hassles. The assumption driving the hypotheses is that borrowers prefer this 
“price” to be as low as possible. Based on the link between shareholder power and these 
operational characteristics—which will be explored in more detail in subsequent 
chapters—the hypotheses are formulated. 
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Because the World Bank is dominated by non-borrowing industrialized countries, it can 
access capital markets at highly favorable terms for its bonds, and hence has a steady 
stream of lendable capital at terms well below what many borrowing countries normally 
get on private markets. At the same time, non-borrowing countries impose more onerous 
project oversight requirements as well as multiple layers of bureaucracy and slow loan 
approval time. These non-financial aspects to World Bank loans are, on the whole, 
unappealing to borrowing countries, and can outweigh the low financial cost, notably 
when countries’ alternatives for sovereign financing increase and when their borrowing 
needs decrease. For Latin American countries that, on average, tended to have increasing 
access to alternative sources of finance from 1990 onwards, this should lead to a long-
term trend away from World Bank lending. Over and above that long-term trend, during 
years when a country is doing relatively better they would be even more inclined to move 
away from the World Bank. The opposite should be true during years when they are in a 
relatively more constrained situation. When a crisis becomes global, tight international 
capital markets and reduced country access to private financing should further strengthen 
the attractiveness of the World Bank due to its unparalleled access to capital markets and 
the “flight to quality” of bond buyers, which translate into low funding costs and, hence, 
loan prices. 
 
The borrower-dominated CAF, by contrast, has weaker and more expensive access to 
capital markets. Hence the financial terms of its loans are less attractive than the World 
Bank’s, especially in a time of economic turbulence. On the other hand, because it is 
controlled by the very nations it lends to, the CAF has no incentive to impose the 
safeguards that many borrowers object to in World Bank operations, nor any reason to 
build up the bureaucratic layers of checks and balances that slow down loan approval. 
This limited bureaucracy is attractive to borrowing countries, although the higher cost of 
loans is a drawback. Typically, the stronger the macroeconomic situation in a country, the 
more important a country will consider the former as compared to the latter. As a result, 
one can expect that the long-term trend of lending by Latin American countries will move 
towards the CAF as opposed to the World Bank. Over and above the long-term trend, 
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countries will react year-to-year relatively more in favor of the CAF in better economic 
situations, and relatively less so in worse situations. In times of crisis, however, CAF 
borrowing costs on private markets are likely to rise considerably due to its own higher 
cost of funding, thus reducing the attractiveness of CAF loans. Moreover, in times of 
crisis, the needs of individual countries may surpass the loan amounts the CAF can 
provide.  
 
The IADB occupies an intermediate position between the World Bank and the CAF in 
terms of shareholding structure, with borrowers controlling a slim majority of voting 
power on individual loan approvals, but with industrialized nations led by the US able to 
veto any changes to IADB policies and organizational structure. As a result the IADB 
enjoys some of the same advantages as the World Bank in terms of access to capital 
markets and low cost, and also some of the disadvantages such as more bureaucratic loan 
approval procedures and safeguard policies demanded by non-borrowers. However, the 
greater power of borrowing shareholders as well as the fact that most IADB staff is from 
the region’s political and economic elite, loan preparation and negotiation is smoother 
and bureaucratic requirements less rigid. Hence, over the long term, the IADB is 
expected to see lending rise more (or decrease less) than the World Bank. However, it 
should not rise as much as for the CAF. Similarly, IADB lending is expected to react in 
between the other two MDBs during short-term yearly fluctuations of a country’s 
economic and financial circumstances. During crisis years, IADB lending should increase 
more than CAF lending, but less than World Bank lending.  
  
The above discussion can be summarized with the following testable hypotheses: 
1. Under conditions of generally positive fiscal and developmental 
trends in their borrowing countries, as a long-term trend the World 
Bank (non-borrower dominant MDB) will experience a decline in 
lending, the CAF (borrower dominant MDB) will experience an 
increasing trend, and the IADB (more balanced between borrowers 
and non-borrowers) will find itself in between.  
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2. Around this longer-term trend, countries will gravitate toward 
World Bank lending and to a lesser degree the IADB, and away 
from the CAF, as their circumstances worsen in the short term, and 
vice versa when short-term conditions improve. 
3. In times of global crisis, the World Bank and, to a lesser degree the 
IADB, will show an increase in lending, while CAF lending will 
increase less or even decrease.  
 
The theoretical framework introduced here suggests that the demand-side factors outlined 
above can help explain lending patterns by different MDBs. It is obvious that overall 
lending patterns will be influenced by both demand and supply. Factors that have 
frequently been identified as determinants of supply in the existing literature (such as 
level of development, the interest of industrialized country shareholders and MDB staff 
preferences) will therefore be controlled for in the econometric analysis. However, even 
these variables can also be interpreted from a demand-side perspective. This issue is 
discussed in more detail in Section 3.3. 
3.3 Regression Estimation Methodology and Results 
 
To test the above hypotheses, the overall trends of lending by the three different 
development banks and the reaction of their lending to different economic and capital 
market conditions need to be compared, controlling for possibly interfering variables. The 
dependent variable is lending commitments by each of the three MDBs to the five 
countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela for the period 1991-2010.29  
 
To test the first hypothesis on the correlation between MDB lending and the long-term 
economic development in the region (in all its different dimensions), a linear time trend 
(Year) is introduced. To assess the second hypothesis related to the specific influence of 
variance in individual economic variables over and above this general trend, measures of 
                                                
29 In the literature on international development assistance, disbursements are typically used in studies of 
aid effectiveness, whereas commitments are used to examine the motives of aid allocation or borrower 
demand. See Berthélemy 2006 and McGillivray and White 1993 for further discussions of the relative 
merits of commitments vs. disbursements. 
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GDP per capita, international reserves and investor rankings are utilized. GDP per capita 
and reserves are intended to proxy how badly a country might need external resources or 
not, and the investor index gives a sense for a country’s access to private capital markets 
to fill those needs (alternative supply). For the latter, the Institutional Investor index of 
sovereign risk is used, which is also employed by Ratha, 2005 and Knack et al., 2012 for 
similar purposes.30 A separate indicator variable for the global crises in 1997/98 and in 
2009 is included, with the aim of verifying the impact of global capital market tightening 
as described in the third hypothesis. 
 
Control variables include the inflation rate as a measure of economic governance, and the 
number of (relevant) votes along with the US in the UN General Assembly for political 
closeness to the largest shareholder in the World Bank and the IADB. In the existing 
literature, such variables reflecting the governments’ general political stance as well as 
their economic policies have frequently been shown to influence MDB lending (Thacker, 
1999, Burnside and Dollar, 2000, Dollar and Levin, 2004, Dreher et al., 2009a and 
2009b, and Kilby 2006, 2010 and 2011, among others). IMF lending is also included as 
an alternative source of funding,31 and the countries’ population as a simple scaling 
factor. All variables and data sources are described in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 An indicator tracking the interest rate faced by a government would be ideal here, but this would involve 
finding out the interest rate a government would have had to pay to borrow from private markets, for both 
bonds and bank loans. This counter-factual cannot be realistically constructed. 
31 In an experimental version of this model, bilateral lending was also included. However, it had no 
significance, nor did its inclusion affect the other variable results. As such it was left out of the final 
version.  
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Table 3.1. Variable Description and Sources 
Variable Name Description Source 
World Bank 
lending 
Annual World Bank sovereign lending 
commitments in each fiscal year, in millions 
of const. 2007 US$. In the single case of 
Bolivia, this variable includes a limited 
amount of IDA lending. No other country 
received IDA lending during the period 
under review.  
World Bank, 1990-
2010  
IADB lending Annual IADB sovereign lending 
commitments in each fiscal year, in millions 
of const. 2007 US$. Includes both non-
concessional (OC) and concessional (FSO) 
loans, although OC lending is much higher 
in all countries except Bolivia for the entire 
period.  
IADB, 1990-2010 
CAF lending Annual CAF sovereign lending 
commitments in each fiscal year, in millions 
of const. 2007 US$.  
CAF, 1990-2010; 
CAF 2009a for 
sovereign vs. non-
sovereign split in the 
early part of the 
period 
Year 1991, …, 2010 (linear trend)  
Investor ranking Ranking on the semi-annual Institutional 
Investor index of investor sentiment. 
Institutional Investor, 
1990-2010 
Reserves (% of 
ext. debt) 
Total international reserves (minus gold) as 
% of public and publicly guaranteed external 
debt service. 
World Bank, 2012a 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in 2007 international $, PPP World Bank, 2012b 
Global crisis  Dummy = 1 for the years 1998/99 (Asia, 
Russia and Brazil capital markets crises) and 
2009 (global financial crisis)  
 
UN voting with 
US 
Number of votes in the UN General 
Assembly designated as important by the US 
State Department in support of the US 
position, plus ½ the number of abstentions, 
divided by the total number of votes in the 
UN General Assembly designated as 
important by the US State Department. This 
follows the methodology of Thacker, 1999.  
Database of votes 
provided by Dreher 
for 1983-2008, as 
used in the papers by 
Dreher et al. 2009a 
and 2009b; US State 
Department 2012 for 
2009 and 2010 data  
Inflation (%) Inflation in annual % (national consumer 
price index) 
World Bank, 2012b 
IMF lending 
(mio) 
IMF disbursements in calendar year, 2007 
US$ 
World Bank, 2012a 
Population (mio) Absolute numbers World Bank, 2012b 
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It must be acknowledged at the outset that the variables included in our empirical model 
can a priori reflect supply and demand side considerations. In fact, previous studies 
advancing only supply side arguments face exactly the same dilemma, but this tends to be 
overlooked and is usually not even mentioned. To address the issue explicitly, both 
perspectives are presented in Table 3.2, with the coefficient signs that each interpretation 
would predict. For all relevant explanatory variables, the sign of the estimated coefficient 
indicates whether the demand or supply perspective is more plausible. 32  
 
For example, the hypotheses predict a negative correlation between reserves and World 
Bank lending in a given year, due to the country demanding less World Bank loans. 
However, from a supply side perspective, the World Bank could be expected to increase 
the loan offer because the country is a more attractive low-risk borrower. For poor 
African countries, an alternative, need-driven supply argument may be plausible, but 
none of the interviews undertaken for this thesis and other existing information from 
within the MDBs suggests that this would be the case for the middle-income countries 
and years in the sample. Since the early 1990s, the World Bank has produced numerous 
strategy reports and undertaken various procedural reforms specifically for the purpose of 
maintaining lending relationships with wealthier middle-income countries, which the 
World Bank fears no longer want to work with them. This includes the middle-income 
country assessments and strategies (World Bank, 2001a, 2004a and 2007a), studies on the 
costs of safeguard policies (World Bank, 2001b and 2010a), the country systems pilot 
(World Bank, 2005a), investment lending reform (World Bank, 2009a) and the recent 
Program for Results instrument (World Bank, 2011a). The drive to continue lending to 
wealthier borrowers—in part to protect the quality of the loan portfolio—is also noted by 
Knack et al. (2012, p. 171).  
 
 
                                                
32 An ideal variable to better disentangle supply from demand effects would be the amount each MDB 
would have been willing to lend to each country for each year—while this information does exist, it is 
unfortunately not publicly available. 
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Table 3.2. Variables and Expected Impact: Demand vs. Supply 
Variable Demand-side interpretation Supply-side interpretation 
Year (linear trend  
capturing general  
economic development) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries become economically and 
financially more self-reliant and have 
less need for funding from development 
banks. Because of the differences in 
bureaucratic hassle factor (World Bank 
most, CAF least, IADB between), the 
World Bank should be clearly on a 
negative trend (–), the CAF positive 
(+); IADB in between (+/–). 
Countries become safer borrowers. This increases 
the willingness to lend for all banks, or at the least 
maintains steady trends due to need to generate 
loan income based on MDB financial model.  
 Expected coefficient: + or flat 
[An alternative interpretation that would predict the 
opposite sign suggests that MDBs may prefer to 
supply to economically needy countries. However, 
substantial evidence from documents and 
interviews clearly contradicts this view (see also 
Knack et al. 2012, p. 171), particularly in middle-
income countries such as those in the sample] 
Investor ranking 
(financial situation as 
perceived by investors) 
As above.  As above.  
Reserves (% ext. debt) 
(debt sustainability) 
As above.  As above.  
GDP per capita 
(economic situation) 
As above.  As above.  
Global crisis (global 
financial downturn) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries have greater demand for 
MDB loans due to tight international 
capital markets. 
However, CAF lending becomes more 
expensive as compared to IADB and 
World Bank lending because of a 
greater difference in funding costs in a 
crisis. Thus, World Bank and IADB 
lending should go up (+), CAF 
lending should go up less or decrease 
(+/–). 
Banks attempt to stabilize the financial situation. 
However, since the crises are global, the World 
Bank as a global bank may have other priorities 
than lending to Latin America. In this case the 
coefficient for the World Bank might not be clear 
(+/–). CAF also unclear (+/-) because it may face 
restrictions in access to capital markets because of 
its lower rating, and hence may be forced to restrict 
loan supply; IADB lending should increase (+) as 
it has a regional role to fulfill and should not be 
restricted by capital markets due to AAA rating. 
UN voting with US 
(political closeness to 
US) 
 
 
Banks are more attractive lenders for 
countries that share their main policy 
orientation. Expected coefficient for 
World Bank (+), for CAF (–) and for 
IADB in between (+/–).  
Borrowers are more attractive for banks that share 
their main policy orientation. Expected coefficient 
for World Bank (+), for CAF (–) and for IADB 
in between (+/–).  
Inflation (%) 
(bad economic 
governance from World 
Bank perspective) 
 
 
 
 
 
Governments with high inflation rates 
will avoid the World Bank, which 
would interfere with their economic 
policy choices. The same might be true 
for the IADB, but is certainly not true 
for the CAF. Expected coefficient for 
World Bank (–), while for CAF 
lending should not be affected (+/–). 
IADB in between (+/-). 
World Bank will lend less to governments with 
high inflation rates, which indicate non-orthodox 
economic policies. The same might be true for the 
IADB, but is certainly not true for the CAF. 
Expected coefficient for World Bank (–), while 
for CAF lending should not be affected (+/–). 
IADB in between (+/-).  
IMF lending 
 
 
 
IMF lending could reflect situations of 
greater need, but also the existence of 
alternative funding to satisfy given 
needs. Expected effect unclear. 
IMF lending could reflect situations of greater 
need, but also the existence of alternative funding 
to satisfy given needs. Expected effect unclear.  
Population 
 
 
 
 
Higher number of inhabitants increases 
the demand for funding. Expected 
effect (+) 
 
Higher number of inhabitants increases the supply 
of funding as a response to need, but also because 
large countries are typically politically important. 
Expected effect (+) 
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The design of the model—looking at the comparisons between the impact of relevant 
explanatory variables the lending of three different MDBs (rather than just one)—further 
helps bring out these demand effects more clearly. 
 
While the coefficients for economic variables will give more or less plausibility to either 
the demand or the supply side arguments, the situation is more difficult to interpret for 
policy variables. A country that is politically opposed to the US may either prefer to 
borrow from the CAF, or otherwise, the World Bank and the IADB may be more 
reluctant to lend. For example, Ecuador has not borrowed from the World Bank since 
2009. Many existing studies would interpret a correlation between Ecuador’s U.N. voting 
against the U.S. and no lending as a sign of U.S. influence at the World Bank. However, 
interviews with Ecuadoran government officials and World Bank staff in the Ecuador 
office (discussed in Chapter 6) make it clear that in fact the World Bank would like to re-
start lending, but the country prefers not to take out loans for its own political reasons. 
Since the distinction is impossible to ascertain in a statistical framework, we use these 
variables only as controls.  
 
Conceptually, the argumentation is based on the idea that for any Latin American 
country, borrowing from the World Bank, the CAF and/or the IADB must be considered 
as joint decisions, because these banks operate in a common market. This has 
consequences for the choice of regression model. If lending by different MDBs is not 
determined independently from each other, this information can be taken into account to 
obtain more efficient regression estimates. Therefore this chapter uses seemingly 
unrelated regression estimation (SURE) that allows error terms to be correlated across 
equations. In addition, SURE is convenient to compare the three individual MDB cases, 
which is necessary to examine the role of the three governance types. This is 
accomplished by testing the differences in the coefficients for the different MDB 
regressions using (one-sided) Wald tests.  
 
The first three columns in Table 3.3 show the SURE regressions using (1) World Bank 
lending, (2) IADB lending, and (3) CAF lending as the dependent variables. The 
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remaining three columns show the differences in the coefficients for the different banks 
and the significance of these differences according to the Wald tests.  
 
The first line, for the linear trend, provides partial support for the hypothesis related to 
long-term trends in lending choices. On average over the 20-year period and the five 
countries considered, and at given levels of the other variables, World Bank lending has 
declined by 11 million USD per year, IADB lending has declined by 21 million, and CAF 
lending has increased by 20 million. These effects are statistically significant for IADB 
and CAF. The coefficient for IADB was hypothesized to be greater (more positive) than 
for World Bank, and that the CAF’s should be greater than for both other banks. The 
difference in the coefficients for World Bank and IADB indicates a stronger (here: less 
negative) time trend for World Bank, but this unexpected result is non-significant 
(column 4). Conversely, and as expected, the CAF shows a significantly more positive 
time trend than either the World Bank (column 5) or the IADB (column 6). 
 
These results indicate that over time, along with the overall growth and stabilization of 
Latin American economies, CAF lending increased steadily, while World Bank lending 
declined. The even stronger negative trend observed for the IADB was unexpected both 
theoretically and based on the graphical illustration in Figure 3.1, which suggests a 
similar trend between the two MDBs. This implies that the development represented in 
the graph is partially driven by some of the other variables. In any case, from Figure 3.1 it 
is evident that the absolute level of IADB lending remained above World Bank lending 
throughout the period, apart from three years. In fact by 1991 the IADB was already 
lending more in absolute terms than the World Bank, which could indicate that the 
dynamics behind the first hypothesis may have already played out before the time period 
analyzed here in relation to the IADB vis a vis the World Bank. Alternatively, it could be 
that the differences in loan approval procedures and safeguards between the World Bank 
and IADB are too marginal from the point of view of the borrower to make much of a 
difference between the two MDBs, compared to the far more borrower-friendly 
procedures at the CAF.    
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Table 3.3. Determinants of Lending and Differences Between MDBs, 1991-2010 
Coefficients for 
 
 
Method: SURE 
(1)  
World Bank 
lending 
(mio USD) 
(2)  
IADB lending 
(mio USD) 
(3)  
CAF lending  
(mio USD) 
(2) - (1) 
Difference  
IADB-World 
Bank 
(3) - (1)  
Difference 
CAF-World 
Bank 
(3) - (2) 
Difference 
CAF-IADB 
Year -10.88 -21.13* 20.38** -10.25 31.26** 41.51*** 
 (0.19) (0.09) (0.05) (0.30) (0.02) (0.00) 
Investor ranking -19.87* -12.89** 7.62*** 6.98 27.49** 20.51*** 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.00) (0.32) (0.02) (0.00) 
Reserves (% ext. debt) 7.90* 1.00 -5.56** -6.90** -13.45** -6.56 
 (0.09) (0.81) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.15) 
GDP per capita 0.19* 0.18*** -0.04 -0.01 -0.23*** -0.22*** 
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.26) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) 
Global crisis -167.08** 113.83* -119.89*** 280.92*** 47.19 -233.72*** 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.25) (0.00) 
UN voting with US 
(share) 
672.17*** 
(0.01) 
-177.64 
(0.67) 
-44.91 
(0.87) 
-849.81* 
(0.05) 
-717.09** 
(0.04) 
132.72 
(0.37) 
Inflation (%) -0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.12*** 0.10*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
IMF lending (mio USD) 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.08*** 
 (0.50) (0.54) (0.55) (0.49) (0.25) (0.00) 
Population (mio) 57.72** 50.11*** 11.79 -7.62 -45.94** -38.32** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.26) (0.39) (0.03) (0.01) 
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. For differences, they are calculated testing one-sided hypotheses using Wald 
tests (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Country fixed effects are included but not shown. All right-hand-side variables 
except “Year” are lagged by one year. There are 100 observations (5 countries x 20 years) in each regression. R² 
(within) for each of the regressions individually is 25%(1), 15%(2) 45%(3). 
 
Over and above the general trend, the specific economic variables related to the second 
hypothesis show the expected results for the investor index. A one point increase on the 
investors’ ranking scale (0-100) leads to a 20 million USD decrease in World Bank and a 
13 million decrease in IADB lending. At the same time, it leads to an 8 million increase 
in CAF lending. As with the linear trend, the differences in coefficients between the CAF 
and the other two banks have the expected sign and are strongly significant. These 
outcomes are very difficult to reconcile with a supply-side perspective. They clearly 
indicate a preference for the CAF whenever a country is rated highly so that it has a 
generally better access to the capital market. While the difference between World Bank 
and IADB now also points in the expected direction (IADB taking up an intermediate 
position between World Bank and CAF), it is again non-significant (column 4). 
 
The other economic variables (GDP per capita and reserves) do not show the expected 
results. To some extent, this may be due to the multicollinearity between the different 
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variables.33 When taking out the time trend and the investors’ ranking, neither GDP per 
capita nor reserves are significant for the lending of any of the three banks. When only 
the investors’ ranking is entered, the positively significant reaction of CAF remains 
unchanged. This implies that access to the capital market matters most for the demand-
side arguments. The more traditional economic indicators fail to show the expected 
effect—at least as long as individual country fixed-effects (FE) are controlled for.34  
 
The effect of the global crises variable also shows some unexpected features. Ceteris 
paribus, the effect of a global crisis reduces rather than increases World Bank lending, by 
an average amount of 167 million USD. This can only be interpreted as a supply 
restriction, given that the World Bank as a global player faced simultaneous demands 
from all parts of the world during these situations. This was particularly true during the 
1998/99 crisis (see Figure 3.1), when the World Bank apparently focused more on 
lending to the hard-hit Asian economies. The IADB as a regional development bank 
shows the expected significant and positive coefficient, indicating that as a regional MDB 
it stepped in to fill the gap left by the World Bank’s supply restrictions. While the CAF is 
also a regional MDB, its own cost of funding would have spiked during the crisis (it is 
negatively impacted during capital market tightening, unlike the other two MDBs, as will 
be discussed in Chapter 4), explaining the negative coefficient. This is in line with the 
hypothesis that in times of economic crisis, countries shift their demand towards MDBs 
with lower lending cost. 
 
Coefficients for the political control variables correspond to the typical findings in the 
literature, which enhances confidence in the correct specification of the model overall. 
UN voting along with the US significantly increases the average loan volume extended 
by the World Bank (as found by Anderson, et al. 2005 and Dreher et al. 2009a) while it is 
insignificant for the IADB (as found by Bland and Kilby, 2012). The large coefficient for 
the World Bank refers to the hypothetical situation that a country that never voted along 
                                                
33 The bivariate correlation coefficients between any two of these variables except GDP per capita and 
reserves are above 20%, between the investors’ ranking and GDP per capita, it is as high as 55%. 
34 Given the results of a Hausman test, the inclusion of FE is clearly indicated, and RE-estimation is biased. 
See Annex 1, Table A1.1, for a comparison with a random effects regression (Regression 1). 
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with the US then always votes with the US. The coefficient indicates that, on average, a 
country that increases the share of its votes along with the US by 10 percentage points 
would receive 67 million USD more in World Bank loans. As with the IADB, the 
coefficient is not significant for the CAF; and both regional development banks differ 
significantly from the World Bank but not among themselves. Similarly, only World 
Bank lending reacts negatively to higher inflation, but the positive reaction of both the 
IADB and CAF suggests a possible substitution effect—although as stated previously 
whether this is driven by supply or demand considerations is not clear. Regardless, even 
though differences between the MDBs related to inflation are significant, the coefficients 
are very small, implying that the impact of this policy variable is minimal (at least at the 
relatively low inflation levels prevalent during the period under analysis).  
 
The control for alternative funding by the IMF is insignificant throughout, possibly due to 
mutually offsetting effects (e.g., IMF funding could show the need for resources, but also 
that existing needs are being covered from this alternative source). At the same time, the 
control for population appears important, at least for the World Bank and the IADB, 
although country FE should already capture the bulk of the variance in population size. 
 
Robustness of these results was checked in a variety of ways. Annex 1, Table A1.1 
presents some alternative specifications using per capita lending rather than the absolute 
volume of lending, using tobit regressions, and using a specification in logs. To save 
space, joint regressions were used across all three banks (with MDB-specific country 
effects) rather than SURE regression, and interaction terms are specified for all variables 
with an IADB and a CAF dummy respectively. While this does not provide a significance 
test for all differences between the three banks, it shows whether and to what extent 
IADB and CAF lending reacts differently from World Bank lending. Results of 
regressions that appear most convincing in econometric terms do confirm the results, and 
differences between the specifications find plausible explanations. Annex 1 provides a 
detailed account of the regressions presented, discusses the pros and cons of each 
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specification and compares the results. Serial correlation was also tested using a 
Wooldrige and a Baltagi-Li test, and no evidence was found whatsoever.35 
 
All in all, results appear relatively robust and point to a significant role of demand-side 
factors playing out in different ways for the three banks, in line with the theoretical 
arguments on their governance structures. Of course, as an initial explorative analysis, 
this study had to concentrate on a clearly defined region and period, and thus a limited 
number of relevant banks. To ascertain if the same dynamics hold true in other regions of 
the world and with other MDBs, it would be necessary to expand the analysis. This would 
also mitigate the problem of just including a single case for each of the three governance 
structures. While an extension to other MDBs is beyond the scope of this paper, it should 
be possible to use this classification for further research testing the external validity of 
our results. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter statistically tested two novel theoretical considerations regarding multilateral 
development banks (MDBs). First, MDBs respond not only to supply factors such as 
geopolitical considerations of major shareholders, bureaucratic pathologies or 
development ideologies, but also to the evolving demand of their client borrowing 
countries. Hence the traditional supply-side perspective adopted to analyze MDB lending 
can be usefully augmented by demand side considerations—all the more so in recent 
years as the alternatives for sovereign borrowing have grown tremendously for many 
developing countries. Second, demand for loans depends, among other things, on the 
governance structures of the MDBs, notably on the balance of power between their 
borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders, and the implications of this governance 
structure for loan cost and bureaucratic procedures. Borrowers weigh these factors 
                                                
35 As further alternative to these specifications, using the Libor-based loan rates directly as additional 
explanatory variables would be useful. However, a reliable time series could not be constructed because of 
comparability issues between loans offered by different MDBs in different time periods, as well as data 
shortcomings. As a test, a new variable was constructed by taking the difference between the CAF and the 
IBRD Libor rates, and it is positively and significantly correlated to IBRD lending (i.e. the higher the price 
of the CAF, the higher IBRD lending), and this effect reduces the effect of the general trend (year). Overall, 
this is consistent with our expectations. See Chapter 4 and Annex 2 for a more detailed discussion of MDB 
loan financial terms. 
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differently depending on economic circumstances, so that the relationship between 
economic conditions and lending can be used to (indirectly) assess the link between MDB 
governance structures and demand for lending.   
 
These issues are investigated by comparing three MDBs with different governance 
structures: (i) domination by non-borrowers (World Bank), (ii) domination by borrowers 
(CAF), and (iii) more balanced control by both borrowers and non-borrowers (IADB). 
Lending by each of these MDBs is examined for a common set of borrowing countries in 
Latin America from 1991 to 2010. Multivariate econometric analysis suggests that 
indeed, lending in response to different economic situations differs considerably among 
the three banks. Over time, along with the overall growth and stabilization of Latin 
American economies, CAF lending increased steadily, while World Bank lending 
declined. The IADB’s trend was also negative, which was unexpected, but the absolute 
level of lending has nonetheless remained consistently above the World Bank’s through 
the period (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Over and above that general trend, countries are even more inclined to opt for CAF 
lending and less to the World Bank, with the IADB in between, when in relatively good 
economic conditions, as proxied by their access to private capital markets. This 
alternative supply variable turned out to be more important for countries than proxy 
variables for country need (reserves and GDP per capita).  
 
During times of global capital market crises, the effect on World Bank lending was 
overall negative, also an unexpected result, while it was positive for the IADB and 
negative for the CAF. These results are likely more driven by supply-side considerations, 
especially the fact that the World Bank may face credit rationing and need to allocate 
more loans to other parts of the world, while the regional IADB will “pick up the slack” 
and ramp up lending to Latin America. The CAF, by contrast, is negatively affected by 
capital market tightening due to its lower credit ranking, and hence its cost of funding 
will rise, which would be unattractive to borrower countries.  
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These results are generally in line with the theoretical expectation that the non-borrower 
dominant governance structure of the World Bank, and the bureaucratic and policy 
stipulations that come along with this structure, lead countries to seek alternative 
creditors. These alternatives are easier to find when the countries’ economy is in good 
shape, particularly when it is perceived to be so by private capital markets. During global 
economic crisis, however, MDBs with large industrialized countries as major 
shareholders can make use of their better access to private financial markets and ensure 
lending at much better rates. They are therefore the preferred creditors during such 
periods—although the World Bank may face supply restrictions due to needs elsewhere 
because of its global mandate. 
 
Thus, the hypotheses posited at the outset find some support in the empirical evidence 
analyzed in this chapter. Whether this is in fact driven by the assumptions underpinning 
the hypotheses—that governance structures shape lending characteristics, which in turn 
affect country demand—remains an open question. The statistical tests here merely 
confirmed that this is plausible, but did not establish causal links. Hence, the next two 
chapters will examine several operational characteristics of MDB lending, and their links 
to shareholder balance of power, using qualitative research methods, to determine if these 
causal links do indeed hold true. The subsequent chapter will then examine two country 
case studies in an effort to ascertain if these MDB characteristics impact loan demand in 
the ways hypothesized here. 
 
The results of this chapter do not (and were not expected to) reject the notion that supply-
side dynamics play a prominent role in shaping MDB lending patterns, and in fact the 
findings in relation to global crises and policy variables substantiate supply-side impacts. 
But the evidence indicates that the overwhelming focus on supply-side considerations in 
the existing literature can and should be usefully supplemented with demand 
considerations, taking into account the preferences of borrower countries. This is 
particularly true in light of the changing economic panorama for many middle-income 
developing countries that have heretofore been among the largest MDB borrowers. 
Focusing on supply factors may have been a realistic approach to analyzing MDB lending 
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in the 1980s, but the current situation of many large developing countries suggests that 
demand must be taken into account to better understand the complexities of development 
lending today. 
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4 THE POLITICS OF LOAN PRICING AT 
MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
 
Why do countries borrow from multilateral development banks (MDBs)? One can 
imagine any number of possible reasons, ranging from access to technical assistance, the 
use of MDBs to further internal political agendas or a desire to be seen in international 
financial markets as a “good student” and hence attract investment, among many others. 
But the most obvious reason is, of course, because MDBs offer loans at more attractive 
financial terms than borrowing countries could get themselves from other sources. The 
signature characteristic of MDBs, which has led to the remarkable success of this 
particular variety of international organization, is that—based on their capital structure 
and financial track record—MDBs can borrow cheaply on international financial markets, 
and on-lend resources to borrowing governments at low interest rates with enough margin 
left over to pay for administrative overhead. Hence, as part of the goal of understanding 
demand factors in development lending, this chapter considers political economy issues 
underlying MDB loan pricing. The aim is to ascertain how this critical characteristic of 
MDB lending for borrower demand may be linked to the differing shareholding structures 
of the World Bank, IADB and CAF, thus providing evidence relevant to Hypothesis 1.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 addresses the impacts of MDB capital 
structure on access to bond markets. Section 4.2 discusses the incentives behind net 
income accumulation, and the consequent impact this has on loan pricing. Section 4.3 
concludes. Evidence in the chapter comes from several sources: data and documents from 
the MDBs themselves, interviews with high-level financial officials and executive 
directors and alternate executive directors (country shareholder representatives)36 at all 
three MDBs, interviews and reports from bond rating agencies, and news reports.  
                                                
36 The World Bank executive board has 24 “chairs”, and all but five of these represent groups of countries. 
Chairs grouping multiple countries have the executive director from one country, the alternate from another 
country, and top advisors to the executive director from other countries in the chair. Countries often rotate 
those positions on a regular basis. The IADB has a similar shareholding representation structure, organized 
into 14 chairs. 
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4.1 Why MDB Loan Pricing is Both Important and Puzzling 
 
What factors, exactly, lead MDBs to set the price of their loans at a given level? Do those 
prices vary among different MDBs, and if so, why? Considering that the raison d’être of 
MDBs is to promote development, one might presume that MDBs pick an optimal price 
for borrowing countries in light of their abilities to pay, and keep this cost relatively 
steady to make repayment flows more predictable for developing countries. One might 
further imagine that MDB loan costs vary between each other mainly as a function of the 
level of wealth of shareholder countries of each MDB, and hence the perceptions of 
investors buying MDB bonds. For example, the World Bank—backed by most nations of 
the world, including all industrialized countries—would logically have cheaper 
borrowing costs than, for example, the regional Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB). Both would in turn borrower more cheaply than the sub-regional Andean 
Development Corporation (CAF), which is majority-controlled by several Latin 
American countries.  
 
These assumptions are only partially borne out by the data, as Figures 4.1 and 4.2 reveal. 
The figures show the “all-in” loan costs offered to borrowing countries in recent years by 
the World Bank (63% controlled by industrialized non-borrowing country shareholders in 
2009), the IADB (voting control split 50.02% borrower and 49.98% non-borrower 
country shareholders) and the CAF (controlled by borrowing country shareholders).37 The 
loan costs of all three MDBs fluctuate markedly over the years, rather than staying at a 
steady level, and the rates from all three trend in roughly similar directions over time. 
This suggests that all MDBs face considerable impacts from global capital market 
movements, and transfer this funding risk to their borrowers by varying the interest rate 
they charge for their loans. This finding is not entirely surprising, but it has important 
implications for social scientists in attempting to understand MDB activities—if MDB 
loan prices rise and fall due to global capital market conditions, that might have a major 
                                                
37 Comparing the pricing for different MDB loans is no simple task, due to issues such as the fees charged, 
type of interest rate offered and maturity profile, among other issues. The figures depict two types of loans 
that are directly comparable, with the available years for each MDB in question. See Annex 2 for a full 
discussion of these issues and the methodology behind these figures.  
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impact on the demand for MDB loans on the part of countries that have other borrowing 
options.  
 
Figure 4.1. Libor-based Loans (All-in Costs) 
 
Source: Methodology for annualizing fee costs taken from World Bank 2010b. Loan interest rate sources: 
World Bank, 2011b; IADB, 2011a; and CAF, 2009a. Fee sources: World Bank, 2007b; World Bank, 
2011c; IADB 2011b; and CAF 2009a. 
  
Figure 4.2. Adjustable Spread Loans (All-in Costs) 
 
Source: Methodology taken from World Bank 2010b. Loan interest rate sources: World Bank, 2011b and 
IADB, 2011c. Fee sources:  World Bank, 2007b; World Bank, 2011c; and IADB 2011b. 
 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e 
(%
) 
Libor‐based Loans (All‐in Cost) 
IBRD 
IADB 
CAF 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
In
te
re
st
 R
at
e 
(%
) 
Adjustable Spread Loans (All‐In Cost) 
IBRD 
IADB 
 
103 
But two other patterns immediately apparent in the figures are more surprising. First, 
while CAF’s loan costs are higher than the other two MDBs, the gap is not as wide as one 
might expect in light of shareholder composition, and narrowed quite dramatically toward 
the end of the period. In fact, in 2007 and 2008 CAF loans were priced just marginally 
above those of the World Bank and IADB—a rather shocking finding, considering the 
huge wealth gap among country shareholders backing the CAF and the other two MDBs. 
Second, IADB loans are often slightly cheaper than World Bank loans, especially with 
the adjustable rate loan instrument, even though the World Bank is obviously a much 
larger and better-known MDB, with nearly four times the number of country shareholders 
(48 vs. 186 members, respectively, in 2009).  
 
What explains these curious findings? How is it that the sub-regional CAF is able to offer 
increasingly competitive loan pricing compared to much larger MDBs backed by the 
wealthiest countries in the world? And why would the regional IADB offers lower loan 
prices then the global World Bank? This chapter attempts to answer these questions by 
utilizing a theoretical framework based on the relative balance of power and interests of 
borrowing vs. non-borrowing country shareholders at these three MDBs, in keeping with 
the broader theoretical approach of the thesis. In so doing, the chapter seeks to better 
understand how shareholder interests shape loan pricing, a key aspect influencing 
demand for MDB loans on the part of developing countries.  
 
The research is limited to two sets of critical factors shaping loan pricing common to all 
three MDBs: (i) the ability of each MDB to issue debt on private markets, as related to 
shareholding structure; and (ii) the uses of and hence incentives for MDBs to generate 
annual net income. The first factor goes a long way toward determining the cost of 
funding of each MDB, a key component of its loan price. The second set of factors gets at 
why each MDB—a non-profit organization—might charge borrowing countries more 
than might otherwise be the case as a way of generating a certain level of net income each 
year. This paper explores these issues and their links with the composition of country 
shareholders within each MDB.  
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These issues are almost entirely ignored in the academic literature, despite their 
importance for understanding MDB activities. Countries borrow from MDBs in large part 
because MDBs are willing to lend them money at attractive interest rates and maturities. 
Hence, analyzing decision-making process that goes into the financial terms of MDB 
lending is essential to grasp why they do what they do. However, academic analysis of 
these financial issues has thus far been limited to a history of the World Bank (Kapur et 
al., 1997, particularly pp. 905-1118) and two papers on the World Bank’s use of net 
income (Kapur, 2002 and Mohammed, 2004). A former World Bank senior financial 
advisor has written a little-known (and one suspects, given the paucity of references to it, 
even less read) book on the financial mechanics of MDBs, but it was intended for 
development practitioners, and does not consider political economy implications in any 
detail (Mistry, 1995). Researching the financial cost of MDB loans might deter more 
politically-inclined researchers, but as this chapter will demonstrate, the finances of 
MDBs are deeply political. The aim is to determine whether country shareholder 
composition does in fact influence loan pricing in ways that lead to the patterns seen, and 
to describe the causal mechanisms.  
 
It should be noted that this chapter considers mainly the non-concessional lending 
windows of the World Bank and the IADB, for two main reasons. First, concessional 
lending resources do not come from capital markets and as such issues such as net 
income generation, financial stability ratios and market perceptions of shareholders do 
not come into play. Second, concessional lending represents only a small fraction of non-
concessional lending by MDBs in Latin America (in 2009, FSO equaled 1.5% of total 
IADB lending commitments and IDA equaled 1.4% of total World Bank lending 
commitments in Latin America), and is as a result much less relevant for this research 
project.38 As such, for the remainder of this chapter references to “World Bank” and 
“IADB” refer to the non-concessional lending windows of each, except when specifically 
noted. The CAF only recently began very limited concessional lending. 
                                                
38 A study of MDB activity in Africa or South Asia, by contrast, would necessarily have to take 
concessional lending into account.  
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4.2 The Impact of Capital Structure on MDB Borrowing in Global 
Capital Markets 
 
Unlike most other international organizations, the majority of MDB resources come from 
borrowing on international capital markets. The fact that MDBs can access international 
bond markets, use those resources to make loans and cover the bulk of their 
administrative costs on the margin between borrowing and lending costs—and hence do 
not require regular budgetary allocations from member governments—has 
unquestionably been key to the spectacular success of this particular model of 
international organization. Thus understanding the relationship between MDBs and 
capital markets is important for a broader understanding of how MDBs function and why 
they may differ from one another.  
 
The link between shareholder composition and the ability of an MDB to raise resources 
on private capital markets requires a brief review of an MDB’s financial model. 
Countries reach an agreement to create an MDB, and contribute a certain amount of 
capital in actual cash (“paid-in capital”). As well, each MDB builds up a level of financial 
reserves as a result of its operations, which together with paid-in capital comprise the 
organization’s equity, comparable to the equity of any private financial institution. 
Uniquely, however, MDBs also have a portion of capital that each member country 
commits as a guarantee should the MDB ever need it, but does not actually pay in cash 
(“callable capital”). Armed with equity and callable capital, MDBs issue bonds on 
international capital markets.39 Thus, the bond rating and the terms at which international 
capital markets are willing to lend to each MDB depends to a very large degree its capital 
structure. 
 
A key factor in determining the market’s perception of MDB creditworthiness is, in turn, 
the creditworthiness of the country shareholders providing callable capital. This feature 
of MDBs originated with the creation of the World Bank. Founding countries were 
required to pay 20% of their capital commitment in cash, with the remaining 80% 
                                                
39 MDBs can and do make private bond placements, for example with central banks, but the vast majority 
of their funding come from capital markets.  
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committed as a guarantee that would be called upon should the bank ever require it to pay 
off their creditors.40 Every MDB created since has utilized the same mechanism. This 
callable capital—and the creditworthiness of the governments providing it—acts as a 
guarantee to private markets that the credit they provide to an MDB is protected and will 
be paid off, regardless of whether borrowing countries default on their loans from an 
MDB. As the bond rating agency Fitch noted in a 2010 report laying out their rating 
criteria for MDBs, “Supranationals’ credit quality derives first and foremost from the 
support of member states…Support to MDBs is granted through ‘callable capital’…” 
(FitchRatings, 2010a, p. 1). 
 
All three major rating agencies only consider callable capital from industrialized non-
borrowing countries to be of any real worth, although there is some difference among 
them in terms of allowing AA or only AAA callable capital to be counted. Callable 
capital from countries with lower ratings are not counted because, in the words of 
Standard and Poor’s, “At a time of global financial stress sufficient to require an MLI 
[multilateral lending institution] to issue a capital call, it is unlikely that many of these 
countries would be able to comply” (Standard and Poor’s, 2007, p. 7). According to this 
criterion, the agencies view the IADB and World Bank essentially the same. For both, the 
sum of callable capital from highly-rated shareholders and total paid-in capital and 
reserves are consistently more than 100% of total outstanding loans and guarantees. As 
Standard and Poor’s notes referring to the World Bank, this “implies that the bank would 
remain solvent even if all of its loans were deemed worthless and it had to pay out under 
all of its guarantees outstanding” (Standard and Poor’s, 2010a, p. 17). Hence both the 
World Bank and IADB have for decades awarded both the highest bond rating, AAA, 
despite the fact that borrowing shareholders hold a higher percentage of voting power in 
the latter. To the markets, the relative voting power of countries is less important than the 
guaranteed capital from wealthy countries.  
 
                                                
40 The share of callable capital in total capital has grown steadily over the years for both the World Bank 
and IADB. As of end-2009, callable capital represented about 94% of total World Bank capital and 96% of 
IADB total capital. 
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The CAF faces a very different situation. It was first created without any callable capital. 
Faced with a total inability to access private capital markets, shareholders committed 
US$200 million in callable capital in 1975. This had no impact whatsoever on inspiring 
the confidence of bond markets, and when the CAF began to work in earnest on winning 
the trust of markets it did so through its operations, not callable capital (see Chapter 2). 
This trend has continued to the present. Unlike the World Bank and IADB, the CAF’s 
paid-in capital (68% of total capital) is now much higher than callable capital (32%). And 
of the CAF’s callable capital, only the US$200 million share of Spain was rated AAA, a 
rating it lost in 2010 (Standard and Poor’s, 2010b). Even though it has financial 
indicators superior in many respects to the World Bank and IADB, the CAF is currently 
rated A+ by Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, and A1 by Moody’s—four steps below the 
other two—mainly because of the lack of AAA callable capital (FitchRatings, 2009; 
Standard and Poor’s, 2010b; Moody’s, 2009). Ratings agencies indicate that further 
upgrades in CAF’s ratings would depend in large part on attaining more creditworthy 
shareholders.  
 
The CAF has been very clear that it will not take on non-borrowing shareholding 
countries to any significant degree, because of the implications it would have in changing 
the MDB’s governance. In a 2009 interview, President Enrique García stated: “Whatever 
happens, the developed countries will never have more than 10% or 15% of the shares 
and that makes a lot of difference. Developing countries know we are loyal partners” 
(O’Shaughnessy, 2009). Both the IADB and the African Development Bank were 
founded with the similar intention of being controlled by borrowers, but ended up giving 
non-borrowing shareholders greater voting power to gain highly-rated callable capital and 
improve their standing in international capital markets (see Chapter 2 for IADB and 
Strand, 2001 or Mingst, 1990 for the African Development Bank). The CAF has 
evidently made the decision to forgo the “easy” route to better capital market access 
through callable capital, and instead maintain borrowing shareholder control and build up 
market access through its track record and strong financial ratios. A top CAF treasury 
official addressed the issue candidly in an interview: “From countries that are not 
investment grade, ratings agencies won’t consider callable capital in the same way. But 
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callable capital is not something that we are focused on anymore” (CAF interview, 
December 14, 2010).  
 
The contrasting composition of shareholders, then, is clearly a major factor in defining 
how cheaply the three MDBs can borrow on international capital markets. As one former 
top World Bank finance official wrote, with perhaps some exaggeration, “…ratings 
agencies do not actually base their rating of the MDBs on the spurious sophisticated and 
often confusing, if not almost irrelevant, financial ratio analysis they purport to impress 
their readership with. Instead, they now appear to be basing their judgment solely on the 
strength of usable callable capital” (Mistry, 1995, p. 73). A former MDB analyst from 
one of the top three ratings agencies attributed this tendency in part to the fact that many 
people in the agencies did not have a strong background in finance, but rather came 
international affairs, and hence focus on sovereign ratings and callable capital as an easy 
yardstick when analyzing MDBs (Ratings agency interview, August 20, 2012). 
 
In large part because of the high share of callable capital guaranteed by non-borrowing, 
highly-rated industrialized countries, both the World Bank and IADB are rated AAA, and 
consequently issue bonds at some of the lowest rates of any issuer in the world, sovereign 
or non-sovereign. The CAF, by contrast, could not get rated at all for the first two 
decades of its existence, and even now borrows at rates considerably above the other two 
(though, critically, below any of its member countries). This difference in capital market 
access, in turn, is fundamental in defining the rates at which each MDB is able to offer 
loans to its borrowers. Hence, there appears to be little difference as far as the markets are 
concerned between the World Bank and the IADB—both receive a AAA rating, despite 
the fact that non-borrowing countries have less voting power in the latter.  
 
Largely driven by the differences in market perception of shareholders and the security of 
callable capital, the World Bank and IADB can borrow money from international capital 
markets at relatively similar and very low rates, while the CAF must pay a considerable 
premium. Constructing a comparative time series of the total funding costs for each MDB 
(including all currencies and maturities of the many bonds each issues every year) is not 
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realistic, but a recent example demonstrates the overall pattern. In 2011 all three MDBs 
issued five-year, US$ bonds, at the following yields: World Bank (IBRD) 1%, IADB 
1.375%, CAF 3.625% (Bloomberg L.P., 2012). Top-level finance officials in all three 
banks confirmed that this pattern has held true over the last two decades. 
4.3 Net Income, Reserves and Equity 
 
Beyond the price an MDB must pay to borrow from international markets, policies 
around net income, reserves and equity also have a major impact on the financial terms of 
loans. The net income generated by each MDB each year—that is, total income (from 
loans and other investments) minus total expenses (financial and administrative)—has in 
most years amounted to a tidy sum of money for each of the three MDBs considered here. 
From 1980 to 2009, annual net income (in 2007 US$ terms) averaged US$1.8 billion 
annually and totaled US$53.4 billion for the IBRD; US$646 million annually and totaled 
US$17.8 billion for the IADB; and US$155 million annually and totaled US$3.3 billion 
for the CAF.  
 
The first question to be asked when considering annual net income is, why does it exist at 
all? If an MDB is a non-profit organization, does not the existence of net income imply 
that it is charging too much for its loans? As a cooperative bank owned by all its 
members, shouldn’t it lower the cost of its loans to the point where it simply breaks even? 
The fact that MDBs do have net income, and that country representatives as opposed to 
management decide how to use it, indicates that political considerations are involved. 
Each of the three MDBs analyzed here set their loan rates in such a way to generate a 
certain level of net income every year, which is in turn used for three purposes: (i) to 
increase financial security; ii) to expand equity and hence operational capacity; and iii) to 
fund any other projects shareholders may deem suitable. These three incentives to 
increase net income translate directly into higher loan costs to borrowing countries.  
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4.3.1 Uses of Net Income I: Building Reserves to Protect Non-Borrowing 
Shareholders 
 
One of the principal reasons for generating net income every year is to strengthen an 
MDB’s financial reserves in relation to its loan portfolio, which—as the name implies—
provide an added level of security, as in any financial institution exposed to potential 
risks. Both the World Bank and IADB have systematically built up reserves since their 
inception, making allocations out of net income every year to reach a total of just under 
US$30 billion for the World Bank and US$15 billion for the IADB by 2009. The CAF, 
by contrast, did not begin building reserves in its early years, and began in earnest only in 
the late 1980s as it began to seek capital from international markets (see Chapter 2). The 
CAF’s reserves were just under US$2 billion at end-2009.  
 
This pattern of reserve accumulation is justified by MDBs as necessary to reassure bond 
investors that their investment is well protected, even in the event of defaults by 
borrowers, as well as to cover any unexpected operational expenses. A quote from a 2006 
IADB report sets out the basic premise: “The net income target was intended to set a 
level of net income that would permit the Bank (i) to cover current expenses in the 
context of changing financial markets, and (ii) to accumulate reserves as a way to protect 
debtholders and equityholders of the Bank of potential unexpected losses” (2006a, p. 18). 
However, the pattern of reserve accumulation suggests that protecting bondholders and 
access to financial markets is not the only consideration in mind, especially for the World 
Bank and IADB.  
 
The key to understanding MDBs’ policy of systematically allocating net income to 
reserves—at the expense of borrowing countries, who pay the cost for this in higher loan 
interest rates—is the equity-to-loans (E/L) ratio. This ratio is the principal benchmark by 
which financial markets consider the capital adequacy of MDBs (and indeed of all 
banking institutions). The level of an MDB’s equity capital is the main indicator by 
which MDBs themselves measure their own financial health. Equity here refers to an 
MDB’s i) paid-in capital and ii) level of reserves, otherwise known as retained earnings. 
In essence, each MDB’s level of equity defines the amount of lending it is able to make. 
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The World Bank publicly targets an E/L ratio of 23-27% (World Bank, 2010d), while the 
IADB targets an even higher 32-38% (IADB, 2006a). The CAF has no publicly stated 
official E/L target. In practice, the ratios of all three MDBs have converged to a similar 
level in recent years, in the 30-40% range (Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3. Equity to Loans, 1990-2009 
 
Source: World Bank AR, IADB AR and CAF AR, 1990-2009.  
 
On the face of it, the level of this relatively technical financial ratio may seem 
unremarkable. It takes on a new relevance, however, when one realizes that it is very far 
above the capital adequacy levels of commercial banks. The Swiss banking giant UBS, 
for example, had a Tier 1 capital ratio41 of 11-16.7% between the end of 2008 and the 
third quarter of 2010 (UBS, 2010), while Citigroup had a Tier 1 capital ratio of 12.5% in 
the third quarter of 2010, down slightly from 12.7% from the previous year (Citigroup, 
2010). These post-crisis ratios, it should be noted, are well above the single-digit ratios 
held prior to 2008.  
 
Thus the question arises: why do MDBs have capitalization ratios so much higher than 
commercial banks? Why not, instead, lower the capitalization ratio to a level more akin to 
                                                
41 Tier 1 capital, as defined by Basel I and II, is equivalent to equity plus retained earnings as a share of 
risk-weighted assets. For political reasons, MDBs do not (at least publicly) risk-weight their loan portfolios.  
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commercial banks? This would have the benefit of requiring less capital contributions 
from shareholders, less annual allocations to reserves (and hence lower loan costs) or 
allow greater lending capacity, or some combination of all three. One might imagine that 
the answer would be the attitudes of bond markets, due to the political nature of MDB 
business, but evidence suggests that this is not the case. Referring to the very high E/L 
level, one World Bank Treasury official stated flatly that the World Bank could double its 
lending and still maintain the AAA rating (World Bank interview, January 20, 2009). A 
second Treasury official agreed, adding that the E/L ratio is “way above what the market 
looks for” (World Bank interview, November 17, 2009). An IADB Treasury official 
suggested that ratings agencies pay more attention to MDBs staying roughly in line with 
one another, and not any particular level of reserves or equity. “Let’s say we lower our 
equity-to-loan ratio from 30 to 15%. They [rating agencies] will look at how it compares 
to other MDBs—if it’s totally out of whack they will get worried, but if it’s in line with 
the others, and there’s a good justification, it will be fine. They look at what our 
competitors do” (IADB interview, November 15, 2010). A World Bank alternate 
executive director for one middle-income Latin American country stated in an interview 
that the E/L ratio “is defined by the board, and there is no technical or mathematic reason 
why it is set at this level. Our feeling is that the bank is too conservative, but this decision 
was made years ago and no longer comes up for discussion, because the ratings agencies 
are used to it” (World Bank AED interview, December 14, 2011).  
 
The ratings agencies themselves do seem to place a considerable amount of emphasis on 
the E/L ratio, as judged from the financial reports. In on-the-record interviews done with 
all three agencies done for this research, the analysts all maintained that if the ratings 
dropped significantly, it could impact ratings. When pressed why the MDBs should have 
E/L ratios so much higher than private banks, a Moody’s analyst acknowledged that the 
ratio could drop without an impact on the rating (Moody’s interview, August 13, 2012). 
A former analyst with 10 years’ experience rating MDBs at one of the top three agencies, 
who requested anonymity to speak more freely, agreed with the MDB treasury staffers 
quoted above. “Viewed strictly as a financial institution they could come down quite 
 
113 
considerably. Certainly 20% would not be a problem, and something below that would be 
doable as well” (Ratings agency interview, August 20, 2012). 
 
The high E/L ratio is all the more puzzling when one considers that both the World Bank 
and the IADB (though not the CAF) have a huge amount of callable, guaranteed capital 
that is not included in equity, but which shareholders are obligated by international treaty 
to provide in case of need. This vast on-call reserve—totaling US$172 billion for the 
World Bank and US$97 billion for the IADB, both in 2009—is unique to MDBs, and 
does not exist for commercial banks. Taking into account the additional security of 
callable capital, the E/L ratio of the World Bank and IADB is even more conservative. 
Evidence suggests that the callable capital itself, and the fervent desire of wealthy 
shareholders to avoid any call on it, is a driving force behind MDBs building up equity 
through net income allocations far beyond the requirements of the market.  
 
Moody’s notes this in its analysis of the World Bank: “The IBRD realizes that by having 
enough resources of its own to absorb risk, it protects members from a possible capital 
call. The Bank judges its capital adequacy as the ability of its equity to generate future net 
income to support normal loan growth and respond to a potential crisis without having to 
resort to a call on capital” (2008, p. 4). This use of reserves is substantiated by an 
interview with a top official in the World Bank’s Corporate Finance division, which sets 
financial strategy. When asked why the World Bank maintained such high E/L ratio, the 
official agreed that it was well beyond what bond markets called for, and went on to 
explain why: “The rating agencies know that callable capital is there to bail bondholders 
out. But shareholders traditionally have not wanted us to call capital. A call on capital is 
something they want to avoid, because it’s not something in their budget, it would come 
out of nowhere. So the history of the Bank has always been to manage its finances to 
avoid a call on capital” (World Bank Corporate Finance interview, January 20, 2011).  
 
The motivation is similar with the IADB, as noted in a Moody’s analysis (2010, p. 10). 
An IADB Treasury official confirmed this explanation, justifying high reserves by 
comparing the IADB to how a commercial bank could face a crisis: “An MDB cannot fire 
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a bunch of people, we can’t divest or sell our assets, there’s no one to sell our loans to. So 
we have to rely on the retained earnings...Ultimate we are trying to protect—in our case 
it’s not bankruptcy, its callable capital. The main non-borrowing shareholders, especially 
the US, do not want to get called on” (IADB interview, November 15, 2010). 
 
The reality for both the World Bank and IADB is that while callable capital is extremely 
useful for ensuring the best possible rates on international capital markets, it cannot ever 
be actually used without facing dire political consequences. Wealthy governments are 
happy to commit callable capital, as long as they never feel that it will actually be called 
upon. Thus it is incumbent upon the administration of both MDBs to protect against a 
capital call by building up a very high level of equity as a share of loans, far higher than 
any commercial bank. It is no coincidence that no MDB has ever made a call on its 
callable capital—the result would likely be the demise of the MDB itself. As one World 
Bank executive director put it succinctly almost four decades ago, “Management and the 
Board should think about callable capital as a Christian thinks about heaven, that it is a 
nice idea but no one wants to go there because the price of admission is death” (Canadian 
ED Claude Isbister on April 27, 1973, quoted in Kapur et al., 1997, p. 991). The result of 
this extremely cautious financial management in the service of protecting non-borrower 
callable capital is higher interest rate charges on loans to borrowers. 
 
Interestingly, the CAF apparently feels pressure to follow a similar policy, even though it 
has only minimal callable capital. One can imagine that, as the IADB official quoted 
above alluded to, ratings agencies may not have a fixed number in mind when analyzing 
different MDBs, but they expect them to follow a relatively similar pattern. One can also 
imagine that the World Bank, with its long history and weight in the market, sets the 
standard, forcing others like the CAF to follow its lead to ensure good bond ratings, even 
though it does not have a direct financial reason to do so. Hence, the reason for MDBs to 
charge higher loan rates and accumulate net income is evidently divergent shareholder 
interest (industrialized countries protecting against a call on capital vs. borrowing 
countries wanting cheaper loans), but the effects appear the same regardless of the 
balance of shareholder power in each MDB, due to embedded market expectations. 
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4.3.2 Uses of Net Income II: Building Equity With Reserves Instead of Paid-In 
Capital 
 
Once one assumes that MDBs are targeting a given E/L level, the question is then how 
one achieves it. As noted above, equity is comprised of both reserves (which is 
accumulated net income) and paid-in capital from shareholders. If an MDB needs to 
achieve a certain equity target to be able to make a certain amount of loans, why not do 
so by increasing paid-in capital, instead of generating reserves out of annual net income, 
which in turn come from the fiscal accounts of the very countries the MDB is supposed to 
be helping through higher interest payments on MDB loans? Evidence suggests that 
building equity through reserve accumulation is simply a lot easier than convincing 
wealthy shareholders to kick in more paid-in capital through contentious and protracted 
capital increase negotiations. This is much more of an issue for the World Bank and 
IADB than the CAF, as can be seen in Figure 4.4—although all three have converged 
since the mid-1990s toward a roughly similar overall E/L ratio, the World Bank and 
IADB have relied much more heavily on reserve accumulation to do so, while the CAF 
has done so more by increasing paid-in capital. 
 
The reasons for these divergent patterns of building equity are directly linked to the 
composition of shareholders behind each MDB. For both the World Bank and IADB, 
capital increases—especially of paid-in as opposed to callable capital—are extraordinary 
complex, conflictive and time-consuming endeavors, and hence both MDBs find it much 
more expedient to gradually build equity each year by allocating much higher levels of 
net income to reserves. While both the World Bank and IADB were given capital 
increases in response to the recent global financial crisis, the process was extremely 
lengthy and the amount of paid-in capital was at the lower end (for the World Bank) or 
well below (for the IADB) the amount originally proposed by the MDB itself.  
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Figure 4.4. Reserves as a Share of Equity, 1975-2009 
 
Source: World Bank AR, IADB AR and CAF AR, 1975-2009.  
 
The IADB first announced it was seeking a capital increase on February 25, 2009 
(BNAmericas, 2009), and it was not finally approved until July 21, 2010 (IADB, 2011d).  
IADB management itself did not publicly name a figure for the capital increase, but an 
independent commission created by the IADB proposed US$150 billion, of which US$6 
billion would be paid-in capital (IADB, 2009). Shareholders approved only a US$70 
billion increase, of which only US$1.7 billion was paid-in capital. News reports indicated 
that the U.S. was the main country trying to limit the size of the increase, while 
borrowing countries such as Argentina were pushing for a higher amount (Thompson, 
2010).  
 
The World Bank formally proposed a capital increase in the Istanbul Annual Meetings in 
September 2009, and it was agreed by April 2010 (World Bank, 2010c). The World 
Bank’s Development Committee originally proposed a paid-in capital increase of US$5-
11 billion (World Bank, 2009b), and shareholders agreed to only US$5.1 billion paid-in 
capital increase, out of a total of US$86.2 billion. Press reports indicate that attitudes 
about the capital increase were clearly split along non-borrower versus borrower 
shareholder lines, including outright initial opposition by France, Canada, Italy, and the 
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United Kingdom and lukewarm support by the US, with support from major borrowing 
countries such as Brazil, China and Indonesia (see for example Reuters, 2009 and 
Bloomberg, 2009).  
 
A top World Bank Treasury official linked loan prices, net income and politics bluntly: 
“In order to ask for a lower capital increase, we can increase amount of money we earn 
on loans…This generates greater net income, which is allocated to reserves and hence 
can be used for lending…We try to minimize capital increases as much as possible, 
because of the political difficulties involved” (World Bank interview, November 17, 
2009). A World Bank strategy paper also alluded to the link between loan pricing and 
capital, when discussing a loan price increase in 2009: “While the objective of this 
pricing increase was to improve the institution’s financial sustainability, it would also 
gradually enhance IBRD’s capital position as higher income is added to reserves over 
time” (2009c, p. 3).  
 
Borrowing country shareholders have objected to this practice, voicing instead a clear 
preference for a direct capital increase. As far back as 1995, Argentina’s Finance Minister 
Domingo Cavallo stated at the Annual Meetings that while his country “supported the 
policy of sound reserves…If the net income of the Bank were to continue at the levels of 
recent years, we feel that interest rate waivers could be increased in order to reduce the 
actual cost of borrowing to our countries” (World Bank, 1995, p. 135-6). Brazil’s current 
executive director at the World Bank pointed out in an interview that price increases in 
place of a capital increase could make the Bank’s loans unattractive to his and other 
countries. “This would be a disaster for the financial cooperative, because the lower 
middle-income countries would take the burden, and lending costs would have to increase 
much more significantly than now. That would be unsustainable. So you have to ask 
whether increasing prices is the best way to address financial sustainability. A direct 
capital increase would be much better” (World Bank ED interview, December 12, 2011). 
Another current alternate executive director from Latin America raised similar objections, 
saying that borrowers are unable to influence capital increases and that G7 countries 
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prefer to increase loan prices as a way to avoid capital contributions (World Bank AED 
interview, December 14, 2011).  
 
The IADB faces a similar dynamic, except that it receives much stronger pressure from 
its single largest shareholder, the United States. An independent commission convened in 
2009 to consider the possibility of a capital increase for the IADB put the issue 
succinctly: “The Commission fully realizes that there is bound to be resistance to the 
notion of a general capital increase, albeit one that consists largely of guarantees and of 
limited actual cash transfers. The United States, at 30% the single largest shareholder of 
the Bank, is at present facing many demands on its budgetary resources, both for 
guarantees and for actual cash transfers” (IADB, 2009, p. 4). As a result, the IADB 
“relies on a small amount of paid-in capital, averaging 4 per cent in the last 30 years, 
augmented by retained earnings” (Ibid., p. 5) An IADB Treasury official confirmed the 
importance of generating retained earnings to avoid requesting capital from major 
shareholders. “If overall we want to increase lending, we have to increase loan charges to 
generate retained earnings.” The official went on to note that the reason was the split 
between borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders, with the latter resisting capital 
increases that serve to provide subsidized loans to the former. “We know the IBRD is 
getting similar pressure from its non-borrowing shareholders, but in our case the U.S. is 
30%, so it carries a big stick, it has a huge voice” (IADB interview, November 15, 2010). 
 
The contrast with the CAF is stark. As the figure above shows, a much lower portion of 
the CAF’s equity comes from retained earnings, and much more from paid-in capital. The 
reason is simply that shareholders are much more willing to contribute paid-in capital 
when the organization needs it, thus the CAF is less reliant on building up reserves to 
achieve a given overall E/L ratio. The recent global financial crisis is a good example. 
Facing potential financial constraints to service increasing loan demand from member 
countries, shareholders quickly and unanimously approved a US$2.5 billion paid-in 
capital increase in August 2009 (CAF AR, 2009). A CAF Treasury official detailed the 
ease of the increase in an interview, with no small note of smugness in his voice: “We 
asked shareholders for US$1 billion, and instead they gave us US$2.5 billion. We can 
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increase the capital base whenever we need to, because the structure of our shareholders 
is so different. They know we can leverage the capital that they supply as efficiently as 
possible, which then gives them greater possibilities to take out loans from us. It’s not 
like that with the IADB and the World Bank, where some shareholders contribute capital 
and others benefit by taking out loans” (CAF interview, December 14, 2010). Including 
paid-in capital from new members, the CAF raised US$4 billion in paid-in capital 
following the 2008 crisis, almost as much as the vastly larger World Bank (US$5.1 
billion) and more than twice as much as the IADB (US$1.7 billion) (CAF, 2009b). A 
ratings agency analyst contrasted the CAF’s capital increase with the IADB’s in an 
interview: “If you see how much trouble IADB has had in getting significant capital 
injection, it’s been like a Mexican soap opera it’s taken so long, compared to how quickly 
the CAF got it done” (FitchRatings interview, November 22, 2010). 
 
As this section makes evident, the structure of shareholding countries has a very 
important impact on each MDB’s ability to raise paid-in capital, which in turn directly 
influences whether it has an incentive to raise loan charges as a means of building equity 
without having to face politically difficult capital increases. The fact that a major share of 
paid-in capital for both the World Bank and IADB must come from country shareholders 
that do not borrow from these MDBs means that paid-in capital is much harder to come 
by. As a result, both the World Bank and IADB have a stronger incentive to generate a 
relatively high amount of net income every year to build equity without recourse to a 
capital increase. Accumulating reserves through higher loan charges is an extremely 
effective way for the World Bank and IADB to expand lending capacity without turning 
to shareholders for a capital increase. These reserves act, in essence, as a paid-in capital 
contribution from borrowing members alone, but without any increase in their share of 
voting power that normally could come with a formal capital increase. As one Latin 
American alternate executive director put it, using net income in this way could be 
understood as a capital increase, which should—but does not—give borrowers more 
voting power (World Bank AED interview, December 14, 2011). The dynamic within the 
CAF is quite different. Shareholders see the CAF as a useful tool to serve their own 
interests, rather than donor aid with dubious effectiveness, and hence increases of paid-in 
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capital are much more easily available. As a result, the pressure to use loan charges and 
net income as means of building equity is much lower.  
4.3.3 Uses of Net Income III: Allocation to Fund Shareholder Programs 
 
A third important reason for an MDB to generate net income each year is that 
shareholders can allocate that income not only to reserves, but also to special purposes 
that most often obey the interests of the wealthiest and most powerful non-borrowing 
shareholders, rather than borrowing country shareholders.  This is a major and conflictive 
issue for the World Bank, and has grown in financial importance in recent years. The 
issue has a smaller but growing importance for the IADB, and is essentially non-existent 
for the CAF—thus clearly matching the balance of shareholding power between 
borrowers and non-borrowers in the three MDBs.  
 
The issue of allocating net income for purposes beyond building reserves first arose at the 
World Bank when IDA was created, in the early 1960s. The Bank had begun 
accumulating very considerable retained earnings, and was at the time facing pressure 
from borrowing countries to lower the costs of its loans rather than continue building 
reserves. At the same time, the Bank faced pressure from many countries—backed by the 
United Nations and, eventually, the U.S. government—to offer loans at much lower rates 
to the poorest countries. The creation of IDA allowed the Bank to address both of these 
issues. It ensured that the new concessional lending window would be housed within the 
World Bank rather than the United Nations (with the support of the U.S., which exercised 
much greater voting power in the Bank and could hence better control the resources), and 
it offered an opportunity to dedicate some of its net income every year beginning in 1960 
in such a way that it stayed “in house” and under the Bank’s control (see Chapter 2). 
 
Thus began the annual practice of allocating part of the World Bank’s IBRD net income 
to IDA, which continues to this day. While this might seem reasonable at first, it is 
important to recognize that this income comes directly from the interest payments made 
by World Bank borrowers. These borrowers frequently suggest that IDA should be 
funded not by them, but rather by fiscal allocations from the wealthiest countries. Why, 
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after all, should slightly better-off developing countries be made to pay for loans to the 
poorest countries? In the words of one researcher, this “could be seen as a transfer from 
one set of developing countries to another” (Mohammed, 2004, p. 12). Predictably, the 
annual debates on IDA allocations are invariably split by borrower versus non-borrower 
shareholders, and just as predictably, non-borrowing shareholders always win. The debate 
began in the early years of IDA, with especially vocal opposition to transfers from Brazil 
and other Latin American countries (Kapur et al., 1997), and continues to this day. One 
World Bank Treasury official, who has the job of marketing loans to middle-income 
countries (MICs), said “MICs who pay for IBRD loans say ‘Wait a minute, now we 
finance IDA? IBRD wasn’t created for that.’ This certainly hurts our ability to be 
competitive in terms of pricing” (World Bank interview, September 15, 2010).  
 
What’s more, this allocation appears to have become increasingly institutionalized, as a 
convenient way for wealthy shareholders to use the World Bank’s IBRD net income to 
minimize the amount of money they are requested to contribute to the regular IDA 
replenishments. In previous years, shareholders understood that the World Bank would 
give IDA part of IBRD net income as conditions permitted, and the Bank was very clear 
that this was not an obligation—even going so far to write language to that effect in 
IBRD bonds, to reassure capital markets of its independence from IDA (World Bank AR, 
1960). More recently, however, IDA replenishments (as well as contributions to HIPC 
and MDRI debt relief initiatives to IDA countries) have included prior commitments 
from IBRD of certain amounts of net income allocation. This in effect requires IBRD to 
generate sufficient income through loan charges to meet the commitments (see for 
example World Bank, 2009c). “In the past IDA transfers were sometimes scaled back or 
stopped if the capital outlook wasn’t good,” said a World Bank Corporate Finance 
official. “That’s less so the case these days, for sure” (World Bank interview, January 20, 
2011). A World Bank Treasury official stated flatly, “Profit allocation for IDA seems to 
be one of the main goals of the board every year” (World Bank interview, September 15, 
2010). 
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Figure 4.5. IBRD Net Income Allocations, 1964-2009 
 
Source: World Bank AR, 1964-2009. 
 
Cumulatively, transfers to IDA and debt relief add up to a very considerable sum of 
money: US$13.3 billion since 1960 in nominal terms and US$24 billion in real terms 
(Figure 4.6). To all intents and purposes, the World Bank’s non-borrowing shareholders 
are forcing middle-income developing country borrowers to contribute to less developed 
countries. Needless to say, this is not a contribution that borrowing countries generally 
feel they should have to make. “It’s definitely a negotiation every year, what are prices 
going to be and what transfers are going to be,” a top World Bank Corporate Finance 
official said. “There’s a trade-off. Certainly the higher loan prices are, the more can be 
afforded to transfer out to IDA. And the lower IDA transfers are, the lower loan prices 
could be…That’s certainly something that’s very different between us and IADB and 
CAF” (World Bank interview, January 20, 2011). 
 
Interviews with shareholder representatives at the World Bank make it clear that 
borrower countries strongly object to allocating net income for IDA, and feel that these 
are forced on them by non-borrowers wanting to minimize their own budget allocations 
to IDA replenishments. The current Brazilian World Bank executive director as well as a 
Latin American alternate executive director both complained that not only are they being 
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forced to contribute to IDA through higher loan prices than would otherwise be the case, 
but that they are not even given credit as having made contributions at all. “They say that 
‘the Bank’ or “the shareholders’ contributed to IDA countries…Many MICs are raising 
the point that the Bank should recognize that transfers to IDA are from MICs, in order to 
receive an increase in voting share, or at least to compensate” (World Bank AED 
interview, December 14, 2011). Non-borrower EDs interviewed, including 
representatives of Switzerland, the U.S. and the U.K., said instead that the allocations 
were fully justified and came from the Bank’s capital base, to which they contributed the 
largest share (World Bank ED interviews, January 13, 2012; January 25, 2012; January 
30, 2012).  
 
Shareholders have also taken to allocating grants out of IBRD net income in most years 
for purposes that are linked to the geopolitical interests of major non-borrowing 
shareholders. Since the mid-1980s, grants have been allocated to trust funds for the 
former Soviet Union, Gaza-West Bank, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Liberia and 
Lebanon, as well as emergency assistance for Rwanda and post-tsunami recovery in 
South Asia. A middle-income IBRD borrower in Latin America may wonder why they 
are in effect contributing to a trust fund intended to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
or ethnic tensions in the Balkans—both clearly of major interest to western Europe and 
the United States. Between 1985 and 2009, grants out of net income have totaled US$1.9 
billion, or US$2.4 billion in real terms. Between 2010 and 2019, they are projected to 
total another US$100 million per year, equaling US$1.2 billion in foregone reserve equity 
(World Bank, 2009d). This, of course, translates into higher loan costs to borrowers. 
 
The World Bank’s original Articles of Agreement permitted net income to only be used 
for three purposes: building reserves, reducing loan charges or distributing dividends to 
shareholders (Kapur et al., 1997).42 Dividends have never been redistributed, while 
reserves (as described above) have been built up systematically, not to say excessively. 
                                                
42 The current Articles of Agreement, last amended in 1989, stipulate only that the Board of Governors 
decide annually how net income should be allocated (World Bank, 1989 Article V, Section 14). According 
to the World Bank’s former general counsel, “There is no mention of grants in the Bank’s articles, 
however…Grants from the IBRD net income were authorized by a formal interpretation issued by the 
Executive Directors in July 1964” (Shihata, 2000, p. 85-6). 
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However, instead of taking the third option of reducing loan charges, non-borrowing 
shareholders have instead grown accustomed to using net income as a slush fund, 
allowing them to fund programs that suit their own interests, and not necessarily those of 
borrowing countries, without requiring actual direct fiscal allocations out of their own 
budgets. As the Brazilian executive director put it, “Developed countries want to milk it 
like a cow, to take the place of bilateral contributions” (World Bank ED interview, 
December 12, 2011). The total amount of these allocations since they began in 1964 and 
2009 is US$18 billion, or US$29 billion in real terms—an average of US$630 million per 
year in real terms. Between 1975 and 2009, the World Bank’s IBRD loan income 
averaged US$7.5 billion in real terms annually, meaning that if annual allocations out of 
net income had not occurred, the interest and fee payments made by IBRD borrowers on 
their loans could have been reduced by 8.4%.  
 
By contrast, the IADB makes only very limited allocations out of net income annually. 
The IADB’s concessional lending window, called the Fund for Special Operations (FSO), 
is funded entirely by contributions from both borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders 
during the capital replenishment processes (there have been nine thus far in the IADB’s 
history, the most recent in 2010). Part of the reason for this may be that FSO lending 
volumes are so small (only 6% of total lending between 2000 and 2009, compared to 
40% for the World Bank’s IDA) that it can finance most of its needs from repayments on 
old loans and on limited income from investing its existing capital stock, and needs only 
small levels of replenishments. Hence pressure to allocate out of net income from the 
regular lending window (Ordinary Capital) is much lower. Only for a period of five 
years, between 2000 and 2004, did a small portion of OC net income go to FSO, totaling 
US$136 million (IADB AR, 2000-2004).  
 
Similarly, all debt relief contributions from the IADB (totaling US$4.4 billion through 
2010) are financed directly from FSO itself, and not from OC resources (IADB, 2011e). 
Starting in 2005, the IADB began listing “special programs” under administrative 
expenses, which were defined in the financial statement as “non-reimbursable and 
contingent recovery assistance to borrowing member countries” (IADB AR, 2005, p. 116 
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note B), but again the total value was very low, only US$246 million between 2005 and 
2009. The impact of these two sets of allocations on loan pricing is obviously minimal.  
 
The ninth capital replenishment in 2010 called for the IADB to allocate US$200 million 
annually out of OC net income until 2020 for Haiti reconstruction—the first of this type 
of regular allocation of this kind. According to several executive directors from both 
borrowing and non-borrowing countries, this allocation was demanded by the U.S. in 
return for its support to increase the IADB’s capital. Brazil’s executive director at the 
IADB said his country supported helping Haiti, but nonetheless opposed the allocation. 
“We said to the U.S., ‘why us?’ Do it by yourself, not with our money, because in the end 
we take loans and the bank increases the interest rate to transfer this income for Haiti. We 
argued this with the U.S. government. We have the intention to help Haiti, but we do it 
directly. But in the end, the request was done” because otherwise the U.S. threatened to 
block the capital increase (IADB ED interview, January 10, 2012).  
 
Whether this allocation signals future use of IADB’s net income in ways similar to the 
World Bank remains to be seen, but by all accounts non-borrowers will continue to push 
for it. The UK’s representative to the IADB’s annual meeting in 2008 stated the rationale 
clearly in a speech: “We have heard our FSO colleagues calling for a larger FSO window, 
and we think this is something that the IDB should consider as an option for the use of its 
net income” (IADB, 2008). A 2010 U.S. Treasury statement of position on reform 
priorities states that the IADB should “provide net income transfers to fully support 
concessional window (FSO)” (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2010a). According to the 
IADB’s Argentine executive director, the issue was raised by several non-borrowers 
during the recent capital increase, and the idea was uniformly opposed by the borrowing 
country shareholders (IADB ED interview, January 13, 2012).43  
 
The CAF first began setting aside portions of annual net income for special purposes in 
1995, in relatively small amounts. Annual allocations have grown progressively over 
                                                
43 Such a shift would be all the more interesting (and likely conflictive) considering that the U.S. insisted on 
veto power over all FSO operations when the IADB was created, specifically because of the amount of 
money the U.S. contributed at the time (see Chapter 2).   
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time, to reach US$70 million allocated out of net income in 2009 (CAF AR, 1995-2009). 
However, only a portion of these allocations go to what might be considered “needy” 
causes—a large portion is dedicated to a technical assistance fund to help countries 
prepare project proposals, and another sizeable portion is for pre-funding of major 
infrastructure projects. Both of these funds are better viewed as business development 
grants intended to result in major CAF loans. A smaller amount goes to the Human 
Development Fund, which promotes sustainable development projects for the very poor. 
The exact breakdown of these funds is not available for every year. In 2009, the CAF 
committed US$8.2 million via the Human Development Fund, a tiny amount compared to 
the US$8.8 billion in total lending commitments that same year (CAF AR, 2009). Hence, 
making use of net income for shareholder purposes beyond reserve accumulation, so 
prevalent in the World Bank and also present in the IADB though to a lesser degree, is 
almost non-existent at the CAF, due to the lack of non-borrowing shareholder pressure.  
4.3.4 Summary of Net Income Issues 
 
The divergent interests of borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders play a major role in 
shaping the incentives facing each MDB to accumulate and allocate net income each 
year, which in turn has a direct impact on the cost of loans. Non-borrowing shareholders 
have a strong motivation to build up net income to: i) maintain capitalization ratios well 
beyond what a private bank needs, to better protect the callable capital for which they 
would be disproportionately liable; ii) build equity through reserves rather than increasing 
paid-in capital out of their own budgets; and iii) use “surplus” net income to fund projects 
and causes obeying their own interests and not necessarily those of borrowers. Because 
net income comes mainly from loan charges—which are paid entirely by borrowing 
countries—non-borrowers have no incentive not to make use of this mechanism. 
 
In the World Bank, non-borrowers have all the voting power necessary to make these 
allocations each year during the Board of Governors meetings, over any objections from 
borrowers that net income should be used to reduce loan prices, as provided for in the 
Bank’s Articles of Agreement. In the CAF, by contrast, control by borrowing countries 
means that reserve ratios are kept much lower, since equity can be built through paid-in 
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capital increases, while allocations to special projects are minimal. However, the CAF is 
still forced to follow the lead of the World Bank and other MDBs in maintaining higher 
capitalization ratios than it might otherwise, to placate bond markets that have come to 
accept the World Bank’s financial ratios as “normal” for an MDB. The IADB falls 
between the World Bank and CAF, following a similar pattern as the World Bank in 
relation to capitalization and equity, but closer to the CAF in relation to net income 
allocations for special purposes. Evidence suggests that the greater voting strength of 
borrowers gives them a stronger voice in keeping net income (and hence loan charges) as 
low as possible, although the U.S.’s veto power over capital increases did result in an 
agreement to allocate net income to Haiti as part of the most recent capital increase.  
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The intention of this chapter has been to explore whether and how the relative interests of 
borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders influence the price of loans offered by MDBs 
to borrowing countries, one of the main factors influencing demand for MDB loans. The 
evidence indicates that shareholder balance of power does indeed shape many financial 
considerations that impact the cost of each MDB’s loans, in ways that generally conform 
to the positioning of the World Bank at one end of the spectrum, the CAF at the other, 
and the IADB in the middle.  
 
The World Bank—with dominant voting power by non-borrowing, wealthy countries—
has, on the one hand, better access to international capital markets at lower rates, and on 
the other hand, incentives to boost net income at the expense of borrowing countries to 
protect and further the interests of non-borrowing shareholders. Hence, while the World 
Bank can raise capital at extremely low rates, it does not pass on this low cost of funding 
to borrowers to the degree that it might otherwise.  
 
The CAF, controlled almost entirely by borrowing countries, is at the other end of the 
spectrum both regarding capital market access—which is much more tenuous due to the 
lack of wealthy shareholders—and net income incentives—which are almost non-existent 
as the CAF resolutely minimizes the cost to borrowers above all other considerations. 
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This dichotomy with the World Bank holds true in all aspects except for the case of 
maintaining an extremely high (compared to private banks) equity to loans ratio, which is 
due to the market-defining example set by the World Bank and followed by other MDBs 
to meet market expectations for how an MDB should manage its finances. The CAF’s 
strong efforts to hold down loan costs have meant that in times of low global interest 
rates and narrowing spreads on MDB funding (such as the mid 2000s), the interest rate 
charged on CAF loans to borrowing countries has come down almost to the level of the 
World Bank.  
 
The IADB, with a slim voting power majority of borrowing countries but veto power by 
the U.S. over changes to the capital structure, falls in between the two extremes, although 
it tends more toward the World Bank than the CAF. The fact that the IADB has a number 
of wealthy non-borrowing shareholders defines its AAA status and excellent access to 
low-cost financing, despite the fact that non-borrowers do not hold a majority on the 
board. Regarding net income allocation, the IADB appears to act more like the World 
Bank in relation to capitalization ratios and the uses of reserves to build equity as 
opposed to paid-in capital, while it is more like the CAF in that it allocates very little net 
income to special shareholder projects, concessional financing or debt relief. This lack of 
allocations to special purposes helps offset the IADB’s slightly higher borrowing cost, 
thus bringing down the cost of its loans to the same level or even at times below that of 
the World Bank.  
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5 NON-FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MDB 
LENDING 
 
This chapter continues examining the causal links that might explain the patterns in 
lending demand analyzed in Chapter 3. The rationale is that loan financial terms 
(discussed in Chapter 4) are not the sole reason why a country chooses to borrow or not 
from an MDB—a variety of other non-financial aspects of MDB loan operations also 
play a major role. This chapter demonstrates that a number of non-financial 
characteristics of MDB lending are systematically linked to the balance of power between 
borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders governing each MDB (Hypothesis 1). The 
chapter also provides some evidence on how these differences impact loan demand 
(Hypothesis 2), a topic discussed further in the subsequent case study chapter.   
 
The focus here is on the non-financial “hassle factor” required to process a loan, 
including overall bureaucratic procedures and time to process a loan as well as two 
specific sets of procedures for loan approval: environmental/social safeguards and 
procurement rules. Private sources of sovereign finance also require some degree of 
procedures, but compared to MDBs they are faster, relate simply to the client’s ability to 
repay and make no stipulations on how the borrower can or should spend the resources. 
Hence, the bureaucratic loan requirements analyzed here are, for the most part, uniformly 
negative “hassle factors” from the point of view of borrowers, and thus reduce loan 
demand, all else being equal. Other non-financial characteristics that could influence 
demand for lending, such as policy conditionality or technical expertise, are much more 
nuanced and dependent on the circumstances of individual countries, and as such are 
explored in more detail in the country case studies in the following chapter.  
 
The chapter addresses each of the three topics in turn—overall loan processing time, 
environmental and social safeguards and procurement procedures. In each case, the 
research seeks to first establish whether each of the characteristics fall along a continuum 
from the point of view of the borrower, with the CAF at one end, the World Bank at the 
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other and the IADB in the middle. Second, the chapter traces causal links between the 
interests of borrowing and non-borrowing countries in establishing the relative 
positioning of these characteristics along that continuum. Lastly, the chapter presents 
preliminary evidence linking the characteristics to the evolution of loan demand from 
borrowers, a topic that will be considered in more detail in the following chapter. 
Evidence is based on interviews with executive directors (ED) and alternate executive 
directors (AED) as well as staffers from all three MDBs, and policy documents from the 
MDBs themselves.  
5.1 Loan Approval Procedures and Processing Times 
 
The time MDBs take to design, review, negotiate and approve loans is a significant 
burden to borrowing country governments, and one brought up frequently in interviews 
with borrower executive directors as well as government officials (as discussed in the 
next chapter). These procedures—especially in-country missions—require a considerable 
commitment of time by top-level ministerial officials who frequently must attend lengthy 
meetings to discuss project details with MDB staff. As well, many of the projects in 
question have potentially important economic impacts. Hence the length of time taken to 
approve them represents a significant opportunity cost for the country. These procedures 
and times vary considerably among the three MDBs analyzed here (Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1. Loan Approval Procedures and Times 
 World Bank IADB CAF 
Approval 
Time 
12-16 months 7-10 months (2007-2009) 3-6 months; 1.5 if urgent 
Improvements None in last 5 years Down to 5 months avg. in 
2011 
None 
# of Missions • Identification 
• Pre-appraisal 
• Appraisal 
• Negotiation 
• Identification 
• Appraisal 
• Negotiations (often VC) 
• Identification/appraisal 
• Negotiations (often VC) 
# of Review 
Phases 
• Concept 
• Quality Enhance 
• Decision 
• Board 
• Eligibility (often virtual) 
• Quality/risk (often 
virtual) 
• Operations 
• Board 
• Business Committee 
• Loan and Invest Committee 
• Board (for larger loans) 
Caveats Decision meeting can 
be skipped for low-risk 
invest loans since 2009 
(but rare due to risk-
averse staff) 
• Missions faster than WB 
(example: negotiations ½ 
day vs. 2-3 days) 
• Shorter project 
documents and reading 
time before meetings 
than WB 
• Missions faster than either 
IADB or WB 
• Loans below US$20 mln 
approved by operations VP 
• Loans below US$75 mln 
approved by president 
• Non-resident board meets 3-4 
times/year; can approve loans 
by email 
 
5.1.1 World Bank44 
 
Estimates of time required to process a World Bank loan from identification to board 
approval vary greatly according to the type of loan, with investment loans typically 
taking longer due to more stringent safeguard and procurement procedures than with 
budget support (adjustment) lending. A 2007 internal study on the World Bank’s cost of 
doing business faced by borrowers reported an average of 16 months for investment loans 
(World Bank, 2007a), while a presentation in the Bank’s Latin America division stated an 
average of 11-12 months for all types of loans (adjustment and investment) (World Bank, 
2008a). Latin American shareholder representatives at the World Bank all said in 
interviews that loan procedures are far too lengthy, and imply significant opportunity 
costs, especially for projects that could have major economic impacts. The borrower 
shareholders placed the blame squarely on non-borrowing shareholders, as voiced by one 
                                                
44 The information in this chapter on World Bank loan requirements relates to all borrower countries, not 
just Latin America. Although there could conceivably be small differences between countries, all policies 
and processing requirements are the same for every borrower country.  
 
132 
Latin American AED: “With less than 30% of the vote, we are in a weak position to 
influence in policy design and define performance standards. The shareholding is crucial 
to define the design of these policies” (World Bank AED interview, December 14, 2011).  
 
Despite repeated discussion of the problem among management and on the Board since 
2000, there had not been significant progress speeding up the process. Efforts to 
streamline internal loan approval procedures, including the 2009 reform of investment 
lending for low-risk projects (World Bank, 2009a), have made almost no impact on 
approval speed.  Asked why, one operations staffer who has worked both on project 
lending and in efforts to streamline loan processing procedures said, “The incentives 
really aren’t there. Senior management doesn’t want to order people to simplify because 
they’ll get caught in a trap and there’ll be some scandal…What happens is that each 
separate component is fine and make sense, but when you add it up it leads to major 
delays” (World Bank interview, October 4, 2011). 
 
Most investment loans involve four separate country missions (identification, pre-
appraisal, appraisal and negotiations) as well as four full formal internal reviews 
(concept, quality enhancement, decision to appraise and Board approval) (World Bank, 
2012c). Low-risk, repeater investment loans are sometimes allowed to skip the decision 
meeting as part of the recent investment loan reform, but few loans actually qualify for 
this procedure due to risk-averse management, according to long-time Operations Policy 
staffer in the Latin America division (World Bank interview, September 7, 2011). 
Adjustment lending (providing general budget support) follows a very similar schedule, 
but with a higher-level decision to appraise meeting. Considering the need to organize the 
project staff team (all of whom are working simultaneously on multiple projects in 
different countries), coordinate schedules with government officials, circulate documents 
for review informally and then again formally 2-4 weeks before all review meetings, and 
find a slot in the Board agenda, the lengthy approval process should come as no surprise.  
 
Most if not all of the obstacles slowing down the review process were instigated at the 
behest of non-borrowing countries, against the wishes of borrowers, according to multiple 
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interview sources. An Operations Policy staffer in the Latin America region, who 
previously worked as a staffer on the Executive Board, said, “The World Bank is 
majority-owned by Part 1 countries like the US, Japan, France, Netherlands, and the 
Nordics. So every time there’s a screw up, another rule gets written and process gets 
added, formal or informal. Unfortunately that’s the way the place works...These ideas 
come from the Part 1 countries, they’re certainly not the borrowers’ ideas—they didn’t 
come to the Board asking for tighter restrictions on how we do things” (Ibid.). 
 
This formalistic, risk-averse and lengthy set of procedures for loan approval also pertains 
to any modification to a loan that has already been approved. According to an Operations 
Memorandum on Project Restructuring, staff must prepare a Restructuring Paper to be 
approved by the relevant country director and signed off on by the regional vice-president 
(World Bank, 2012d). This process, the operations staffer noted, is required even for 
something as simple as extending the closing date of a loan—a common problem, 
particularly with investment projects that run into frequent delays in developing countries 
for a myriad of reasons (World Bank interview, September 7, 2011). Any restructuring 
involving safeguard re-categorization or changes to a project’s development objectives 
must be submitted to the Board for approval.  
5.1.2 IADB 
 
The overall bureaucratic hassle factor and slow processing times required for loans at the 
IADB is by all accounts similar to that of the World Bank, but somewhat faster and less 
onerous to borrowers. According to recent internal data, the average time required for full 
project preparation and approval averaged 10 months during 2007-2010 for all loans 
(IADB, 2011f)—slightly faster than the World Bank. Further, the trend was clearly 
downward, with an average of eight months recorded in 2009 and roughly 7.5 months in 
2010 (Ibid.). While the steps to loan approval are similar, the process is more streamlined 
at the IADB because the borrowing country shareholders had more influence to approve 
slightly less onerous review requirements, according to a top-level operations staffer who 
previously worked in operations at the World Bank. Although major non-borrowers 
would prefer stricter oversight processes, the staffer said that they—especially the U.S.—
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limit using their power to issues of major concern, in the interests of more consensual 
governance in light of the nearly 50-50 split on the board (IADB interview, January 24, 
2012).  
 
The number and type of formal steps for sovereign loan approval seem comparable on 
paper to the World Bank.45 However, all required documents are considerably shorter 
than in the World Bank, the reading period prior to review meetings is shorter, and two of 
the review meetings are “virtual” rather than physical, all of which speed the process up. 
As well, most projects require only two formal missions, compared to four for the World 
Bank—a considerable savings of time, especially in light of the need to coordinate 
schedules among mission staff and government officials. Final loan negotiations usually 
take place via video conference rather than an in-country mission as with the World Bank 
(IADB interview, January 24, 2012). While the IADB’s procedures were always 
somewhat less cumbersome than the World Bank’s, they have improved in recent years, 
with more delegation to the team leader with the specific aim of shortening project time 
to approval, according to a high-level policy staffer (IADB interview, December 7, 
2011).  
 
Both staffers and shareholders agreed that the still-lengthy approval times at the IADB 
act as a disincentive for borrowing countries to take out loans when they have other 
options, and also that the bureaucratic obstacles overwhelmingly derive from the interests 
of non-borrowing shareholders. The Brazilian ED stated that, “It’s difficult to reduce the 
speed, because the internal process and all the different committees. This comes from the 
non-borrowers—we just experienced this in the capital increase, they created a lot of 
steps in the process, new departments to take care of one issue, and this means the project 
takes a year instead of six months” (IADB ED interview, January 10, 2012). The Chilean 
ED painted a similar picture. “Everybody agrees that it’s too conservative, but the bulk of 
the non-borrowers are on the same page” (IADB ED interview, January 24, 2012).46  
                                                
45 The IADB 2012 lists the major steps as: Develop Project Profile, Eligibility Review, Proposal for 
Operation Development, Quality and Risk Review, Operations Policy Committee Review, and finally 
approval by Executive Board (IADB, 2012a). 
46 The Chilean ED specified that he was expressing his own views, not those of his country. 
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Non-borrowers agreed that they were the cause of much bureaucratic overhead. A 
European G7 AED said, “We have really strengthened the internal oversight mechanism 
and environmental and social safeguards and this might perceived by borrowing members 
as making doing business more complicated with the IADB” (IADB AED interview, 
January 13, 2012). A second non-borrowing G7 European AED stated that the extra 
procedures were the result of non-borrowers using their financial leverage to influence 
policies. “The borrowers consider things like environmental and social safeguards, audits, 
the Office of Institutional Integrity, the Office of Independent Evaluation, the 
Independent Complaints Mechanism as overhead, as additional cost to doing 
business…The non-borrowers consider those to be essential parts of an organization that 
produces good programs that have a positive economic and development impact on the 
region. The borrowers say, ‘you aren’t paying for this when you take out a loan,’ and we 
say, ‘you are not raising the money on your capital, we are’” (IADB AED, January 31, 
2012).  
 
Staff and EDs attributed the faster speed of the IADB compared to the World Bank to 
greater flexibility and less need to rigidly follow the letter of the rule. In large measure 
this more flexible attitude is derived from the fact that the great majority of the staff are 
from the region themselves, and many of them are former (and future) government 
officials. Of the IADB’s nearly 2,000 employees, 68% were from regional borrowing 
countries at the end of 2009 (IADB, 2012b). A management-level IADB policy staffer 
said that this familiarity with the region was a strong comparative advantage over the 
World Bank, and facilitated smoother loan processing (IADB interview, January 18, 
2012). The Chilean ED noted that “there is more cultural proximity with the IADB, it’s 
perceived as more of our bank than the World Bank. I mean, the World Bank’s regional 
vice-president [U.S. national Pamela Cox at the time of the interview] doesn’t even speak 
Spanish” (IADB ED interview, January 24, 2012). A Latin American AED at the World 
Bank who previously worked as a government official dealing with both MDBs put it 
succinctly: “The IADB works more like Latin America—a lot is based on relationships, 
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not rules. There decision-makers can take decisions; here they are more focused on 
following procedure” (World Bank AED interview, January 25, 2012). 
 
Shareholders and staff also emphasize the importance of borrowers having more of a 
stake and a say in the IADB compared to the World Bank. “With the IADB, we feel more 
comfortable borrowing, because more than half the shareholders are countries that also 
borrow. With this, psychologically many countries prefer the IADB to the World Bank,” 
said the ED staff from a middle-income borrower country (IADB ED staff interview, 
January 24, 2012). Two G7 European AEDs agreed, one saying, “There’s probably more 
trust in us than in the World Bank. They see this as ultimately a bank that they have 
50.01% control over” (IADB AED interview, January 31, 2012). A management-level 
staffer echoed these comments: “I think the IADB is perceived more as a bank owned by 
the borrowers. This is more their bank than the World Bank. This issue of belonging, 
having more influence on the institution, makes some countries prefer the IADB” (IADB 
interview, January 18, 2012).  
5.1.3 CAF 
 
The CAF’s loan approval procedure is far faster and less formal than either the other two 
MDBs. Major loans routinely move from conception to final approval within three 
months, or even faster if the country needs it, according to several CAF operations and 
policy staffers interviewed. All concurred that the reason for the reduced bureaucracy is 
directly linked to the fact that borrowing country shareholders control the institution, 
unlike the World Bank and IADB. “We have definite advantages in terms of flexibility 
and reaction time compared to the other multilaterals,” said one operations staffer. “This 
is from our operating design and type of administration. We are much less rigid than the 
other multilaterals, which have certain impositions from donating countries that we do 
not” (CAF interview, May 25, 2009). 
  
Rather than facing five or six levels of review for each loan prior to reaching the 
executive board, as with the other two MDBs, CAF loans face only two review levels, 
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according to staffers in operations and high-level managers.47 The Comité de Negocios 
Corporatives (Corporate Business Committee) considers whether the proposed project 
conforms to CAF policies and business strategy, and is the only review that considers a 
project’s concept and development impact. After proposal development, the project is 
presented to the Comité de Préstamos e Inversiones (Loan and Investment Committee) to 
analyze the loan’s credit risk implications for the CAF’s loan portfolio and financial 
profile. Not only are the review meetings fewer, but the CAF review meetings are much 
less onerous also, according to a former CAF staffer who has worked at all three MDBs. 
“Projects are discussed and have to get approved, but the meetings are really fast and not 
nearly as serious as the IADB and the World Bank” (CAF interview, June 1, 2009). As 
well, several staffers noted that authority is much more decentralized than in the other 
MDBs, with officials in country offices permitted greater decision power without having 
to get approval from headquarters in Caracas. 
 
The CAF has greater flexibility in both arranging and modifying loans than the other 
MDBs. Loans can be initiated or sped up by direct communication between a country’s 
politicians and CAF management, according to the former CAF staffer. “It’s much easier 
to influence the CAF than the IADB or the World Bank. The president of Ecuador can 
call the president of CAF and arrange things. Everything is much more negotiable” 
(Ibid.). Loan modifications are also considerably easier. For example, if a country’s 
financing costs were to drop, the CAF is willing to allow the country to repay more 
expensive loans and renegotiate new loans on better terms. One operations staffer said, 
“The countries don’t feel that they are tied to expensive financing terms. It’s more 
difficult with the other two, when they sign a contract it’s a lot stricter” (CAF interview, 
August 23, 2011). By contrast, the World Bank requires board approval even for changes 
in development objectives, and changes to financial terms of World Bank or IADB loans 
require negotiation of an entirely new loan.  
 
                                                
47 The CAF’s formal loan approval process is not publicly available. This process was confirmed by three 
separate interviews (CAF interviews May 25, 2009; August 23, 2011; August 24, 2011). 
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Final approval of loans is also radically different at the CAF compared to the World Bank 
and IADB. Sovereign loans below $20 million can be approved directly by operations 
vice-presidents and sovereign loans below $75 million can be approved directly by the 
executive vice-president, with no further review, according to a top-level CAF manager 
(CAF interview, August 24, 2011)—an authority delegated to management unimaginable 
at the other two MDBs. As well, the executive board itself is a group of finance ministers 
and central bank governors who meet only three to four times per year, rather than a 
permanent sitting board. Because they are top-level officials, the manager said, they can 
take major decisions quickly without having to consult with their capitals, as executive 
directors at the World Bank and IADB (Ibid.).  
 
All CAF staffers interviewed, as well as staff and shareholder representatives at the other 
two MDBs, pointed to the CAF’s executive board as a critical characteristic that 
differentiated it from the IADB and World Bank. According to a top CAF finance officer, 
“The lack of heavy oversight is for sure a big competitive advantage. Our administration 
is given more control over day-to-day operations; we don’t have a sitting board. This 
eliminates or reduces almost to zero political interference in our operations” (CAF 
interview, December 14, 2010). An operations official described the board as functioning 
“like a club of friends from the same neighborhood—there’s no external influence. There 
are also a lot of ex-ministers and government officials from all the countries on staff, so 
the board has a lot more confidence in management, they feel well-represented” (CAF 
interview, August 23, 2011). Long-time CAF President Enrique Garcia, in a 2005 
interview, makes much the same point about the relationship between management and 
shareholders. “I do not have a resident board here. CAF has a board that meets three to 
four times a year and they are all finance ministers or central bank governors. This means 
that all high-level decisions are taken very quickly. [Governments] have to delegate to 
management” (Barham, 2005a, p. 20). 
5.2 Environmental and Social Safeguards 
 
A fundamental difference between loans offered by MDBs and those offered by private 
sources of sovereign credit are environmental and social safeguards. These consist of 
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procedures and restrictions on different types of lending operations meant to “safeguard” 
the project from having negative impacts, primarily on the environment and on certain 
social groups that might be affected. All MDBs have some type of safeguards system, 
although they vary considerably, thus the burden required of borrower countries also 
varies depending on which MDB they borrow from. This section first compares the 
current environmental and social (E&S) safeguard framework, and then shows how 
shareholder interest has shaped their design. 
5.2.1 Current Safeguard Framework 
 
The World Bank currently has 10 operational policy E&S safeguards (six related to the 
environment, two on social issues and two on legal issues) while the IADB has four (two 
on the environment and two on social issues). The CAF has a list of 14 safeguards (six 
related to the environment, seven on social issues, and one overarching safeguard), which 
are not codified into formal policy to the same level as the other two MDBs (CAF, 2007). 
The most controversial of the safeguard issues relate to environmental impact, 
involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples. According to a recent review of 
safeguard policies by the World Bank’s IEG, these are also the most commonly 
triggered—72% of investment loans globally between 1999 and 2008 trigger 
environmental assessments, 30% involuntary resettlements, and 17% indigenous peoples 
issues (World Bank, 2010a).48 As such, the comparative analysis below focuses on these 
three areas. The World Bank safeguards are applied in all operations, hence the 
discussion below for the World Bank relates not just to Latin America.  
 
A. Environmental Protection 
 
The environmental safeguard policies of the World Bank (OP 4.01) and the IADB (OP 
703) are in many respects quite similar. All project teams are to perform an initial 
screening to determine which “category” a project falls into—A, B, or C—depending on 
similar criteria for expected environmental impacts. Category A projects are considered 
to imply the greatest environmental risk, Category B only local impacts that can be 
                                                
48 The remaining safeguards are triggered on between 1% and 12% of projects.  
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mitigated, and Category C minimal or no environmental impacts.49 On the basis of the 
categorization, the project team and borrower are then required to follow a number of 
other steps during the loan approval and implementation process, with more rigorous 
procedures for Category A projects. Broadly speaking, steps involve undertaking an 
environmental assessment (EA) for Category A and B projects, engaging in consultations 
with affected parties (twice for Category A projects), and implementing action plans to 
mitigate environmental damages.  
 
In a number of key areas, however, World Bank and IADB environmental safeguards 
differ, with the latter being more flexible and less strict. Both mandate an EA done by the 
borrower, but the World Bank requires Category A project EAs to be undertaken by 
“independent EA experts not affiliated with the project” (World Bank, 1999a, para. 4). 
The IADB’s policy makes no mention of who should undertake the EA, meaning it could 
acceptably be done by an environmental unit within the relevant ministry or by the 
government’s environmental oversight body (IADB, 2007). As well, the World Bank 
requires Category A project borrowers to “engage independent, internationally 
recognized environmental specialists to advise on all aspects of the project relevant to the 
EA” (World Bank, 1999a, para. 4). The IADB “may ask the borrowers to establish an 
advisory panel of experts” (IADB, 2007, p. 24, emphasis added) for Category A projects, 
but the guidelines explicitly state that “not all category A projects will a priori require and 
advisory panel” (Ibid., p. 25), leaving a considerable degree of leeway depending on the 
circumstances. 
 
The IADB’s stipulations are also more relaxed regarding consultations with affected 
people. While both MDBs require consultations for both Category A and B projects, the 
World Bank specifies that “the borrower consults project affected groups and local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) about the project’s environmental aspects and take 
their views into account” (World Bank, 1999a, para. 14). The IADB requires only that 
borrowers consult with “affected parties”, with no mention of NGOs, adding only that 
                                                
49 The World Bank also has a Category FI for projects supported by financial intermediaries with some 
Bank financing, which the IADB does not include.  
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consultations with “other interested parties may also be undertaken…” (IADB, 2006b, p. 
10). In the case of Category A projects, both MDBs require two sets of consultations, 
though here again the World Bank is much more specific on exactly when these 
consultations occur during the project development process (World Bank, 1999a, para. 14 
and IADB, 2007, p. 35). The World Bank states that the EA review will give “special 
attention to, among other things, the nature of the consultations with affected groups and 
local NGOs and the extent to which the views of such groups were considered” (World 
Bank, 1999b, para. 12), while the IADB guidelines make no similar statement. During 
implementation, the World Bank requires borrowers to continue consultations, while the 
IADB does not (IADB, 2006, p. 10). 
 
The institutional arrangements for EA approval within each MDB also vary, with the 
IADB project teams afforded considerably more independence compared to World Bank 
teams, which face oversight at each phase. In the World Bank, the project team is 
required to work with the Regional Safeguards Advisor—a separate office pertaining to 
the Operations Vice-Presidency, and not to the country teams—at all stages of the 
process beginning with the initial screening and categorization, and the RSA can shut the 
project down at any point if not satisfied for all Category A and B projects (World Bank, 
1999b). For the IADB, the team makes its own decision on categorization, and only 
Category A projects require approval from the Committee on Environmental and Social 
Impact (CESI) (IADB, 2007). For Category B projects, the CESI will review “only those 
operations that the Committee considers necessary” (Ibid., p. 25). The EAs produced by 
borrowers are reviewed only by the project team (Ibid., p. 30-31).  
 
IADB staffers and independent observers concur that while the general environmental 
directives of the IADB and World Bank are quite similar, implementation is less rigorous 
at the IADB. One safeguard specialist formerly at the IADB and now at the World Bank 
noted that a project designated as Category A at the World Bank faces numerous extra 
mandatory procedures and reviews, while there is little difference at the IADB. “It’s 
fundamentally different at IADB, there’s really no consequence for administration and 
timing of categorizing A or B, absolutely no consequence, the process is exactly the 
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same. For us [at the World Bank], there are a lot of processes to go through, there is a 
difference in level of scrutiny that projects go through here” (World Bank interview, 
September 6, 2011). Similarly, an independent panel reviewing IADB safeguards stated 
that safeguard requirements “were often uneven or too general to provide explicit, legally 
binding guidance to countries and ultimately, to Bank staff charged with supervising 
compliance” (IADB, 2011g, p. 25-6). A top current environmental staffer at the IADB 
agreed, noting that the translation of actions listed in the EA into actions by the borrower 
was lacking. “When we actually looked at the end of that effort, in the execution and 
supervision, we couldn’t find where the requirements were established in terms of an 
agreement with the borrower,” the staffer said. “It’s not in the operation plan, it’s not 
even in the loan agreement—it kind of disappeared” (IADB interview, December 7, 
2011). 
 
At the CAF, environmental safeguards are contained in a few very short and general 
paragraphs with essentially no formal obligations put on project teams or borrowers—a 
far cry from the detailed and lengthy policies and guidelines at the World Bank and 
IADB. The over-riding principle, as emphasized by the CAF’s first safeguard, is that “all 
projects financed by the CAF conform to the environmental legislation of the country 
where the project is executed, as well as the international agreements and commitments 
by shareholding countries” (CAF, 2007, p. 13, author’s translation). That is to say, the 
CAF simply ensures that the country follows its own E&S laws for CAF projects, and 
places no other external obligation on the borrower. Regarding environmental evaluation, 
the policy states that the CAF undertakes its own evaluation as part of the normal project 
cycle, that “when it is considered necessary, [the CAF] requests the presentation of 
complementary environmental evaluations, studies and analysis…”, with no specifics 
given on content, timing or types of environmental risks (Ibid.). The CAF clearly 
absolves itself of any responsibility for environmental damages, stating that “It is the 
responsibility of the client to adopt measures necessary to avoid, control, mitigate and 
compensate environmental and social impacts and risks” (Ibid.). 
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As should be evident, while the IADB and World Bank differ to a degree in the rigor of 
their environmental safeguards, the CAF is several orders of magnitude more lax, leaving 
almost complete flexibility to assess each project as it chooses. This assessment is 
supported by an analysis of the CAF by a MDB watchdog NGO. The report points out 
that the CAF’s policies only call for departing from national laws on consulting affected 
populations or taking measures to safeguard the environment “when it is considered 
necessary”, and “the policies give no orientation to indicate under what conditions the 
bank could consider it ‘necessary’ to do so” (Bank Information Center, 2008, p. 14, 
author’s translation). The environmental assessment process, which is a key feature of 
both IADB and World Bank procedures for high-risk projects, is not formally stipulated 
in the CAF’s policies, and according to the NGO not a single assessment had ever been 
undertaken up to 2008 (Ibid., p. 17). Further, while the CAF’s environmental strategy 
refers to numerous documents involved in the approval process, none of those documents 
are publicly available (nor, indeed, does the CAF have any transparency policy regarding 
public access to information, unlike the other two MDBs).  
 
B. Involuntary Resettlement 
 
When a project has a significant land use component—such as for transport 
infrastructure, hydropower facilities, or slum upgrading—task teams with the World 
Bank and the IADB as well as borrowers are required to undertake a number of measures. 
The resettlement policies of the IADB (OP 710) and World Bank (OP 4.12) are similar in 
most respects, and as with environmental oversight, differ in a few specific but 
potentially important details. Project teams in both MDBs are mandated to seek 
alternative designs that do not involve resettlement, and broadly require compensation 
and assistance to those who are resettled to achieve a standard of living equal to or better 
than pre-project levels. The application of the World Bank’s safeguard is slightly more 
broad, encompassing not only resettlements caused directly by the MDB-funded activities 
(as with the IADB) but also that are “a) directly and significantly related to the Bank-
assisted project, (b) necessary to achieve its objectives as set forth in the project 
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documents; and (c) carried out, or planned to be carried out, contemporaneously with the 
project” (World Bank, 2001c, para. 4). 
 
In designing a resettlement plan, the World Bank requires “meaningful consultations with 
affected persons and communities, local authorities, and, as appropriate, 
nongovernmental organizations” (Ibid., para. 14), and that displaced people should be 
“meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities to participate in planning and 
implementing resettlement programs” (Ibid., para. 2b). By contrast, the first sentence of 
the consultations section of the IADB’s implementation guidelines for resettlement states 
that “Where possible, the affected population should be involved in the design of the 
resettlement plan” (IADB, 1999, p. 18, emphasis added). The guidelines then go on at 
great length to detail why consultations with community authorities and local NGOs can 
lead to conflicts and might be best avoided, and offers a variety of flexible options for the 
borrower to take affected people’s views into account when designing the resettlement 
plan depending on local conditions. The World Bank further requires the creation of a 
third-party dispute resolution mechanism to address grievances related to the resettlement 
plan (World Bank, 2001c, Annex A, para. 17), which is discussed but not mandated in the 
IADB’s guidelines (IADB, 1999). 
 
On the issue of compensation to affected individuals, both MDBs clearly state the 
principle of re-establishing or exceeding prior levels of livelihood. However the World 
Bank policy states that individuals be “provided prompt and effective compensation at 
full replacement cost for losses of assets” (World Bank, 2001c, para. 6), while the IADB 
specifies “fair and adequate compensation and rehabilitation” (IADB, 1998, p. 1), 
providing greater leeway for project teams and governments. Further, the World Bank 
emphasizes that “Preference should be given to land-based resettlement strategies for 
displaced persons whose livelihoods are land-based” (World Bank, 2001c, para. 11), 
while the IADB policy states only that “The options that are offered should be 
appropriate for the people affected, and should reflect their capabilities and realistic 
aspirations” (IADB, 1998, p. 4), again providing considerably more flexibility (especially 
as finding new land on which to resettle people whose livelihoods are land-based is often 
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extremely difficult). The World Bank policy also specifically addresses the issue of 
people who may lose access to natural resources due to restrictions involving parks or 
protected areas and mandates further consultations (World Bank, 2001c, para. 7), whereas 
the issue is not discussed in the IADB policy.  
 
In overseeing resettlement issues, the World Bank team must work with the regional 
social development unit, the Legal Vice-Presidency and a special Resettlement 
Committee, all of which must review and approve borrower actions (World Bank, 
2001d). Once under implementation, the project is “not considered complete—and Bank 
supervision continues—until the resettlement measures set out in the relevant 
resettlement instrument have been implemented” (Ibid., para. 16). For the IADB, the 
project team essentially has to pass one hurdle—the submission and approval of an 
Environmental and Social Impact Report by the Committee on Environmental and Social 
Impact (CESI), after which it moves into the regular project channels of the Loan 
Committee and the Board for final approval (IADB, 1999). While the resettlement 
commitments of the borrower are incorporated into the loan agreement, they are not in 
the legal agreement, unlike the World Bank (Ibid.). The IADB’s policy guidelines discuss 
supervision procedures for resettlement at some length, but make no categorical 
statement like the World Bank policy that project completion depends on resettlement 
completion (Ibid.). 
 
Evidence from internal World Bank analysis supports the conclusion that its resettlement 
policies are more stringent than other MDBs, including the IADB. A study of safeguard 
compliance in 2000, discussing a recent revision of the resettlement policy, noted that 
“Compared to the safeguard objectives of other MDBs and Part I countries, the above 
policy appears to set higher standards and increases potential for external criticism of the 
Bank and borrowers…” (World Bank, 2000, p. 24). The report adds that “In some 
instances, [resettlement policies] would exceed normal practices in industrial countries” 
(Ibid, p. 12). A more recent IEG study from 2010 came to a similar conclusion, quoting 
one World Bank country director as saying, “There is a serious disconnect between what 
countries are doing and our social safeguards. The resettlement policy is way out of line 
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with what our clients have” (World Bank, 2010a, p. 93). The IEG specifically compared 
the World Bank’s policies with the IADB’s, and concluded that the latter was more 
flexible and project-specific (Ibid.). 
 
The CAF’s safeguard regarding resettlement states the same over-arching principles as 
the other two MDBs, but contains no specific requirements whatsoever. The policy states 
simply that in the case of projects requiring resettlement, the CAF “requests the 
formulation of plans that compensate or offer similar or better conditions of life to 
affected groups, and that receiving communities are taken into account” (CAF, 2007, p. 
15, author’s translation). The policy further says that the CAF “supports developing skills 
and options for local community development, especially for indigenous people who, due 
to their vulnerable condition, could be directly affected by an operation” (Ibid.).50  
 
C. Indigenous Peoples 
 
The policies on indigenous people for the World Bank (OP 4.10) and IADB (OP 765) are, 
once again, very similar, both in terms of the comprehensiveness of their coverage and in 
the requirements to project teams and borrowers. As with environmental and resettlement 
safeguards, the IADB appears to be somewhat more flexible in certain respects, but 
unlike the other safeguards, indigenous policy for the IADB also exceeds World Bank 
requirements in at least one area, which may point to political economy considerations 
specific to the Latin America region. 
 
A first important difference is the definition of indigenous peoples themselves. Because 
of the region’s historical background, the IADB can simply define indigenous people as 
descendents of the inhabitants before the conquest who “retain some or all of their own 
social, economic, political, linguistic and cultural institutions and practices,” and who 
consider themselves to be indigenous people (IADB, 2006c). The World Bank—which 
obviously works across the globe, not just in Latin America—is forced to recognize right 
                                                
50 “Support” is the author’s translation of the Spanish word “propende”, which has no good translation to 
English, but suggests a tendency or propensity toward a certain action, and is hence actually even weaker 
than “support.”  
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at the beginning of its OP that “because there is no universally accepted definition of 
‘Indigenous Peoples,’ this policy does not define the term” (World Bank, 2005b, para. 3). 
It then proceeds to set out a series of characteristics to be used to identify indigenous 
peoples that are considerably vaguer than for the IADB which, one can imagine, must 
lead to considerable dispute in many parts of the world. A 2000 World Bank study on 
safeguards mentions one project where it took six months to even decide if a given group 
was “indigenous” (World Bank, 2000, p. 11). The World Bank further explicitly states 
that groups that might have once had a “collective attachment” to an area, but because of 
“forced severance” no longer live there, are also eligible under the policy (World Bank, 
2005b, para. 4).  
 
Both MDBs place considerable emphasis on obtaining the free and informed consent of 
affected indigenous peoples before moving ahead with the project and in the design of an 
indigenous peoples plan to mitigate impacts (Ibid. and IADB, 2006c). However the IADB 
further notes that the “expressed refusal by indigenous people to participate in 
consultations represents a significant risk for the project, and project approval will require 
a waiver of those requirements from the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors” (IADB, 
2006c, para. 2.53a). The World Bank’s OP simply states that the project cannot proceed 
unless the task team is able to ascertain that “broad support” for the project exists (World 
Bank, 2005b, para. 7). The IADB also goes further than the World Bank in requiring 
“socioculturally appropriate and technically feasible mechanisms for the participation of 
affected indigenous peoples in the monitoring and evaluation” of the project and of 
mitigation measures (IADB, 2006c, para. 2.39d). The World Bank requires only that the 
project task leader “ensures that Bank supervision includes appropriate social science and 
legal expertise” (World Bank, 2005c, para. 12). 
 
In terms of bureaucratic process, the two OPs generally mirror those related to 
environmental assessment. The World Bank project team must receive approval from the 
regional safeguard advisor at all steps in the process, as well as the legal department 
(Ibid.). The IADB relies on the project team at most steps of the process, with clearance 
required for the initial social evaluation and the indigenous peoples plan by the CESI. 
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Final obligations are required by the IADB to be included not just in the project 
documents, but also in the legal, contractual documents, unlike the situation with 
resettlement plans (IADB, 2006c). The World Bank has a similar requirement (World 
Bank, 2005c). 
 
The CAF, here again, has the same type of vague safeguards for indigenous people as in 
environment and resettlement issues. The safeguard re-emphasizes the priority of 
following national law, stating in the second sentence that the CAF “is vigilant that 
operations have adequately completed the participation process required by the laws of 
the respective country,” adding that “when considered necessary” the CAF will “request” 
additional public consultations and management plans on indigenous groups “recognized 
by the respective national legislation” (CAF, 2007, pp. 14-15). The Bank Information 
Center report on the CAF notes that it had no specialist on indigenous issues on its staff 
as of 2008 (Bank Information Center, 2008). 
5.2.2 Summing Up and Linking to Shareholder Interest 
 
As with other non-financial aspects of the three MDBs analyzed in this chapter, their 
policies related to E&S protection falls on a continuum, with the World Bank generally at 
one end, the IADB in the middle and the CAF at the other extreme (Table 5.2). The 
evidence clearly indicates that this is a function of shareholder interest and balance of 
power in each MDB’s governance. 
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Table 5.2. Comparison of Three Safeguards 
 World Bank IADB CAF 
Environment 
Experts Independent experts 
for EA and Category 
A advisory panel 
 
No stipulation; 
advisory panel not 
required 
 
National systems 
Consultations Includes NGOs Only “affected 
parties” 
National systems 
Bureaucracy Separate regional 
safeguard team (often 
conflicts with project 
team) 
No separate safeguard 
specialists – project 
team makes decisions 
Ad hoc review as part 
of regular loan 
approval 
Resettlement 
Trigger Caused by or related 
to project 
Directly caused by 
project only 
National systems 
Consultations Required  “Where possible” National systems 
Dispute resolution 3rd party mechanism 
required 
Not required National systems 
Type of resettlement Land-based preferred 
for those with land-
based livelihoods 
“Appropriate” 
resettlement 
National systems 
Bureaucracy Social Development 
Unit, Resettlement 
Committee, Legal 
 
Only project team Ad hoc review as part 
of regular loan 
approval 
Project completion Not until resettlement 
completed 
 
No requirement No requirement 
Indigenous Peoples 
Definition Vague, open to 
dispute 
Descendents of pre-
Hispanic population 
National systems 
Consent “Broad support” Expressed agreement 
required 
National systems 
Supervision Includes social 
science and legal 
advice, no indigenous 
participation required 
Socioculturally 
appropriate 
mechanisms to ensure 
indigenous 
participation required 
National systems 
Bureaucracy Regional Safeguards 
Unit Committee, 
Legal 
Project team only Ad hoc review as part 
of regular loan 
approval 
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A. World Bank 
 
The World Bank is the most inclined to place restrictions on its lending practices that go 
well beyond what national laws of borrowing countries (and indeed non-borrowing 
countries, in some cases) stipulate, and is the most willing to put in place bureaucratic 
hurdles to ensure that those policies are strictly followed. This is evident in each of the 
three E&S safeguards reviewed above, and is substantiated by internal World Bank 
studies. A 2000 assessment of the cost of doing business with the World Bank stated, “In 
their actual implementation, Bank policies are perceived by clients to be more rigorous 
than those required by other sources of development finance…Many other MDBs have 
more flexible guidelines where the Bank has formal policies, and in general have fewer 
staff and internal capacity to support implementation of the guidelines” (World Bank, 
2000, p. 2). Similarly, a 2010 survey of country government officials undertaken by the 
World Bank in 2010 found reported that 73% said overall World Bank safeguards are 
significantly stronger than projects financed by other institutions (World Bank, 2010a).  
 
Numerous sources indicate that the force behind this drive for strict E&S safeguards at 
the World Bank is the interests and voting power of non-borrowing shareholders, who 
implement these policies against the interests of borrowing countries, and institute rigid, 
legalistic procedures that limit the staff’s flexibility. The two most comprehensive 
reviews of the creation of safeguards at the World Bank both document in exhaustive 
detail how activist NGOs brought pressure to bear on the World Bank via the U.S. 
Congress and political parties in western Europe (mainly Germany and the U.K.), which 
led to the implementation and continual tightening of safeguards in the 1980s and 1990s 
against the vocal opposition of borrowing countries.51 Not only did the campaigns force 
the World Bank into implementing much more rigorous environmental and social 
standards than had previously been the case, but the lack of trust of World Bank staff on 
the part of many non-borrowing shareholders led to the creation of the Inspection Panel 
in 1993 as part of IDA 10, as a watchdog that safeguards were followed (Wade, 1997 and 
                                                
51 The two most thorough accounts—though with rather different perspectives—are Wade, 1997 and 
Shihata, 1991, 1995 and 2000. 
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Shihata, 2000). “External criticisms of the Bank by NGOs and influential circles in 
certain member countries with large subscriptions in the Bank’s capital (and large 
subscriptions/contributions to the Bank’s affiliate, the International Development 
Association (IDA)) no doubt influenced that conclusion” (Shihata, 2000, p. 540). 
 
Executive directors from both borrowing and non-borrowing countries said in interviews 
that the latter were unquestionably the main force pushing for tighter environmental and 
social safeguards, largely as a result of pressures they face from civil society. One Latin 
American middle-income AED stated that “It all comes from developing countries—the 
Nordic chair generally pushes a lot about performance standards, France and Germany 
also push, and the United States too depending on the project” (World Bank AED 
interview, December 14, 2011). The Brazilian ED agreed, saying “If I’m from a non-
borrower country, I want to put that in an ex-ante conditionality, safeguards so strong that 
no one has access unless they comply with safeguards, which are for developed countries 
not for developing countries” (World Bank ED interview, December 12, 2011). An 
advisor to European G7 ED said that “We get a lot of lobbying about environmental and 
social human rights safeguards,” and added that tighter safeguards are resisted by many 
borrowers. “Some MICs [middle-income countries] definitely say this isn’t the way we 
should be going about our business. They think that for growth and private sector growth 
to take the place, they should get that damn infrastructure in and let it do the work, and 
that all safeguards are doing is putting grit in the machine” (World Bank ED staff 
interview, January 30, 2012). 
  
B. IADB 
 
The IADB’s safeguard policies are in most respects very similar to the World Bank, 
although they have tightened at a slower pace.  A top environmental staffer at the IADB 
referred to safeguard policies in the early 2000s as “very broad statements, not very 
definitive, more aspirational and giving a general sense of warm feelings about 
environment rather than a rigorous, defined set of practices and commitments” (IADB 
interview, December 7, 2011). E&S safeguards were thoroughly revamped starting in 
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2003, bringing them much more in line with World Bank (IADB, 2006b), driven almost 
entirely by the non-borrowing shareholders. “It was the U.S. and the other donors, no 
question about it,” according to the environmental staffer (IADB interview, December 7, 
2011). As a result of the new policies, the number of policies going through safeguard 
compliance review jumped from 480 in 2007 to 775 in 2009 (IADB, 2011g). Pressure 
from non-borrowers continues to ensure that safeguards are followed. The AED of a 
European G7 non-borrower commented, “I can’t see any non-borrowing country wanting 
to weaken safeguard procedures. That’s the basis on which the Americans can support a 
capital increase” (IADB AED interview, January 31, 2012). Indeed, the U.S. Treasury’s 
report to Congress in 2011 justified its agreement to the most recent capital increase in 
part by noting that its requirement for the IADB to revise E&S safeguards had been 
complied with (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2011). 
 
A new independent inspection panel was also created in 1994 at the behest of non-
borrowers, following the lead of the World Bank, although it was initially a rather 
toothless instrument. As one observer noted, “Created under U.S. pressure during 
negotiations of the IDB’s eighth replenishment, the panel has been little publicized in the 
region and suffers from ‘obscurity and a lack of independence from IDB control’” 
(Nelson, 2000, p. 424). The author specifically cites the greater power of borrowing 
shareholders at the IADB vis a vis the World Bank as the reason for this. Between 1994 
and 2010, the IADB’s Independent Investigation Mechanism received a grand total of 
five complaints, compared to 70 by the World Bank’s Inspection Panel over the same 
time period (World Bank, 2010d). Under pressure from the U.S. and other non-
borrowers52 as part of the ninth capital increase, the IADB completely revamped the 
panel. The U.S. Treasury’s report to Congress in 2009 noted with satisfaction that “with 
the strong support of the United States,” the new panel “significantly improves the IDB’s 
recourse mechanism by increasing its independence from management” (U.S. 
Department of Treasury, 2010b, p. 9). 
                                                
52 The IADB governors for Norway (Olav Kjørven), German (Uschi Eid), and Japan (Yuji Yamamoto) 
expressed support for strengthening the inspection panel (now called the Independent Consultation and 
Investigation Mechanism) in speeches at the 2004 Board of Governor meetings in Lima, Peru. It was not 
mentioned by governors from any borrowing country recorded at the event. See IADB, 2004. 
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Despite the many similarities with World Bank safeguard policies, the IADB has a 
marked tendency to less formalistic rules in a way that offers more flexibility to both staff 
and borrowing countries. The greater power of borrowing shareholders and the more 
consensual atmosphere of IADB governance—necessitated by the more balanced voting 
shares between borrowers and non-borrowers—means client countries are able to shape 
the implementation of these policies in a way that better suits their interests. A researcher 
examining World Bank and IADB policies on civil society influence came to the same 
conclusion on the how the two MDBs compare: “There is a discernible pattern in nearly 
all areas of governance and civil society policy: World Bank adoption of a policy 
precedes the IDB’s and creates a standard…The IDB adapts and revises the World 
Bank’s global approach in ways that reflect the attitudes of regional governments toward 
the new policies” (Nelson, 2000, pp. 419-20) The resulting “loosely framed policy 
reduces opposition and leaves broad discretion with the IDB’s country offices and 
borrowing government officials” (Ibid., p. 420). Staffers and EDs agree with this overall 
assessment. One European G7 AED defended the IADB’s safeguards as robust, but 
acknowledged their flexibility: “We are probably less legalistic than the World Bank” in 
safeguard implementation (IADB AED interview, January 31, 2012). A top 
environmental staffer echoed this view: “Compared to the World Bank, we are less 
procedural—it’s more about the outcome. We wanted some flexibility, it fits the 
institutional culture better” (IADB interview, December 7, 2011).  
 
The one exception to this overall pattern relates to the safeguards for indigenous people 
by the IADB, which are somewhat stronger than the World Bank’s. This reading of the 
policies is substantiated by interviews with staffers. One safeguard expert who has 
worked at all three MDBs attributed this to the particular political influence of indigenous 
groups in the political systems of many countries in Latin America, compared to the rest 
of the world. “Indigenous groups in Latin America have been very vocal and very 
political, and have gained power at the government level…In countries like Venezuela, 
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, there’s a very strong influence of indigenous 
people. Chile has incredible rules for IPs [indigenous peoples]. It’s a political force that 
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you cannot ignore” (World Bank interview, September 6, 2011). Hence, because of very 
strong existing legislation and constitutional protections in many Latin American 
countries on indigenous rights, borrowing governments do not feel threatened by strict 
IADB safeguards in this area, and in fact may find them politically useful.  
 
C. CAF 
 
In contrast to the other two MDBs, the fact that borrower shareholders control the CAF 
ensures that it imposes no binding external constraints on environmental and social 
aspects of project lending, beyond respect for national laws. The CAF first formally 
published an environmental strategy only in April 2007. According to the document, the 
CAF created a Sustainable Development Coordination Office as far back as 1994, which 
in 2004 became the Vice-Presidency of Social and Environmental Development. But by 
the accounts of former CAF officials as well as an independent NGO report (Bank 
Information Center, 2008), the CAF had essentially no safeguards at all until the 2007 
policy statement, and arguably still does not. A top CAF environmental specialist who 
left in the early 2000s to work at other development institutions said flatly, “When I was 
there, the CAF didn’t have any environmental policy” (World Bank interview, September 
6, 2011). The specialist said that the CAF had made some improvements in the last 15 
years, but that “In terms of commitment, depth of analysis and seriousness about how to 
manage environmental and social aspects, the CAF is definitely the lighter one” (Ibid.). 
Staffers at the CAF defend the environmental policies as respectful of local laws. “We go 
with the local legislation, we don’t ask more…We feel that if you are respecting local 
laws and doing your work, you don’t have to go further than that,” said one CAF 
operations staffer. “We don’t go to the extremes as others in ways that would make the 
CAF more expensive and complicated” (CAF interview, August 23, 2011).  
 
CAF staffers point to the difference in shareholder composition as the fundamental 
reason for the variance in policies. “The reason is fundamentally from the composition of 
the board. If for example we had Nordic and European countries on our board, 
environmental issues are very important to them, the bar is a lot higher…At end of day, 
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since this is a Latin bank, for the board to put on conditionality that is stricter than local 
laws would be to shoot themselves in the foot, because they would be requiring expensive 
conditions that they have to pay themselves,” according to an operations staffer (Ibid.). A 
management-level policy staffer concurred, saying that the CAF’s environmental and 
social policies “are not imposed from the outside by third parties, they are Latin 
American policies designed for this context… Our policies are not from 
environmentalists from some other country, they don’t respond to the policies of non-
borrowing countries like the other banks” (CAF interview, August 24, 2011). An IADB 
environmental official agreed that governance played the fundamental role in shaping the 
different policies. “It’s because the board membership completely different. There’s no 
European, North American or Japanese shareholders in the CAF, which are the countries 
that tend to raise these concerns” (IADB interview, December 7, 2011). 
5.3 Procurement Safeguards 
 
While E&S safeguards have a relatively high degree of visibility, financial safeguards on 
MDB lending receive considerably less public attention but are a major source of non-
financial costs faced by borrowing countries. As one internal World Bank study noted, 
procurement and financial management requirements apply to almost all operations, 
whereas environmental assessments take place on about half of investment operations and 
resettlement on about 25 percent (World Bank, 2001b, p. 9). Procurement rules govern 
how the proceeds of loans may be spent by recipient governments—that is, the 
procedures by which the government selects and pays the providers of goods and services 
needed for the completion of a project—while public financial management (PFM) 
regulates the flow of resources through government bank accounts, audit procedures and 
the like. As with other safeguards, procurement and PFM policies on World Bank and 
IADB loans supersede any national legislation or procedures in these areas.  
 
Interviews with financial safeguard specialists and operations staffers at both the IADB 
and World Bank point to procurement as a much more contentious issue between 
borrowers and MDBs, compared to PFM policies. “PFM is just about the systems for 
moving the money, and every country has those,” said a World Bank financial safeguard 
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specialist. “That part of our work is kind of a relief for the countries. Procurement is a lot 
more difficult, because it involves national legislation and legal interpretation” (World 
Bank interview, April 24, 2012). An IADB procurement official agreed, saying 
“Definitely procurement is more difficult for the countries, because it has to get done 
before the project moves, everything else [PFM] is after the fact. There’s many layers of 
challenges with procurement, and governments have a real fixation on it” (IADB 
interview, April 27, 2012). This view is supported by the fact that in 20 interviews with 
World Bank and IADB shareholders discussing financial safeguards, attention was 
focused entirely on procurement, and PFM was not raised a single time as a political 
issue. As such, this section will focus on procurement. 
 
Accounts of staffers and EDs and a review of policy documents indicate that the 
procurement safeguards for the World Bank and the IADB are very similar. A World 
Bank procurement specialist, who previously worked at the IADB in harmonizing 
procurement policy among MDBs, said, “We are 98% similar in every aspect. There’s 
some differences in how certain words like corruption and fraud are defined, but they are 
minor, and we have a group working on harmonizing this right now” among the World 
Bank, IADB, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank and European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank interview, April 24, 2012).  
 
The IADB was forced by the U.S., with the backing of European shareholders, to simply 
adopt the World Bank’s procurement guidelines wholesale in the mid-2000s, as were the 
other regional development banks. Procurement staffers at both the IADB and World 
Bank concurred that the U.S. and Europeans insisted that the IADB use the World Bank 
standards, and used their leverage on an upcoming capital increase negotiation to force 
the issue. “The U.S. said, ‘if you don’t take the World Bank’s policy on this, we won’t 
agree to the next capital replenishment.’ And the Europeans backed the Americans, so we 
did it,” according to a current World Bank and former IADB procurement specialist 
(World Bank interview, April 24, 2012). An examination quickly makes clear that the 
relevant procurement guidelines for the World Bank and the IADB are, in fact, almost 
word-for-word copies of one another (World Bank, 2011d and IADB, 2011h). The 
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bidding documents have been the same for the IADB and World Bank—as well as the 
other major regional MDBs—since 2005. Rules on which types of expenditures must be 
bid, which types of loans require using procurement guidelines, cut-off values requiring 
international competitive bidding are the same for both banks. As well, the World Bank 
and the four major regional MDBs have an agreement by which a firm found to have 
engaged in improper practices at one MDB is barred from bidding on contracts in another 
MDB.  
 
According to the World Bank procurement specialist, borrowing government officials are 
constantly demanding to know why they must follow these rules instead of their own 
national systems. “They say, ‘we have our own laws, why should we follow your 
procedures?’ So I have to explain that the country signed an international treaty and they 
are members of the World Bank, so these rules take precedence over national law. It’s 
always a long process” (World Bank interview, April 24, 2012). A long-time staffer in 
the World Bank’s Operations Policy division said he had experienced similar complaints 
in Latin America. “A country like Mexico has their own procurement laws, which they 
think are quite good. To a large extent the Bank thinks they are good too, but the board 
has resisted country systems for procurement” (World Bank interview, September 7, 
2011). The IADB procurement specialist offered a similar critique, saying that borrower 
countries strongly object to the imposition of outside rules when they already have 
functioning procurement systems (IADB interview, April 27, 2012). 
 
The over-riding importance of procurement policy to the U.S. and its veto power over 
capital increases, coupled with the support of other non-borrower shareholders, has meant 
that the greater influence of borrower countries at the IADB has not translated into less 
stringent procedures faced by borrowers. “It’s basically the U.S., they think that 
[procurement controls] will help their interests, help their business to compete for 
contracts,” said one top IADB policy staffer. “Japan is also involved. It’s a consistent 
worry by non-borrowers that transparent and competitive procurement rules have to be 
applied. The U.S. has been more vocal on the fact that the MDBs have to have their own 
procurement policy without country systems” (IADB interview, January 18, 2012). A 
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European G7 shareholder AED at the IADB said national lobbies also pushed him to 
support procurement standards, but he concurred that the overwhelming pressure came 
from the U.S. “This is an action taken by the U.S. across the board in all MDBs to say, 
‘that’s a red line for Congress.’ I think the issue is that as part of the pitch to sell 
multilateralism to Congress, the U.S. has to say ‘for every dollar we put in to these 
multilaterals, we get seven back for U.S. Inc.” (IADB AED interview, January 31, 2012).  
 
Despite this overwhelming interest of the dominant non-borrowing shareholder on 
procurement, there is evidence that even here the IADB is able to make safeguard 
compliance more flexible than at the World Bank. When asked if borrowers would see 
any difference at all between the World Bank and IADB in procurement, the World Bank 
procurement specialist who has worked at both MDBs said without hesitation, “The 
implementation. It’s the same set of rules, but World Bank implementation is more rigid, 
and the IADB is more flexible in how to implement those rules. That’s why there’s a 
clear preference with the IADB for the countries in the region” (World Bank interview, 
April 24, 2012). The IADB procurement official agreed, saying that their application of 
the rules was less legalistic than the World Bank, and that as a result countries preferred 
to work with the IADB (IADB interview, April 27, 2012). This view was supported by 
Latin American borrower shareholders at both the IADB and World Bank, all of whom 
said that the World Bank was much more obsessed with rigidly following procedure than 
the IADB.  
 
The contrast between the World Bank and IADB, at one end of the continuum, and the 
CAF at the other, is if anything even more stark regarding procurement than in any other 
area of lending policy. The CAF, simply put, has no procurement or financial policies 
whatsoever—once the country is granted a loan, it is free to spend the resources as it sees 
fit. A top CAF policy manager stated, “The only procurement rule we have is that 
countries follow their own legislation. We don’t have any of the types of procurement 
policies that cause problems with the IADB and the World Bank, which come from the 
interests of donor countries. In the other banks, the European countries that are 
 
159 
shareholders, or the U.S., they have an interest that their companies can bid on projects, 
but in the CAF we don’t have that” (CAF interview, August 24, 2011).  
5.4 Impact of Non-Financial Policies on Borrowing 
 
The above analysis of three key aspects of non-financial lending policies in all three 
MDBs suggests a relatively clear continuum from the point of view of borrowing 
countries: the World Bank’s policies are clearly the most onerous, the IADB’s similar but 
with a greater degree of flexibility, especially in implementation, and the CAF’s rely 
entirely on the laws and procedures used by each country, with no external imposition. 
  
The key question then arises: are these characteristics in part responsible for the evolving 
patterns in lending analyzed in Chapter 3? Evidence suggests that the answer is yes. To 
substantiate that claim, this section makes the causal link between MDB characteristics 
and lending patterns based on evidence from interviews with staffers and EDs, speeches 
by country representatives, as well as reports by the MDBs themselves. The question is 
then addressed further in the next chapter through interviews with actual government 
officials involved in borrowing from MDBs.  
 
Unquestionably, the decision to take out a loan from an MDB is extraordinarily complex 
and involves a multitude of factors that cannot be fully controlled for, including a 
country’s own economic and political situation, the availability and price of MDB 
funding compared to other sources of sovereign funding, the personal relationships 
between government ministry officials and MDB staffers, quality of technical assistance 
and the conjunctural interests of powerful MDB shareholders. But there seems to be little 
doubt that, all else being equal, the non-financial characteristics discussed above lead 
countries to prefer the IADB to the World Bank and the CAF to the IADB.  
5.4.1 Overall Hassles Impacting Lending Demand 
 
The clearest evidence of the impact of World Bank safeguard and bureaucratic 
impositions on lending comes from concerns of World Bank management itself, as 
evidence by the Cost of Doing Business Task Force launched in the early 2000s to 
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address these problems. The Task Force report states that “The Bank has more favorable 
lending terms than the five Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). At the same time, 
Bank safeguard and financial requirements and other business practices tend to be more 
comprehensive, more stringent and more consistently enforced and are perceived by 
clients to add costs” (World Bank, 2001b, p. 10).   
 
Despite the efforts of the Task Force to address bureaucratic limitations, little has 
improved in the intervening decade.  A 2010 study by the World Bank’s IEG found that 
environmental, social and financial safeguards clearly limited lending. “The impact of 
this chilling effect was reported by a majority of team leaders from Latin America and the 
Caribbean and over 40 percent from East Asia and Pacific and South Asia” World Bank, 
2010a, p. 46). Some 60% of Latin America task team leaders reported client avoidance of 
World Bank projects or components because of safeguards (Ibid.). A survey found that 
72% of safeguard staff had encountered situations where the client government wanted to 
avoid dealing with the Bank on a project because they considered that social safeguard 
requirements might be too expensive or time consuming, while a further 55% said the 
same question regarding environmental safeguards (Ibid.). 
 
While safeguards and bureaucracy are impacting the overall desire of countries to borrow 
from the World Bank and (to a lesser degree) the IADB, the impact is particularly strong 
in major infrastructure projects, such as building roads, urban transit, energy plants and 
the like. These types of projects—which were the overwhelming focus of World Bank 
activities until the mid-1980s—are now seen as particularly complicated due to the 
likelihood of triggering environmental and social safeguards as well as the increasing 
complexities of procurement rules. The 2001 Cost of Doing Business Study found 
“feedback from clients that the willingness of IBRD borrowers to pursue Bank lending 
for certain kinds of infrastructure—electric power, dams, slum upgrading, 
transportation—is affected by the clients’ desire to avoid the costs and hassles of certain 
safeguard policies. Given other opportunities for financing, IBRD borrowers articulated 
an explicit hierarchy of preference for official borrowing in these infrastructure sub-
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sectors: domestic resources, bilateral donors, Regional Banks and lastly, the World Bank” 
(World Bank, 2001b, p. vii).   
 
This sentiment was echoed in several speeches to World Bank annual meetings. In 2006, 
for example, Peruvian Finance Minister Fernando Zavala said that “new restrictions have 
appeared, such as the stringent social and environmental safeguards promoted by the IFIs, 
which have practically paralyzed investments in large dams” (World Bank, 2006a). A top 
IADB environmental staffer related a recent story about Brazilian plans for two major 
hydroelectric plants. “There was a point when some folks at the IADB were trying to 
court Brazil to finance that project, and the immediate response from the Brazilians was, 
‘Not on our life, you’ll come running in here with your safeguards,’” the staffer said. “In 
another project, in Ecuador, they wanted to divert a river in a UNESCO Biosphere 
Reserve, which would have killed the river for 27 kilometers. The Ecuadorans said, ‘We 
don’t want to deal with your safeguards, we can just have the Chinese finance this’” 
(IADB interview, December 7, 2011). 
 
While the IADB’s safeguards and procedures are somewhat less onerous to borrowers 
than the World Bank’s, both MDBs are considered much more difficult to work with than 
the CAF. “This is definitely an advantage for the CAF,” said the Argentina IADB ED. 
“The safeguards impose extraterritorial legislation on the countries. You don’t want to 
have a parallel legal system short-circuit the decisions in your own legal system” (IADB 
ED interview, January 13, 2012). The Brazilian ED in the IADB expressed the same 
attitude, and said his country would much prefer to use the CAF or bilateral funding 
sources for major infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams due to their use of 
national legislation (IADB ED interview, January 10, 2012).  
 
This flexibility and speed of the CAF compared to the other MDBs, derived from the 
structure of its shareholding, is seen by the organization as a key asset that helps explain 
why its lending has grown so rapidly in recent years. A top CAF policy staffer stated, “I 
think the agility and rapidity of the CAF vis a vis the other banks is a competitive 
advantage and it does partially compensate for the higher cost of our loans. Political 
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cycles are short in Latin America, usually four years, and authorities want to see the 
results of their projects quickly. The fact that the CAF can react so much faster than the 
others is a major advantage” (CAF interview, August 24, 2011). The former operations 
staffer now at the World Bank agreed. “The CAF cannot compete in terms of price, 
because it doesn’t have the rich donor countries behind it and it has a higher cost of 
borrowing to pass on. So instead it competes on speed and easy conditions. If a country 
needs a loan, the CAF can deliver it a lot faster, without a lot of safeguards and with 
much more convenient conditions. This is why the CAF is growing so rapidly” (CAF 
interview, June 1, 2009). A top IADB Treasury official, discussing the reasons behind the 
CAF’s sharp increase in lending, agreed that non-financial characteristics are key. “One 
of big advantages [of the CAF] is that there’s not the same environmental oversight and 
other requirements that we have to satisfy for each of our loans. They can pretty much 
write a loan and make out a check. We have to abide by desires and requirements of 
shareholders, meet conditions for gender issues, indigenous issues, environmental 
issues—the CAF doesn’t have the same requirements. For some countries, it’s definitely 
worth paying extra to avoid those hassles” (IADB interview, November 15, 2010). 
5.4.2 Hesitant Moves Toward Reform 
 
Since the mid-1990s, a series of initiatives at both the World Bank and the IADB have 
attempted to reduce the bureaucratic burden facing client countries. One World Bank 
policy staffer who has been involved in various of these efforts since the early 2000s put 
the reasons behind them succinctly: “All these MICs [middle-income countries] have 
alternative sources of financing, and some just won’t put up with extra processing 
requirements. The idea is to recapture that clientele” (World Bank interview, October 4, 
2011). This directly links to Hypothesis 3 of this study—the World Bank and IADB are 
not simply sitting passively as these bureaucratic procedures impact their lending, but are 
instead actively attempting to improve their competitiveness to ensure continued demand 
for their loans. However, this drive—coming mainly from MDB staff and supported by 
borrowing shareholders—has been largely stymied by the resistance of non-borrowers. 
Efforts to implement what are broadly termed “country systems”—that is, using a 
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country’s own laws and procedures instead of MDB safeguards—have been limited at 
best.  
 
The proliferation of different financial and procurement systems required by recipient 
countries for aid and development lending, and the negative effect this has on recipient 
administrative overload and limiting institutional development, was a key aspect of the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The U.S. and other major donor 
countries, as well as 26 multilateral organizations including the World Bank and IADB, 
agreed in 2005 as part of the Paris Declaration principles to move toward greater use of 
country systems in procurement, financial management and E&S safeguards (OECD, 
2012). At the World Bank, this led to the country systems pilot program, wherein staff 
was given the green light to attempt to qualify the systems of 10 countries around the 
world for use in World Bank projects (World Bank, 2010e).  
 
In the discussion of country systems, borrower country representatives at the World Bank 
annual meetings in 2005 and 2006—when the issue was on the agenda—voiced strong 
support. For example, Peruvian Finance Minister Luis Carranza stated, “We think that 
country systems are a good starting point to move toward simpler institutions in the areas 
where external rigid standards have been imposed upon these countries. We are referring 
to the rigid social and environmental safeguard policies, the sophisticated results-based 
framework, and the donor-driven monitoring and evaluation systems” (World Bank, 
2006b). Speeches from non-borrower representatives, however, were considerably less 
sanguine. U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow said his country looked “with concern at 
efforts to rush to use country systems that do not meet the highest international 
standards” (World Bank, 2006a). Similar statements of caution, expressing fears that 
country systems could weaken Bank fiduciary and environmental safeguards, can be 
found in speeches by representatives of Switzerland (World Bank, 2004b), Germany 
(World Bank, 2005c), the Nordic countries (World Bank, 2006b) and Canada (World 
Bank, 2007c), among many others.  
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In the end, the restrictions imposed on the pilot program by non-borrowers ensured its 
failure. A World Bank procurement staffer in Latin America said, “We picked Brazil, 
Colombia and Panama, and none of them meet the minimum requirements. So we 
couldn’t apply whole country systems. At the end of the day they [the countries] 
considered that the whole thing was not worth it” (World Bank interview, April 24, 
2012). One European ED at the World Bank commented that the country systems design 
was so complex that it was easier for borrowers to simply use World Bank standards 
(World Bank ED interview, January 25, 2012). A 2010 IEG report on safeguards came to 
a similar conclusion. “…client expectations that Bank safeguard responsibilities would be 
transferred to the borrower did not occur. Management clarified that this was never the 
intention of the pilots” (World Bank, 2010a, p. 85). One could forgive borrowing 
countries from wondering what the intention was, then.  
 
Quick on the heels of the failure of the country systems pilot, the Program for Results 
(P4R) lending instrument was designed and approved for pilot testing on January 24, 
2012. The aim of P4R is to tackle the same problem in a different way, by having the 
World Bank reimburse client countries for expenditures already undertaken, if the agreed 
results have been achieved. However, early evidence suggests that the same tensions that 
plagued the discussions on country systems are likely to severely limit the use of P4R. 
All borrower and non-borrower World Bank EDs and several staffers interviewed stated 
that numerous restrictions had been placed on the instrument, mainly at the behest of the 
U.S. with the support of several other non-borrowers. As a result, many types of lending 
projects are excluded from P4R, and the instrument has been capped at 5% of World 
Bank lending. The U.S. ED confirmed that his country specifically pushed for this limit 
to the initial rollout of P4R. “It does raise a number of concerns. Is that country system 
capable of protecting against corruption, insuring the environmental standards are met, 
can it handle it? Let’s make sure it works” (World Bank ED interview, January 30, 2012). 
Further, countries will still be required to demonstrate that they are complying with 
safeguards equivalent to the World Bank’s. In the end, the gains of the new instrument 
appear questionable at best, held back once again by the refusal of non-borrowers to ease 
bureaucratic and safeguard restrictions.  
 
165 
 
“There’s a lot of resistance [to P4R], particularly by the U.S. ED, and discussions around 
capital increase are being tied to this,” according to one operations policy staffer. “The 
U.S. said they won’t support the capital increase if this goes ahead in a way they don’t 
like…The Germans were very negative as well” (World Bank interview, January 12, 
2012). The Brazilian ED concurred, saying that the U.S. and other non-borrowers were 
not willing to give up control over safeguards and procurement because of their mistrust 
of borrower countries (World Bank ED interview, December 12, 2011). And, as with the 
discussion of procurement above, the interests of companies from non-borrower countries 
has played a role. An operations staffer involved in developing P4R pointed to business 
lobbies from non-borrower countries as a strong force lobbying against P4R, specifically 
because of fears that they might lose access to contracts if countries did not use World 
Bank systems (World Bank interview, January 12, 2012).  
 
A similar process has been underway at the IADB. A country systems pilot was 
introduced in the IADB at about the same time as the World Bank, which has only began 
moving ahead recently. Chile’s financial and environmental safeguards have undergone a 
lengthy process of inspection by the IADB, and its systems were approved at the end of 
2011. Colombia and Brazil are due to be taken up in 2012 (IADB interview, January 24, 
2012). While this may sound promising from the borrower’s point of view, several EDs 
voiced caution, suggesting that Chile was a special case because many of its systems had 
already been brought up to OECD level, and it also borrowers very little from the IADB. 
A European non-borrower AED at the IADB concurred. “There’s a lot of countries that 
we will not touch, and continue to operate bank procurement policies in those countries. 
But if Chile is only borrowing US$200 million from the Bank each year, and their system 
is perfectly good, then it’s a bit silly not to use it” (IADB AED interview, January 31, 
2012). 
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The resistance to greater use of country systems at both the World Bank and IADB has 
clearly been driven by non-borrowers, most notably the U.S.,53 with the Europeans and 
Japan also reluctant. Pressure seems focused mainly on procurement—due to a 
combination of fears of corruption and self-interest among non-borrower business 
interests—and environment—due to the political pressure of the environmental lobby 
(see, for example, Indian Law Resource Center, 2010; Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2011; and 
Friends of Earth, 2012). The Swiss ED, discussing the P4R negotiations, said, “The 
barrage of fire that has come from contractors on one side and the professional NGO 
bureaucracy on the other side has been amazing” (World Bank ED interview, January 13, 
2012).54 The reality of voting power in both the IADB and World Bank—most 
particularly the veto power of the U.S. over any capital increase, and its willingness to 
use that power on issues it views as critical—means that both MDBs are unlikely to make 
any major moves toward the use of country systems on a broad scale for the foreseeable 
future.  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The accumulation of evidence reviewed here supports Hypothesis 1, that the non-
financial characteristics of each of the three MDBs do clearly vary as a direct function of 
the balance of power between non-borrowing and borrowing shareholders. Further, 
preliminary evidence from MDB interviews and documents suggests that these 
characteristics in turn act as an important determinant of demand for loans by borrowing 
countries (Hypothesis 2). This causal link will be explored in more detail in the 
subsequent chapter, through case studies and interviews with government officials 
responsible for MDB borrowing decisions.  
 
In all three of the characteristics analyzed here—overall loan processing procedures, 
environmental and social safeguards and procurement rules—the World Bank is 
                                                
53 An OECD study on U.S. implementation of the Paris Declaration agenda reveals a similar finding for 
U.S. bilateral aid by U.S. AID and the U.S. State Department. A field survey of staff officers found that 
79% rarely or never used country systems for procurement, while 84% rarely or never used country 
systems for financial management and accounting (OECD, 2011).  
54 The Swiss ED specified that his views should be taken as personal, and not representing those of his 
country.  
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unquestionably the most willing to impose strict rules above and beyond any national 
procedures, and to enforce those rules in a rigid, legalistic way. The IADB generally 
follows the lead of the World Bank in the “letter of the law”, but offers borrowing 
countries more flexibility in implementation, with the end result being somewhat faster 
and more fluid loan approval procedures. The CAF, by contrast, has few layers of 
bureaucracy and review and essentially no safeguards beyond following national law, 
meaning its loans are approved much more quickly and with minimal bureaucratic 
requirements.  As a top level IADB policy staffer put it succinctly, “Countries feel that 
the IADB is more their bank than the World Bank. But of course they perceive the CAF 
as even more their bank then the IADB. We are in the middle between the two in these 
different governance dimensions” (IADB interview, January 18, 2012). 
 
Interviews with country shareholder representatives and MDB staffers, as well as 
speeches during annual meetings and available MDB reports, all point to the balance of 
power between non-borrowing and borrowing shareholders as the key variable defining 
this continuum. The dominance of non-borrower countries in the governance of the 
World Bank means that their priorities—environmental and social protection (driven by 
NGO lobbying), procurement rules (driven by a combination of corporate interests and 
mistrust of borrower government institutions), and multiple layers of internal review 
(driven by a “principal’s” desire to exert strong control over the MDB staff “agent”)—
take precedence over the desire of borrowers to get loans cheaply and with minimum 
hassle.  
 
The fact that the IADB is more evenly divided between borrowers and non-borrowers 
translates into different characteristics. The slight majority of borrowers relating to day-
to-day decision-making such as loan approval, coupled with the “trump card” of U.S. 
veto power over any changes to the capital structure, means borrowers and non-borrowers 
tend to seek consensus and avoid open conflict on most issues, according to both 
borrower and non-borrower shareholders interviewed for this research. The main 
exception is the US’s threat of withholding a capital increase if it does not get its way on 
policy issues it considers critical, for example environmental safeguards or procurement 
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procedures. But even here, the fewer layers of staff oversight and majority vote on loan 
approvals means that borrowers can influence the way those policies are implemented in 
a way more amenable to their interests.  
 
In the CAF, by contrast, the shareholding dominance of borrowing countries has led to a 
very different set of operational characteristics. With the “principals” unified in their 
goals for the MDB, the “agent” has considerably less incentive to develop or pursue 
interests that do not coincide with those shareholder goals. Hence the administration is 
much more vertical with far fewer bureaucratic layers, and management is given much 
greater freedom and trust by the shareholders. As well, borrowing shareholders have no 
incentive to impose any extra rules or procedures that go beyond their own national laws, 
such as the environmental, social and financial safeguards at the other two MDBs. A 
high-level CAF executive summed the situation up neatly: “Here there’s no difference 
between donor and creditor countries that causes problems and slows things down in the 
other banks” (CAF interview, August 24, 2011). 
 
Evidence also strongly supports the idea that the three characteristics analyzed in this 
chapter have an important impact on the demand for countries to borrow money from one 
or another MDB, when they are in a position to choose. The rapidity and low hassle 
factor of the CAF appears to act at least in part to offset the higher interest rate on its 
loans, particularly in relation to major infrastructure projects where environmental, social 
and financial safeguards would be more problematic at the IADB and World Bank. The 
IADB in some ways appears to have the best of both worlds, with financial terms similar 
to the World Bank by virtue of the economic might of its non-borrowing members, but 
slightly less onerous non-financial characteristics due to the stronger influence of 
borrowers. The World Bank, by contrast, appears to be relying on low price and some 
expertise advantage to attract borrowers, attributes that appear to be declining in 
importance. Well aware of this fact, World Bank management has made numerous 
initiatives over the years to reduce the “hassle factors”, but non-borrower shareholders 
have thus far stymied most efforts. The case studies in the following chapter pursue the 
implications of MDB characteristics for borrower country demand in more detail. 
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6 CASE STUDIES OF BORROWER DEMAND: 
COLOMBIA AND ECUADOR 
 
This chapter comprises two case studies of countries—Colombia and Ecuador—that have 
dealings with all three of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) under analysis. The 
previous two chapters investigated how the balance of shareholder power between 
borrowing and non-borrowing countries in the World Bank, IADB and CAF shaped 
financial and non-financial aspects of lending activity, which could in turn have an 
important impact on the demand for MDB loans from the perspective of borrowers. This 
chapter turns to the views of the countries themselves, to see what criteria governments 
may have to borrow or not borrow from a given MDB, depending on their own 
circumstances. The intention is to ascertain if MDB policies and procedures—and hence 
the shareholder interests that shape them—do indeed play a role in affecting demand for 
MDB loans (Hypothesis 2).  
 
As well, the chapter provides deeper insight into the particular circumstances of 
individual countries, and how political economy considerations specific to the realities of 
a given country at a given juncture in its development might impact borrowing decisions. 
The overarching hypotheses for this study posit several structural characteristics of 
MDBs that impact the demand for their loans in systematic ways. The statistical patterns 
examined in Chapter 3 provided some substantiation for that, however those patterns 
were not conclusive or as strong as might have been expected if the hypotheses were 
absolutely valid. This is no surprise. The diversity of political and economic systems in 
individual countries, the position of those countries in the world economy and the 
idiosyncrasies of key officials in government and MDBs—and their relations with one 
another—are far too complex to model in a statistical regression with any degree of 
exactitude. Considering individual country case studies can help better explain why a 
country might in some cases not follow the more structural patterns expected by the 
hypotheses, due to assumptions about variables that do not apply in a specific country or 
time period, or due to variables not included in the statistical tests.  
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Lastly, the chapter generates evidence in relation to Hypothesis 3, on the impact of 
financial considerations on MDB behavior. As discussed in the introduction, the two 
main resources needed by MDBs are access to resources for the lending (analyzed in 
Chapter 2) and a portfolio of interest-generating loans to cover MDB overhead costs. 
When faced with a situation of fluctuating demand for their loans, the hypothesis would 
then expect MDBs to undertake action to stimulate demand, rather than sit back passively 
as their loan portfolio diminishes. This chapter finds strong evidence for this, with all 
MDBs engaging in competitive behavior—something that they publicly deny occurs, 
preferring the rhetoric of aid coordination and harmonization—in an effort to maintain 
borrowing clients. Offering budget support loans disguised as investment loans, using 
technical assistance as a marketing tool to initiate loans and easing off on policy 
conditionality are among the MDB strategies noted by borrower government officials.  
 
The case studies were chosen based on a number of criteria. First, and most obviously, 
they had to be among the countries that have borrowed from all three MDBs over a 
reasonable length of time. Because of the CAF’s more limited membership (until very 
recently), this brought the number of possible options down to five—Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Colombia was chosen as an upper-middle income 
developing country, currently with very good access to both domestic and international 
capital markets and hence with many options for external financing, but with a period of 
greater economic difficulty in previous years. Peru could have provided an equally 
interesting case with many similar characteristics to Colombia, but the latter was selected 
as it is a larger overall economy and has a higher GDP per capita, thus making it a better 
example of a middle-income country with increasing economic strength and options. 
Venezuela is also an upper-middle income country with relatively good capital market 
access, but was excluded because it has had no relations at all with the World Bank since 
the early 2000s, and the country office is closed.  
 
Ecuador was chosen as an example of a much smaller economy, with considerably less 
access to private capital markets than Colombia due to macroeconomic volatility and a 
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history of debt defaults. As well, the tense relationship between the current administration 
of left-leaning President Rafael Correa and the U.S. stand in stark contrast to the close 
relationship of Colombia to the U.S., which could provide some traction to consider the 
much-hypothesized link between U.S. geopolitical interest and MDB lending (see for 
example Harrigan et al., 2006; Dreher et al., 2009a; and Kilby, 2006 and 2011, all of 
which link lending decisions by MDBs to a country’s relative closeness to the U.S.). 
Bolivia could have also served this role, but was not selected because it has borrowed 
mainly from the highly concessional lending window of both the IADB and World Bank, 
meaning the demand dynamics would likely be much different than countries borrowing 
from the market-based lending window.55  
 
The two main sections of the chapter each address the case of an individual country—
first Colombia, and then Ecuador. The case studies are based primarily on qualitative 
evidence derived from in-depth interviews conducted with current and former 
government officials in each country, who are/were responsible for multilateral 
borrowing decisions. Generally this involved top-level officials in Colombia’s Ministerio 
de Hacienda y Crédito Público (MHCP) and Ecuador’s Ministerio de Finanzas (MEF), 
including ministers, vice-ministers and directors of external credit. Officials in 
Colombia’s National Planning Ministry (DNP) were also interviewed, due to the uniquely 
important role played by that ministry in Colombia’s borrowing decisions, while in 
Ecuador a top official in the Economic Policy Coordinating Ministry—which performs a 
similar role to the DNP among a sub-set of economic ministries—was also interviewed. 
The case studies also consider data on the lending portfolio of each country from each of 
the three MDBs. The chapter concludes with a section drawing lessons from the two case 
studies for the broader research project.  
 
 
                                                
55 Because World Bank IDA and IADB FSO loans are highly concessional (50 year repayment terms and 
minimal or no interest rate), the demand for those loans would naturally be much higher than for market-
based lending. 
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6.1 Colombia: A Sophisticated Middle-Income Borrower with a Long-
Term View 
 
As a major middle-income country in Latin America, with a growing economy and a 
stable macro-policy stance over the medium term, Colombia serves as a good example of 
the kind of country that has an increasing number of options when considering how to 
best fill its sovereign financing needs. With relatively low debt, sustainable fiscal 
balances and good access to capital markets, the country is not in a position of high 
dependence on multilateral lending, and thus demand-side factors are clearly very 
important in shaping the country’s interactions with the three MDBs. In short, Colombia 
is now an MDB client by choice, not by necessity.  
 
The evidence presented below substantiates that the factors analyzed in the previous two 
chapters are indeed important for Colombia, but interviews point to a more nuanced 
prioritization in the view of government officials. Loan pricing and the ability of MDBs 
to offer knowledge services in specific areas of interest to the government are critical; 
loan processing speed, safeguards and the behavior of MDB staff are relevant but less 
important; and procurement hassles are a relatively minor concern. As a result, the World 
Bank and the IADB are more favored by Colombia, while the CAF is lowest on the list, 
though with certain advantages of its own to bring to bear. All three MDBs make 
considerable efforts to “compete” with one another and private markets to maintain their 
relations with Colombia, including developing new financial products, targeting specific 
niches, leveraging technical assistance to make loans and easing off on policy 
conditionality, among other strategies. 
 
Colombia is Latin America’s fifth-largest economy (after Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Argentina) as measured by GDP in 2010, and has a GDP per capita of US$6,225, placing 
in the “upper-middle income” bracket according to the World Bank (2012e). Despite its 
international notoriety for cocaine production and guerrilla violence, Colombia has had a 
relatively stable democratic system with regular elections and peaceful political 
transitions. Its civil service is highly respected in the region as capable, reform-oriented 
and with a long-term planning horizon somewhat distanced from political considerations. 
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Although it is difficult to measure quantitatively, some indicators do support this 
assertion. The World Governance Indicators for 2010 ranked Colombia as sixth out of 20 
major Latin American economies and in the 61st percentile for the government 
effectiveness indicator (compared to 15th for Ecuador, in the 29th percentile), and seventh 
in regulatory quality in the 60th percentile (compared to 18th place for Ecuador in the 11th 
percentile) (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Similarly, a “Weberian” index measuring the degree 
to which public sector bureaucracies employ meritocratic recruitment and predictable, 
long-term careers ranked Colombia 11th out of 35 developing countries (compared to 28th 
for Ecuador, with a score half that of Colombia’s) (Evans and Rauch, 1999).  
 
Colombia has experienced less macroeconomic volatility than many of its neighbors, 
largely avoiding the debt crisis of the 1980s and facing an important (though not 
catastrophic) downturn only during 1998-2002.56 Colombia began issuing bonds in 
international capital markets in 1993 (when it was first granted a rating by Moody’s and 
other ratings agencies), and was elevated to “investment grade” status by both Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s in the spring of 2011 (Bloomberg, 2011). International reserves 
stood at US$24 billion in 2009, a solid 10% of GDP, and growth average 4.7% of GDP 
between 2004 and 2010 (World Bank, 2012b). Hence, the country embodies the trends 
among many developing countries that this thesis seeks to understand—dynamic 
economic growth, stable public finances and solid access to international private capital 
markets on good terms.  
 
Trends in lending commitments to Colombia by the three MDBs since 1990 reveal a 
number of patterns worth noting, to be explored in more detail below. First, the CAF has 
clearly lent the least of the three MDBs to Colombia for the entire period, although its 
lending has generally risen in absolute terms (Figure 6.1). Second, no clear pattern is 
apparent differentiating lending by the World Bank and IADB, apart from a slight 
tendency to borrow more from the latter (especially in the late 1990s and in 2003). Both 
of these patterns go against the predicted outcomes derived from the hypotheses tested in 
                                                
56 GDP growth slowed to 0.5% in 1998, fell by 4% in 1999, and recovered gradually thereafter (World 
Bank, 2012b).  
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Chapter 3. The question to be addressed below is whether the causal factors from which 
the hypotheses were derived are not relevant in Colombia, or whether other factors not 
taken into account in the hypotheses are more important in this country case.   
 
Figure 6.1. Annual MDB Lending Commitments to Colombia, 1990-2010 (Real 2010 
US$ millions) 
 
Source: World Bank AR, IADB AR, CAF AR, 1990-2010. 
 
To answer this question, 10 high-level Colombian officials were interviewed as part of 
this research project, all of whom have or had significant dealings with all three MDBs 
and decision-making authority on MDB borrowing. Interviewees worked either for the 
MHCP, DNP or sectoral ministries (see reference section for complete list).57 Officials 
pointed to a number of factors specific to Colombia—but with broader application—that 
led to MDB borrowing patterns somewhat different than those predicted by the 
hypotheses in Chapter 3.  
                                                
57 In Colombia’s executive branch, the DNP is a “super ministry” overseeing and coordinating the 
government’s activities among the different line ministries, while the MHCP is in charge of issues related 
to public finances. The two coordinate closely on decisions related to external financing (including MDBs). 
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6.1.1 Price and Technical Assistance are Paramount 
 
According to top officials currently or recently in charge of contracting debt from 
multilateral sources at the MHCP and DNP, the two main criteria in deciding whether to 
borrow from an MDB, and which one, are cost (the interest rate on the loan) and the 
value of technical assistance the MDB can provide the Colombian government for its 
priority projects. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the emphasis of MHCP officials was on the cost 
factor as the first “filter” while DNP officials stressed the importance of technical value-
added as primary, but both agreed that the two were by far the most relevant criteria, 
especially in situations like the present when Colombia is not facing urgent need for 
financing and can take opt to take loans only when it suits the country’s needs. As a 
recently retired vice-director of DNP put it, “Price is important, but it’s not just a case of 
financing. In terms of supply of funds we have no problem at all at this moment. So the 
question is what is the value-added that we can have as a country with this multilateral 
compared to another, and how can we guarantee that” (Ramírez, May 30, 2012). 
 
In terms of cost, all officials interviewed stated that both the World Bank and IADB were 
extremely attractive sources of finance. The current MHCP public credit director stated 
that the World Bank and IADB offer loans at very similar rates, and are both invariably 
lower than any other source of sovereign financing. The official added that IADB loans 
are frequently slightly cheaper than the World Bank’s, a finding that coincides with the 
research in Chapter 4 (Gómez, May 29, 2012). The CAF, on the other hand, is 
considerably more expensive, currently even more expensive than Colombia’s own 
sovereign bonds, according to the MHCP’s sub-director of multilaterals from 2009 to 
2012 and now a top advisor. “The CAF has made a big effort to reduce its margins in 
recent years, but they can never compete with the World Bank and IADB because of the 
shareholder composition of the bank. They have a much lower rating because the owners 
of the bank are another category of country. It’s a structural issue” (Rojas, May 29, 
2012), again echoing the findings of Chapter 4. MHCP and DNP officials noted that the 
CAF’s loans had formerly been much more attractive in terms of pricing, but Colombia’s 
own borrowing costs had dropped more quickly in the past 10 years, even though 
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Colombia sovereign debt is still rated below CAF bonds by the top three rating 
agencies.58  
 
The comparison of technical assistance provision by the MDBs again provided a similar 
result, with the World Bank and IADB roughly equal. The DNP official in charge of 
multilateral credit said that the level of technical assistance was not significantly different 
between the two larger MDBs, largely because the IADB improved dramatically in recent 
years in response to demands from borrowing countries (Bargans, June 6, 2012). A 
former DNP vice-director concurred, saying the IADB operated in some sectors in 
Colombia and the World Bank in others not because of any over-riding superiority in a 
given topic, but because of the familiarity of MDB and government staff and past 
experiences. “It’s a bit like a path dependence process,” he said (Ramirez, May 30, 2012).  
 
The World Bank, in particular, appears to have been quick to come to terms with the new 
focus of the Colombian government on technical assistance provision, and according to 
officials is using that as an incentive to market its loans. A second former DNP vice-
director described a 2002 presentation of a collection of World Bank policy notes (World 
Bank, 2003a) covering the country’s development agenda over the course of an entire 
weekend with the new Uribe cabinet. “It was a marketing technique, it really help set up 
the World Bank for a lot of lending. The IADB could not put out a book that 
comprehensive” (Gaviria, June 6, 2012). Similarly, a former MHCP vice-minister, who 
also served briefly as a top official in the Transport Ministry, said that in 2011 she was 
seeking assistance on addressing some of the country’s infrastructure deficits. “I spoke 
with people of the World Bank, and they said, ‘Sure we can help, but take out a loan with 
it too.’ They were very helpful, but had expectations. It was like a marketing tool” 
(Agudelo, June 7, 2012). 
 
                                                
58 CAF loans are at times more expensive than Colombia’s sovereign bonds, despite its own higher bond 
rating, for two reasons. First, bond ratings do not translate directly into pricing, but rather merely offer a 
guide by ratings agencies that investors can interpret as they see fit. Second, CAF’s bonds may be cheaper 
than Colombia’s, but it must charge borrower clients a margin above its own cost of funding on loans, to 
pay for administrative overhead. This margin may be enough to push its loan costs above Colombia’s bond 
yields.  
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As with the price criteria, the CAF is a distant third place to both the IADB and World 
Bank for technical assistance provision, from the point of view of the Colombian 
government. Along with every other official interviewed, the DNP multilateral credit 
director said that the CAF simply did not offer any meaningful technical assistance, and 
that Colombia did not take that into account when considering a CAF loan (Bargans, June 
6, 2012). The CAF is able to occasionally bring in experts on a given theme—particularly 
infrastructure, a focus of CAF lending—but that this was of limited value to the 
government. The director of multilateral assistance at the Environment Ministry agreed 
that the CAF was unable to provide technical assistance. “They show up and say, ‘this is 
what we can lend,’ and that’s it. They don’t offer anything along with it, which to me 
makes them less attractive” as a source of loans (Bautista, June 1, 2012). 
6.1.2 Diversification, Ownership Structure, Reduced Hassles 
 
In light of the above findings about the CAF—that its loans are more expensive than 
Colombia can issue bonds on the private markets, and that it offers essentially no 
technical value-added—one then logically wonders why the Colombian government takes 
any loans at all from the CAF. Officials explained their continued use of the CAF for 
three reasons. The first is Colombia’s long-term strategy of maintaining good relations 
with all MDBs (as well as other sources of funding), to have access to capital should the 
government find itself in need. “We have an unwritten policy not to lose our niches,” 
according to a top DNP official. “When all goes well we have access to resources, but 
when the markets close, we have to open doors, so we can’t turn our backs on the CAF 
knowing that when we need them they can throw us a lifeline” (Bargans, June 6, 2012). A 
former MHCP minister agreed that Colombia consciously maintained its portfolio with 
the CAF to ensure good relations in the event of a crisis. “Colombia has always 
maintained a relationship [with the CAF]. There’s a certain margin of difference that we 
accept paying.... This diversification is a good strategy for the country to maintain its 
sources of financing” (Zuluaga, May 30, 2012). 
 
The second reason relates more directly to the shareholding characteristics of the CAF 
compared to the other two MDBs. Because of the fact that the CAF is owned by a small 
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number of borrowing country shareholders, of which Colombia is one, the country feels a 
proprietary interest—or even a certain obligation—that drives it to borrow from the CAF, 
despite the higher cost and lack of technical expertise. A former MHCP vice-minister 
said that during her time in the ministry (1999-2006) there was political pressure to give 
business to the CAF even if they were more expensive, because the country was a part 
owner. The official recounted a story of when some people in the ministry wanted to pre-
pay a CAF loan because it was expensive, but were blocked from doing so because of 
political pressure. “There are considerations that go beyond just the finances,” the official 
said. “The finance minister, the head of the central bank, they sit on the board of the CAF 
so they feel they are owners, so they don’t treat it like the World Bank or the IADB” 
(Agudelo, June 7, 2012). The DNP multilateral director said the CAF use this to convince 
Colombia to take sovereign loans, pointing out to government officials that it needed 
loans on its books from highly-rated countries like Colombia to solidify the CAF’s own 
credit rating, which would in turn bring down the cost of future loans to Colombia 
(Bargans, June 6, 2012). 
 
The third factor influencing greater borrowing from the CAF than might otherwise be the 
case relates to the analysis of Chapter 5—greater speed and fewer bureaucratic hassles in 
loan processing. Officials noted that this was not in and of itself a major factor, because 
Colombia tends to have a long planning horizon, but did prove useful in marginal cases 
when the government needed to receive resources or start a project more quickly. A 
former MHCP minister directly linked the CAF’s flexibility and speed to the 
shareholding composition, as found in Chapter 5: “It’s much easier and faster for a 
country to get a loan from the CAF than the other banks, their requirements are much 
more complex and extensive, there’s more conditions, because most of the guarantee 
capital is from the richer countries. In contrast, with the CAF no one outside is involved, 
it’s just the countries of the region, there’s no European or North American capital 
involved. This gives a lot more flexibility” (Zuluaga, May 30, 2012). 
  
A former MHCP vice-minister spelled out the process with the CAF as follows: “A 
minister calls [CAF President] Enrique García and says ‘we need 200 million,’ and he 
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says to his team, ‘go to Bogotá and set this up.’ They say to us, ‘go ahead and design the 
loan yourself.’ There’s not this horrible negotiations like there are with World Bank and 
IADB, which send very technical people who have their own ideas. Not the CAF. The 
others are less expensive, but the CAF disburses everything within six months. So I might 
go with the CAF” (Agudelo, June 7, 2012). Several DNP and MHCP officials said that 
this process advantage would lead the government to borrower even more from the CAF 
in situations where the government needs pure financing without technical assistance, if 
the CAF were able to lower loan rates and lengthen maturities. 
 
Comparing the World Bank and IADB on speed and hassle factor, officials offered mixed 
responses about which MDB is easier to work with. All agreed that both MDBs had 
improved notably in recent years, bringing down approval times to under a year in both 
cases. A more decentralized and horizontal organizational structure pointed to a marginal 
advantage for the IADB, albeit one that did not appear determinative in making loan 
decisions. Several sources noted that the local office of the IADB had a greater number of 
sectoral specialists as well as greater autonomy in making loan decisions compared to the 
World Bank. For example, the fact that the World Bank’s country director is based in 
Mexico City was seen as problematic by several officials for making quick decisions and 
resolving problems. Officials also complained that loan preparation with the World Bank 
tend to be more complicated, because of multiple layers of approval above the project 
team itself. “All these committees at the World Bank are nightmare,” commented a 
former MHCP vice-minister. “The technical team might reach an agreement, but the 
committees in Washington become a burden. We’re sitting here negotiating, but the 
person I’m negotiating with doesn’t have the power. Above them they have five bosses 
and all these committees. So who am I negotiating with?” (Agudelo, June 7, 2012). 
According to the top DNP official for multilaterals, loan negotiations (the final phase 
before seeking board approval) can take up to three days with the World Bank, but rarely 
last more than half a day with the IADB. CAF negotiations are even faster, usually 
involving a short telephone call rather than a face-to-face meeting (Bargans, June 6, 
2012). 
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Chapter 5 also emphasized differences in environmental, social and procurement 
safeguards as a major advantage for the CAF, because it simply uses country rules and 
does not impose any external procedures on a borrower, unlike the IADB and (to a 
slightly greater extent) the World Bank. Officials agreed with the chapter’s 
characterization of the degree of strictness of each MDB’s safeguards, with the World 
Bank as the strictest, the IADB a close second and the CAF without any significant 
safeguards at all. For environmental and social issues, several officials reported that 
safeguards were indeed problematic, and that they increasingly preferred to avoid the 
World Bank and IADB as a result. One MHCP official recounted that IADB social 
safeguards resulted in a highway project in Pasto ending up “taking three years and 
costing five times more than any highway in Colombia’s history,” which she said was 
leading ministries to consider using the CAF or other sources of finance for 
environmentally problematic projects (Rojas, May 29, 2012).  
 
The Environment Ministry staffer in charge of multilateral projects recounted similar 
stories involving resettlement and indigenous safeguards with both the IADB and World 
Bank, including one rural development project that the government entirely redesigned to 
avoid having the loan impact any indigenous areas, specifically to not trigger World Bank 
safeguards. “The [World Bank] project team understood us, but the safeguard people 
were very radical in their position,” she said. “We couldn’t let these safeguards be 
triggered, or we’d have to do everything that the World Bank wants us to do. We can’t 
have to do 50 consultations and make sure everyone’s happy every time we do anything.” 
The official also noted that, as found in Chapter 5, the safeguards of the IADB had 
formerly been considerably more relaxed than the World Bank, but had tightened up 
considerably in recent years (Bautista, June 1, 2012). 
  
Procurement safeguards, unexpectedly, seem to work in favor of the IADB and World 
Bank and against the CAF in the case of Colombia. This is due to the well-developed 
system of governmental checks and oversight in Colombia, and in particular the 
extraordinarily complex procurement legislation known as Ley 80 (Congreso de 
Colombia, 1993). Several officials expressed annoyance that the World Bank and IADB 
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insisted on their own rules for procurement, and uniformly disparaged the efforts of the 
IADB’s country systems approach and the new P4R lending instrument at the World 
Bank as “anachronistic”, in the words of a top MHCP official (Rojas, May 29, 2012). 
They also voiced appreciation that the CAF relied exclusively on country systems. 
However, in practice, they all noted that using World Bank and IADB systems was in fact 
considerably more efficient in terms of contracting and procuring than following their 
own legislation. Both DNP and line ministry officials commented that project leaders 
sometimes actively sought out financing from the IADB and World Bank simply to 
bypass the overly complicated procedures required by Ley 80 (Bautista, June 1, 2012 and 
Ramírez, May 30, 2012).  
6.1.3 Budget Support vs. Investment 
 
Another aspect of MDB lending of considerable importance to Colombia is the amount of 
resources lent for general use in the budget, as opposed to loans funding a specific, 
defined project. Logically, Colombia (like almost all MDB borrowers) prefers to receive 
more non-earmarked resources that they can allocate as they see fit. Both the World Bank 
and IADB have rules limiting the amount of general budget support loans for each 
country (50% and 30% of country lending, respectively), which were imposed by non-
borrowing shareholders seeking to maintain control of resource use. However, Colombia 
has in nearly every year since 2000 surpassed those limits for both banks. Several DNP 
and MHCP officials made it clear that Colombia’s ability to surpass budget support limits 
came from direct pressure from the U.S. within the multilaterals in support of 
Colombia—providing evidence in support of the frequently posited claim of the U.S. 
using the multilaterals to further its own geopolitical interest.59 A former DNP director 
confirmed that such agreements were made informally, with the strong support of the 
U.S. government. “When we went to Washington, we always went first to the U.S. 
Treasury, because they run things at the World Bank,” he said. “So we always went there 
first. And the White House would say, ‘we have to help Colombia.’ And the IADB too, it 
                                                
59 Colombia has long been a close regional ally of the U.S., with strong support by the U.S. for Colombia’s 
fight against narcotics production/trafficking and the conflict with leftist guerrillas. The conservative 
administrations of President Bush (2000-2008) and President Uribe (2002-2010), with strong emphasis on 
drug interdiction and a hard line against the guerrillas, were particularly close.  
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was the same thing. The principal shareholder is the U.S. and Colombia has always had a 
very close relationship with the U.S. And that always helped us a lot to get what we 
needed from the multilaterals” (Montenegro, June 1, 2012). 
 
Unlike the other two MDBs, the CAF does not explicitly offer budget support loans—in 
good measure, no doubt, to reassure bond buyers that its loans are for concrete, high-
return projects, much as described in Chapter 2 during the early years of the World Bank. 
However, because of the CAF’s flexibility and lack of obsessive control by shareholders 
over resource use, it is able to offer loans that serve as budget support, which the 
Colombian government has found useful. The top DNP multilateral official described the 
process as follows: “For example we needed resources for infrastructure and we added up 
all we needed and asked the CAF as an amount to finance our budget, but they presented 
it to their board as a project to support infrastructure. The money is fungible. That’s what 
their budget support loans are—they draw up something that looked like an investment, 
but for us it’s a budget support loan” (Bargans, June 6, 2012). MHCP officials pointed to 
a number of fast-disbursing infrastructure projects in recent years by the CAF as 
functioning essentially like budget support. 
  
Government officials praised all three MDBs equally for being quick to facilitate large 
loans to Colombia in times of financial difficulty, notably in the early 2000s (a deep 
recession caused by several domestic and international factors) and again in 2008-09 (the 
global credit crunch). During the 2002 start of the Uribe administration private markets 
were essentially closed to Colombia, and the government took as much loans as it could 
from all three MDBs, although the preference was for IADB and World Bank loans due 
to price considerations. As hypothesized in Chapter 3, the CAF faced its own restrictions 
during the early 2000s because of market risk perceptions about its bonds due to the 
regional economic turbulence, limiting its usefulness at that time. “With the IADB and 
the World Bank it always easy to finance, they almost never suffer because of the 
turbulence in the markets,” one former MHCP official said. “They didn’t have any 
problems during our crisis. But the CAF did, and so the amounts [borrowed from the 
CAF] were very limited at that time” (Agudelo, June 7, 2012). By contrast, the IADB was 
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able to offer a US$1.25 billion emergency loan in 2003 (with the active support of the 
U.S. government, according to Colombian officials).60 A similar pattern is apparent 
during 2008-09, when lending spiked for all three MDBs, but clearly more for the World 
Bank and IADB compared to the CAF. Thus the hypothesis in Chapter 3 that countries 
tend to move toward the World Bank and IADB more than the CAF during a crisis seems 
borne out in the Colombian case, for the reasons posited.  
6.1.4 Competition for a Valued Client 
 
As Colombia has developed in recent years, moving to investment grade status and 
solidifying its position as one of the strongest middle-income economies in Latin 
America, the MDBs have had to adapt to the needs of the country to maintain the position 
as lenders. As the above analysis makes evident, apart from two brief times of crisis 
Colombia has been in a relatively strong economic position in recent years and has not 
been shy about making its demands felt. As a former MHCP minister observed, “There’s 
a spirit to put more into the relation to keep a country like Colombia attracted to the 
banks. No one is interested in losing a client with good risk. The banks are still banks. 
Colombia’s been a very good client to the multilateral banks, and nobody wants to lose a 
good client” (Zuluaga, May 30, 2012).  
 
One aspect of MDB lending that has changed dramatically in recent years, according to 
several officials, is the use of policy conditionality on budget support loans with the 
World Bank and IADB. Throughout the 1980s and up to the early 2000s, Colombia was 
forced to undertake politically difficult policy changes against its will to secure financing.  
All officials interviewed who worked in either the MHCP or DNP during the late 1990s 
and early 2000s complained bitterly about the difficult policies imposed onto the 
government especially by the World Bank, and to a lesser degree the IADB, in exchange 
for badly needed resources. For example, referring to a budget loan related to social 
policy, a former DNP deputy director said, “There was some World Bank bureaucrats 
                                                
60 While the large amount was very useful to help the incoming administration solidify its finances, the 
special emergency loan was also at an unusually high interest rate (6-month LIBOR + 400 basis points, plus 
1.75% in fees), and Colombia quickly pre-paid the loan when its international reserves grew in 2005. See 
Vargas, 2005.  
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who had some knowledge of social policy who were taking advantage of the needs 
Colombia had at the time to impose all these different ideas and obsessions. This was less 
a problem in the IADB, not much less but definitely less at that time” (Gaviria, June 6, 
2012). 
  
However, with Colombia’s increasing economic strength, the days of the World Bank 
and IADB imposing policies that the government does not want to do appear to be gone, 
even during times of need such as in 2008 and 2009. “We have gotten a lot stronger in the 
last 15 years,” according to a top MHCP official. “We don’t let them put in anything [the 
policy loans] that we don’t already want to do. We don’t let them push us. Fifteen or 20 
years ago, they imposed much more, but now we are in a stronger situation with many 
sources of financing.” The official added that reformist bent of many Colombian officials 
made it easy for the World Bank and IADB to construct policy loans, simply by looking 
for what reforms the government was already doing and building a loan around it (Rojas, 
May 29, 2012). The DNP multilateral official told a similar story, saying that policy loans 
“are now relatively easy for us to prepare, because they are using reforms that are ready, 
the banks don’t oblige or demand anything, practically. We sell what we have done. 
When I got in here, it wasn’t like that. Then they imposed on us. But at a certain point we 
said ‘you either buy our reforms or we’re not interested in your loans. We are now a 
client and you need to attend our needs’” (Bargans, June 6, 2012). 
 
This new, more accommodating spirit on the part of the World Bank and IADB is also 
apparent in the relationship between project teams and government counter-parts. The 
Environment Ministry multilateral director said that in her experience, both MDBs make 
considerable efforts to ensure that the country is happy with the MDB project team. She 
recounted an episode from the mid-2000s when the task manager of a loan project was 
causing problems. “The vice-minister called the [World] Bank and said, ‘Either you 
change the task manager or we cancel this project.’ And the loan was for US$800 million. 
The Bank is not going to let that loan fail, so they changed the task manager, because 
that’s their business. Now Colombia can say, ‘We won’t take that loan,’ because the 
government is in a much stronger position” (Bautista, June 1, 2012). 
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All three MDBs have made considerable efforts to design new financial instruments 
beyond bread-and-butter loans to continue providing financing to Colombia. This 
includes operations in local currency as well as various types of swaps and hedging 
instruments to help Colombia manage its risks. According to MHCP debt officials, since 
2008, first the World Bank and then the IADB began offering a variety of options for 
swapping disbursements into local currencies linked to inflation, which helps the 
government better manage financial risks. “The World Bank has made more progress on 
that front, more than the IADB. The IADB is still catching up,” said one official (Gómez, 
May 29, 2012).  
 
By contrast, the CAF offered minimal financial instrument innovation, a reflection of its 
more tenuous financial standing and therefore room to manoeuvre in capital markets 
compared to the two larger MDBs’ stronger bases of shareholders. However, the CAF has 
made the most of the operational versatility afforded to it by its more streamlined 
shareholder arrangements in providing services not available to the IADB and World 
Bank. For example, the MHCP uses the CAF as a deposit-taking institution to manage its 
liquidity issues. This arrangement generates a high interest rate for Colombia from a 
trusted financial institution that it partly owns, and provides resources to the CAF to on-
lend without requiring bond issues, very convenient during times that the CAF might face 
high bond market interest rates. The CAF is also able to lend directly to sub-national 
governments in Colombia without a national guarantee, unlike the IADB and World 
Bank, thus helping finance local government investment without increasing the 
contingent liabilities of the national government, a valuable service from the point of 
view of the MHCP (Gómez, May 29, 2012). 
6.1.5 Summarizing Findings 
 
The case study of Colombia reveals a number of country-specific characteristics that help 
explain why the MDB lending patterns illustrated in Figure 6.1 do not fully conform to 
those predicted by the hypotheses. Borrowing from the CAF has not increased as much as 
expected in a country with increasing access to finance and generally reduce need, either 
 
186 
over the long term or during particular boom years. Nor has IADB lending shown an 
expected overall increase in the long term relative to the World Bank. During periods of 
crisis, Colombia has tended to turn equally to the World Bank and IADB, with if 
anything an emphasis on the latter as opposed to the former.  
 
The reason for the “underperformance” of the CAF seems to be simply that the main 
characteristics hypothesized as being a major advantage of the CAF—the speed and 
reduced hassle of loan processing—are less important to Colombian officials than 
technical expertise and price. While Colombian officials do complain that the World 
Bank and IADB are slower and more cumbersome (as shown in Chapter 5), this is not a 
deal-breaker, due to the more long-term planning horizon and professional, reformist 
inclination of Colombian civil administration. Further, the rigid, time-consuming 
oversight institutions in the Colombian governmental system—notably procurement and 
the budget approval process—make the use of national procedures by the CAF much less 
of an advantage. By contrast, the lack of technical assistance provision and higher cost 
mean that the CAF is lowest on the list of MDB sources for Colombia, even during a time 
of crisis. At the same time, these disadvantages of the CAF are mitigated by 1) Colombia’ 
policy of maintaining good relations with all MDBs in case of a crisis; 2) the ability of 
the CAF to use Colombia’s shareholding involvement to arm-twist it to take out more 
loans; and 3) the CAF’s operational flexibility in making sub-national loans and 
providing de facto budget support through investment operations. 
 
The ability of the World Bank and the IADB to package low-cost loans along with useful 
technical assistance has helped them both maintain a strong position as a source of 
development lending to Colombia, outweighing hassle factors that might play a stronger 
role in other countries. The relatively comparable loan price and the perceived near-
equality in technical assistance has led to lending from both MDBs to remain relatively 
even over time. Further, the ability of both MDBs to supply very high levels of budget 
support loans—apparently due at least in part to the strong support of the U.S. 
government—has further heightened their appeal, especially when combined with the 
willingness of both MDBs to ease off on binding policy conditionality that caused 
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political difficulties in the past. The marginal advantages of the IADB over the World 
Bank along lines suggested in Chapter 5—closeness to the client, slightly reduced 
bureaucratic procedures—appears to be offset in Colombia by the ability of the World 
Bank to bring its highly-valued global expertise to bear and to provide innovative 
financial products useful to the Colombian government’s financial risk management 
strategies. 
6.2 Ecuador: Political Sensitivities and Short-Term Horizons 
 
Ecuador presents a contrasting economic and political context compared to Colombia, 
and its interactions with the three MDBs reveal a very different weighting of the same 
main factors on the part of government officials. Here again, the demand side appears 
key, with Ecuador riding an oil boom and having access to alternative sources of 
sovereign loans, making it much more choosy in its relations with the MDBs, although 
with a completely different outcome than in Colombia. In a sense, Ecuador is at the 
opposite extreme from Colombia, at least in recent years—short-term political 
considerations appear paramount in shaping external borrowing decisions, making speed 
and lending volume by far the most important considerations in the eyes of the 
government, far beyond technical assistance provision or even price. At the same time, 
ideological considerations have played a major role in recent years, to the detriment of 
World Bank and (partially) IADB lending, and here again the relationship with the U.S. 
seems to have had an impact. Interestingly, this conflict appears to have had both a 
demand and supply side effect—reducing Ecuador’s willingness to work with the World 
Bank, and possibly limiting the amount and flexibility of funds made available to the 
country by the IADB. These events have combined to push lending by the CAF to the 
upper limit, and also for the Ecuadoran government to recur to huge loans by the Chinese, 
despite very high interest rates charged.  
 
A defining characteristic of the Ecuadoran economy is a very high level of volatility, 
driven both by dependence on a few commodities (mainly oil) that fluctuate widely on 
international markets and by frequent, dramatic changes macroeconomic policies. 
Ecuador’s average growth rate between 1982 and 2010 was 2.8% (World Bank 2012b), 
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lower than the 3.5% registered by Colombia, but volatility has been very high. Ecuador 
faced three years of economic contraction in the 1980s, and a huge fall of over 6 percent 
of GDP in 1999 during the crisis that led to dollarization. Growth has been relatively 
strong in the 2000s, due in large part to high oil prices, but international reserves were 
only US$2.6 billion in 2010, down from US$4.3 billion in 2008 (Ibid.). Ecuador was first 
assigned a credit rating by Moody’s in 1997, but was downgraded steadily until the late 
2000s and remains well below investment grade. Since a partial default on its sovereign 
bonds in 2008, Ecuador has remained entirely shut out of international capital markets. 
 
This economic volatility has gone hand-in-hand with an equally unstable political 
panorama. Three presidents have been overthrown by various means since 1997, and the 
country has been governed under three constitutions during the same time period. The 
political party system is unstable, and the civil service is highly politicized. The World 
Governance Indicators for 2010 ranked Ecuador 15th out of 20 major Latin American 
economies and in the 29th percentile for the government effectiveness indicator, and 18th 
in regulatory quality in the 11th percentile (Kaufmann et al., 2010). An index measuring 
the degree to which public sector bureaucracies employ meritocratic recruitment and 
predictable, long-term careers ranked Ecuador 28th out of 35 developing countries with a 
score of 4.0, compared to Colombia’s score of 8.5 and 11th place ranking (Evans and 
Rauch, 1999). As one example of the impact this has had on macroeconomic policy 
continuity, Ecuador has had 27 ministers of finance since 1991 (compared to nine for 
Colombia), with only one lasting more than two years (current Finance Minister Patricio 
Rivera, who took office in April 2010) and five in office for less than five months (MEF, 
2012a). 
  
The lending commitments of the three MDBs to Ecuador since 1990 stand in stark 
contrast to those of Colombia (Figure 6.2). The rise of CAF lending starting in the mid-
1990s is remarkably steep, with the smallest MDB lending significantly more to Ecuador 
each year from 1996 to the present. Lending by the IADB is clearly second, although 
with great volatility, while World Bank commitments are also volatile for most of the 
1990s before dwindling to nothing by the end of the 2000s. The long-term patterns do fit 
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the overall prediction of the hypotheses—with CAF lending increasing relatively most, 
the IADB next and the World Bank last—and the results of boom years also could 
conform to expectations. Whether the causal factors behind these trends fits the 
hypotheses remains to be seen. And MDB lending during a crisis clearly does not fit the 
expected pattern, with the CAF being the MDB of choice during the 1999-2000 crisis and 
the 2009 global financial crisis. Both World Bank and IADB lending did spike in 1999, 
but less than the CAF, while World Bank lending was at zero during 2009.  
 
Figure 6.2. Annual MDB Lending Commitments to Ecuador, 1990-2010 (Real 2010 
US$ millions) 
 
Source: World Bank AR, IADB AR, CAR AR, 1990-2010. 
 
To understand the factors behind these lending patterns, eight current and former officials 
responsible for multilateral borrowing decisions in Ecuador in recent years were 
interviewed.61 This included three former ministers of finance, the current vice-minister 
of finance, and the top two officials in the MEF’s office for multilateral credit. As well, 
the current vice-minister of the Ministry of Economic Policy Coordination (MCPE) and 
                                                
61 See reference section for a complete list. 
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his top assistant were also interviewed. The MCPE plays a similar role in Ecuador to the 
DNP in Colombia, undertaking a more strategic overview of economic policy, while the 
MEF is directly in charge of the country’s finances.  
6.2.1 The Role of Ideology in Ecuador’s Multilateral Borrowing 
 
The complete disappearance of World Bank lending to Ecuador following 2008 is 
relatively easily explained: on April 25, 2007 recently elected President Rafael Correa 
declared the World Bank representative Eduardo Somensatto “persona non grata,” 
expelling him from the country (Behar, 2007), and since that time the country has not 
take out a single loan from the World Bank. While the World Bank’s loan portfolio to 
Ecuador has been relatively modest for a number of years, due to country exposure limits, 
the decline of World Bank lending left a financing gap that has, at least in part, been 
filled by the other two MDBs, as well as bilateral sources as discussed below.  
 
The current conflict between Ecuador and the World Bank has its roots in a much greater 
willingness on the part of World Bank officials in past years to require very strong 
actions by Ecuador in return for loans, especially in the context of policy-based budget 
support lending—much stronger than the requirements faced by Colombia. For example, 
a 2000 budget support loan for US$150 million required fully 50 separate policy 
conditions, including the passage of at least seven laws by Congress (a sovereign branch 
of government over which the executive nominally has no authority, even though the 
executive negotiated and signed the loan agreement), covering a huge array of issues 
including wholesale revamping of the tax code, creation of an oil revenue savings fund, 
privatization of the telecommunications and electricity sectors, the intervention and 
closure of 14 private banks, abolition of universal deposit insurance, and various internal 
fiscal controls and audit provisions, among others (World Bank, 2003b). This is a truly 
astounding set of commitments, especially in 2000 (as opposed to the heavy-handed years 
of the 1980s debt crisis structural adjustment programs) and for a relatively small amount 
of money. By contrast, a US$400 million budget support loan to Colombia approved in 
2001 contained conditions in only nine policy areas, and all that related to legal 
provisions were worded carefully to not make any conditions on the actions of the 
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legislative branch (for example, only requiring that the executive submit a legal reform) 
(World Bank, 2001e). 
  
This very heavy-handed attitude of the World Bank toward Ecuador is not unrelated to 
the fact that Ecuador’s policy framework was considerably less well-developed and stable 
than Colombia’s. However, from the point of view of Ecuador, it seemed that the World 
Bank simply pushed Ecuador around because it could, and the country’s officials 
understandably view the institution with considerably more resentment than those in 
Colombia. A finance minister under President Gutierrez during 2003 and 2004, attributed 
Gutierrez’ overthrow in part to the World Bank’s policy demands. “They were very 
inopportune with a lot of their demands, especially requiring passage of laws in 
Congress…We agreed with many things in the [policy] matrices, but they also wanted to 
include things that couldn’t be done at that time...We had a minority in Congress, we 
triggered bigger political problems than we already had...Gutierrez fell because the 
Congress wanted him out, this was part of the reason he was overthrown” (Pozo, June 12, 
2012). The current MEF vice-minister and a high-ranking MEF staffer in the early 2000s 
also highlighted the World Bank’s demands for legal changes as unjust. “As executive, 
we could propose the law, but we couldn’t ensure that what would happen in a political 
entity,” she said. “We said this [to the World Bank], but it didn’t matter. They came with 
their own rules, and that’s how it is” (June 12, 2012). 
 
Current President Correa got a taste of the World Bank’s attitude during his brief stint as 
finance minister (April-August 2005). During his time in office, Ecuador’s Congress 
reformed a law governing the oil revenue savings fund, which was created as part of a 
World Bank budget support loan. The legal changes gave the Ecuadoran government 
greater flexibility in using oil revenues, which under the World Bank’s policy conditions 
called for paying off public debt (70% of oil revenues) and savings (20%), with only 10% 
for social spending. As a result of the changes, the World Bank cancelled a US$100 
million adjustment operation (World Bank, 2006c). Correa visited the World Bank office 
in 2005, and had a number of heated exchanges with the country management team and 
the World Bank Latin America vice-president’s team, accusing the World Bank of 
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blackmail and violation of sovereignty.62 When he returned as president in early 2007, 
Correa soon cut off relations with the IMF and World Bank. Correa’s antipathy to the 
World Bank has since continued unabated, with him angrily interrupting a speech by 
then-World Bank Latin America Vice-President Pamela Cox at an Ibero-American 
summit in October 2011, saying, “Why do I have to listen to lectures from the World 
Bank vice president, who openly blackmailed my country?” before walking out of the 
meeting (Agence France-Press, 2011).   
 
Ecuador would seem to be a clear case of a country choosing not to work with the World 
Bank because of political and ideological reasons. It also exemplifies the need to move 
beyond aggregate statistical analyses in understanding these issues: a regression analysis 
of the sort employed by Dreher et al. (2009a), linking voting patterns in the UN with the 
U.S. position to World Bank lending, would fit Ecuador perfectly, except that the 
causality is exactly the reverse of the assumed—the decision to not engage was 
Ecuador’s, not the World Bank’s or the U.S.’s. According to World Bank staff working 
on Ecuador as well as MEF officials, the World Bank has repeatedly attempted to launch 
discussions on new loan projects since 2007, but as yet the Ecuadoran government has 
refused (World Bank interview, May 14, 2012). The MEF vice-minister said that some 
conversations have occurred, but that Ecuador was not yet ready to restart a lending 
relationship (Almeida, June 12, 2012). 
  
The ideological position of the Correa administration has impacted not only World Bank 
lending, but also that of the IADB. The IADB’s reaction may be a case of the U.S. 
exerting behind-the-scenes influence on the IADB. Ecuador last completed an Article IV 
consultation with the IMF at the start of 2008 (IMF, 2008), and has since taken the 
decision not to allow any IMF mission teams in the country, according to both MEF and 
MCPE officials. The IADB, in turn, has used this as a reason to withhold any budget-
support lending to Ecuador (León, June 11, 2012). According to interviews with IADB 
officials conducted for the previous chapter, an Article IV is not strictly obligatory, and in 
                                                
62 Personal experience as a consultant employed by the Ecuador country management team during 2002-
2007.  
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fact a type of “comfort letter” from the IMF would be sufficient (IADB interviews, 
January 18 and 24, 2012). The MEF vice-minister Almeida—who had in the past worked 
with the IADB herself—was aware of the exact rule, and pointed to the influence of the 
U.S. in preventing budget support lending to Ecuador. “In the IADB you have 
shareholders like the U.S. and Canada who have been very heavy in the discussion and 
they obviously say this [IMF Article IV] is not negotiable” (Almeida, June 12, 2012). 
Hence, the U.S.—possibly with the support of other nations—is using its influence at the 
IADB to restrict budget-support lending to the Correa administration, beyond the letter of 
the IADB’s actual law.  
6.2.2 Government Need and Alternative Supply Sources 
 
Ecuador’s conflict with the World Bank is all the more surprising in light of the fact that 
the country has been essentially shut out of international capital markets since December 
2008, when it engaged in a selective default of sovereign bonds, followed by a repurchase 
at a steep discount (Salmon, 2009). The country’s sovereign debt is currently rated as the 
lowest of any country in Latin America receiving a rating from all three major agencies 
(Guardian, 2012), and its Institutional Investor risk ranking was 28.2 in 2011, also by far 
the lowest of any ranked country in Latin America (World Bank, 2012f).  In part this 
rather sanguine attitude toward what is—along with the IADB—the cheapest source of 
sovereign financing available is explained by the strong fiscal situation faced by Ecuador 
in recent years, based on very high prices for the country’s main export, petroleum 
products. Ecuador’s primary fiscal account averaged a surplus of 0.3% of GDP during 
2007-2011, even including a sharp deterioration in 2009 to -3.6% as a result of the global 
crisis (MEF, 2012b).  Because of this, Ecuador’s public debt has dropped to only 22% of 
GDP as of June 2012, from a high of 86% in 2000 (MEF, 2012c). 
  
At the same time, however, Ecuador has embarked on a major investment surge, one of 
President Correa’s main political platforms. Capital spending has tripled during his 
administration, rising from under 5% of GDP in 2006 to 15% in 2011 (MEF, 2012b). The 
vast majority of the new investment spending has been funded with bilateral loans from 
the Chinese government. Loans from non-Paris Club governments to Ecuador have risen 
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from US$653 million at the end of 2008 to US$3.2 billion by June 2012 (MEF, 2012d). 
Of that, the Chinese lent Ecuador US$2.5 billion between 2009 and June 2012, and the 
Brazilian government another US$250 million (MEF, 2012e). This does not include very 
large loans (several billion US$) given by the Chinese to the Ecuadoran national oil 
company, which according to the MCPE are not classified as public debt because they are 
considered “advanced payments” on future deliveries of petroleum products to the 
Chinese (León, June 11, 2012). All of the new debt is at very high interest rates, listed as 
between 5.1 and 8% on MEF data (MEF, 2012f), with former and current ministry 
officials citing 7% as the standard rate. This more than double the rates offered by the 
CAF and considerably above the terms provided by the World Bank and IADB (Ibid.). 
With an average maturity of 12 years, these rates are comparable to the levels considered 
unsustainable for 10-year sovereign bonds issued by Spain and Italy during the Euro debt 
crisis.  
 
According to both the MCPE and MEF, Ecuador has been taking the maximum amounts 
available from both the IADB and CAF, but that this does not come close to covering the 
country’s investment plans, which accounts for the move to borrow from China, despite 
higher interest rates. “It’s not like we can indebt ourselves as much as we would like with 
these institutions, they all have their limits for each country,” said the MCPE vice-
minister. “We are using both [IADB and CAF] the most possible, so we’ve had to look 
for other sources, which in our case is China. We do need to analyze a bit more the issue 
of pricing, but there is no limit to the amount of loans we can take out with China” (León, 
June 11, 2012). The MEF vice-minister confirmed that Ecuador was at the borrowing 
limit with the CAF and close to the limit with the IADB.  
 
Hence, while demand side issues are a key factor in explaining why Ecuador chooses not 
to work with the World Bank, despite very attractive financial terms, supply side issues 
are also relevant. Ecuador would clearly like to borrow more from both the IADB and the 
CAF, but is unable to because of supply restrictions. In the case of the CAF, the supply 
restriction comes mainly from the danger of over-exposing the CAF’s loan portfolio to a 
country seen as unstable by financial markets, which could impact its own credit rating 
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and borrowing costs. According to both CAF and Ecuadoran officials, the CAF prefers to 
keep exposure to a single country below 30% of the total portfolio, and at certain points 
Ecuador was approaching those limits, which led the CAF to slow down lending 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2010b). The rationale behind the IADB’s country exposure limit is 
more opaque, and there is no way to tell whether this is an objective measure or whether 
the U.S. or other major shareholders are able to influence this allocation behind the 
scenes. A former finance minister attributed the reduced size of the IADB’s loan portfolio 
to the tensions between the U.S. and the Correa administration, saying, “The U.S. has an 
important role in all these boards, the IMF, the World Bank and the IADB. And they [the 
Ecuadoran government] kicked out the U.S. ambassador. The IADB keeps making loans, 
although in much smaller amounts than before” (Pozo, June 12, 2012). 
6.2.3 Speed and Flexibility are Key Factors; Technical Assistance is Not 
 
While limits on available credit are clearly key to explain the size of Ecuador’s portfolio 
with the CAF and IADB, other factors also play an important role, and go some way to 
understanding why Ecuador has not taken the maximum amount of loans from the IADB, 
despite its low cost compared to China and the CAF. The first, according to several MEF 
officials, is speed and ease of approval, which is particularly important for the current 
administration’s drive to quickly complete major infrastructure investments. The lengthy 
approval time for IADB investment loans is too long for many of Ecuador’s planned 
projects. “What we put with the IADB are projects that don’t need to be executed in the 
very short term, that can take that time of maturation and processes of the IADB,” 
according the MEF vice-minister. “With China, they can give us US$2 billion in three 
months, and they just use national laws [for procurement and financial management]. The 
difference is abysmal” (Almeida, June 12, 2012). A second MEF official in charge of 
multilateral borrowing said the greater speed of the CAF led Ecuador to use them for 
many projects over the IADB. “There’s important projects that cannot wait, so we go 
with the CAF. Our government wants to finance these projects quickly, so whoever can 
give us the resources more quickly, we go with them. Speed is very important” 
(Villafuerte, June 8, 2012). 
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As with Colombia, all officials with experience dealing with the three MDBs reported 
that the World Bank and IADB had roughly similar levels of bureaucracy and time to 
approval, while the CAF was significantly faster and easier to work with. “The CAF is a 
lot faster for getting financing, then next is the IADB,” said a MEF official. “In terms of 
time, the IADB and the World Bank are about the same, in my experience” (Ibid.). A 
former finance minister, in office during the Gutierrez government and involved in taking 
loans from all three MDBs, agreed with the assessment of current officials, also adding 
that if the country was in a hurry they could simply call the CAF president directly to 
speed up the loan approval (Yepes, June 8, 2012). The MCPE vice-minister pointed to the 
CAF’s reliance on national legislation as an important factor in its favor. “In the case of 
CAF financing, the form of spending is subject to national legislation,” he said. “By 
contrast the spending with the IADB is subject to their methodology of procurement, 
which is above the national legislation. So in some cases this turns out to a longer the 
process of contracting. It could be that this has been an incentive to change the source of 
financing for types of projects.” (León, June 11, 2012). 
 
Another former finance minister, who was in office at the start of the Correa 
administration in 2007, indicated that not only was the CAF faster and less bureaucratic 
than the IADB, but that it was also more flexible and willing to adapt to the government’s 
immediate needs. “The CAF was always close to the country,” he said. “When the Correa 
government started in a very bad fiscal situation...the CAF accelerated loans that were in 
the approval process, and made disbursements to keep public works going. They were 
very close to the needs of the country…They were much faster than the IADB, and much 
closer to the government” (Ortiz, June 8, 2012). 
 
Several former and current officials also pointed to the lack of safeguards and flexibility 
in loan use as an added attraction behind the huge rise in borrowing from the Chinese, 
apart from available supply. “It’s much more effective for the Ecuadoran government to 
go with China, they don’t demand absolutely anything,” one former finance minister said. 
“You pay more, its short-term, but you get the money right away and there’s less 
requirements for economic policy and transparency in contracting” (Yepes, June 8, 
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2012). As well, the Chinese resources act in effect as budget support lending, as 
according to MCPE and MEF officials it goes directly into the budget and is not tied to 
any specific spending. Hence this could explain the lack of concern of Ecuador about 
losing access to IADB budget support loans.  
 
In stark contrast to the case of Colombia, the expertise and technical assistance that 
comes along with loans, especially for the World Bank and IADB, is of very low 
importance to Ecuador. According to current and former officials, this is partly the result 
of associating technical assistance with the heavy-handed policy impositions of MDBs in 
past years. “The bad relations of the current government with the multilaterals, especially 
with the World Bank, came about as a result of these technical assistance, help that came 
along with the credits. You have to evaluate the impact of this technical assistance, and I 
would say the balance is negative,” said a former finance minister (Ortiz, June 8, 2012). 
The MEF vice-minister stated that while technical assistance can be useful, it is not a 
decisive issue for Ecuador. “An interchange of experiences is fine, but you have to adapt 
it to the country,” she said. “These are banks, let’s not fool ourselves. You don’t take the 
credit just for the knowledge. What you want is to finance what you’ve defined as a 
country as your priorities” (Almeida, June 12, 2012). As in Colombia, the CAF is not 
perceived as a source of technical assistance, except in some very specialized aspects of 
infrastructure projects. However, because Ecuador does not value the assistance to the 
same degree as Colombia, this does not seem to work against the CAF as a source of 
loans. 
6.2.4 Competition for a Sensitive Client 
 
Despite the relatively small size of Ecuador’s loan portfolio for all the MDBs, each has 
engaged in competitive behavior in recent years to maintain or (in the case of the World 
Bank) re-engage with the country. Because of the political stance of the Ecuadoran 
government as well as its particular needs and context, this competition has taken on a 
very different character from the case of Colombia. The focus on technical assistance, 
sophisticated financial products and easing of policy conditionality are not relevant for 
Ecuador, while flexibility in resource use and respect for the political sensibilities and 
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more centralized control of national finances by the Correa administration are more 
useful.  
 
Both the IADB and the CAF have offered Ecuador a number of ways to provide 
“backdoor” financing directly to the budget, since neither provides direct budget support 
loans (the IADB because of the IMF dispute and the CAF as a matter of policy). Several 
current and former officials described how the CAF was able to provide budget support 
disguised as an investment loan. The loans would be drawn up supporting a specific 
sector, such as education or infrastructure, and would according to the CAF be paying for 
sectoral expenses that had already occurred. In reality this simply meant the resources 
were going directly into the general budget. The current CAF portfolio shows a number 
of sizeable sectoral loans that, according to descriptions in the annual reports, are not for 
specific investments, suggesting the CAF has continued this technique under the Correa 
administration.63  
 
The IADB has undertaken similar financial arrangements, although according to MEF 
and MCPE officials it is much more careful about ensuring that specific sectoral spending 
is fully documented before such a loan is approved. Nonetheless, the mechanism 
functions in the same way, essentially replacing spending the government has already 
done (and presumably would have done anyway) with an injection into the general 
budget. One former minister described the process as follows: “With the IADB, we found 
a scheme to identify projects agreed on by the government, and came up with a type of 
reimbursement. We would do a project with our own resources and then show that it was 
completed, and use that as the basis to get financing from the IADB, and return liquidity 
to the budget” (Ortiz, June 8, 2012). Thus, even with the U.S. closing off formal budget 
loans, the more flexible loan procedures of the IADB allow it to continue providing de 
facto budget support. 
 
Current officials also pointed to a more circumspect attitude of all three MDBs on their 
dealings with the Correa administration compared to previous years, for example in how 
                                                
63 For example, US$250 million for “social sectors” in 2010 and US$200 million for “debt policy” in 2008.  
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they go about “marketing” their loans. In previous years, IADB and World Bank officials 
would try to generate demand for their loans by going directly to executing agencies, who 
would then come to the MEF for approval, according to MEF officials. “Not any more. 
Now we say, our development plan is this, our plan of investments is this, these projects 
are those I would like to do with the IADB or the CAF, and then you start to set up the 
missions to come and work on the projects that you say you need as a country. And 
IADB and CAF are fine with that” (Almeida, June 12, 2012). Similarly, the MCPE vice-
minister noted a greater degree of humility on the part of the IADB and the World Bank. 
“In recent years the IADB and World Bank have been much less demanding. In the past 
they had more of an attitude, but before this government,” he said. “Not now. I think the 
international organizations have a different attitude, because the current government has 
been very critical of exactly this type of behavior” (León, June 11, 2012).  
  
The World Bank has by all accounts made a concerted effort to restart lending to 
Ecuador, and although it continues implementing a past project and has engaged in some 
public events, it has not yet been successful. The effort of the World Bank to restart 
lending was confirmed by World Bank staff (World Bank interview, May 14, 2012) as 
well as several current and former Ecuadoran officials. “Yes, they are trying to come 
back,” said the MCPE vice-minister. “There have been many efforts, but politically it’s 
blocked from Ecuador’s side. Like any bank, they think like bankers and want to lend 
money, and so are always looking for a way back, but the government has not opened the 
way” (León, June 11, 2012). 
6.2.5 Summarizing Findings 
 
The case of Ecuador reveals a different set of results to explain trends in MDB lending 
over recent years. While once again many of the factors analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5 are 
relevant for Ecuador, the importance placed on them is quite different from the case of 
Colombia. Here, supply issues seem more relevant than in Colombia, with Ecuadoran 
officials saying they would borrow greater resources from the CAF and possibly the 
IADB if possible, and are recurring to more expensive Chinese lending in part simply 
because of available supply. Price issues are less binding, because Ecuador has no 
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realistic access to private markets and is generally a price-taker to fill its borrowing 
needs. And because of the current administration’s ambitious infrastructure investment 
program, speed is a key demand-side issue, explaining why IADB lending is not used to 
the maximum level available, despite a much cheaper price than the Chinese or the CAF. 
Use of national procedures for procurement and safeguards appeared only of minor 
concern to the Ecuadorans, perhaps in part because it only arose in the relatively small 
portfolio of the IADB, which was far outweighed by Chinese lending with no such 
requirements. Technical assistance, so critical to the Colombians, is by all accounts a 
non-factor for the Ecuadorans. 
 
The Ecuadoran example did highlight one factor not analyzed in Chapter 5 that could be 
relevant: the political impact of working or not working with a given MDB. Because of 
its high-profile legacy in Ecuador—and perhaps in many countries in Latin America and 
elsewhere in the world—the World Bank could well be viewed with great suspicion and 
antipathy by parts of the population, and using it as a whipping boy may prove politically 
useful. Whether this explains Correa’s decision to cut off relations with the World Bank 
(and IMF) is unanswerable, but certainly plausible. The lower profile of the IADB and its 
more regional character may make it a less useful target for politicians, while the CAF is 
likely viewed positively, if indeed the general public is even aware of its existence. This 
political dimension could be worth taking into account more systematically in analyzing 
the World Bank’s lending, especially in countries with strong past World Bank 
involvement and led by politicians on the left of the political spectrum. This, in turn, also 
mixes with potential supply side effects of the role of major shareholders (notably the 
U.S.) in possibly restricting supply to countries for political reasons, as may be the case 
in Ecuador and has been suggested by other academic studies. 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
The research undertaken for this chapter—interviews with high-ranking country officials 
involved in the multilateral borrowing decision process in Colombia and Ecuador—
generated useful evidence to shed further light on the main factors going into MDB 
borrowing in two developing countries. By interviewing the actual officials involved in 
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borrowing decisions in two countries, this chapter was able to examine the political and 
economic complexities of real cases, which both test the plausibility of the analysis in 
Chapters 3-5 and also highlighted certain country-specific realities that point to the need 
for caution in interpreting aggregate statistical patterns.  
 
In the two cases considered here, the main causal factors posited in the previous chapters 
as likely shaping demand for loans from each of the three MDBs appear valid, and the 
position of each of the three MDBs relative to one another in each of these factors was 
reported to be exactly as found in Chapters 4 and 5. However, their degree of importance 
varied considerably depending on country circumstances. Price is unsurprisingly a key 
issue, although much more important for the long-term planning horizon of Colombia 
than in Ecuador, which is currently focusing on borrowing large volumes for major 
investment projects due to political reasons. Speed and bureaucratic obstacles are relevant 
for both countries, but much more so for Ecuador, for the same reasons as above. 
Safeguards appeared much more troublesome for Colombia, possibly because much of 
Ecuador’s major infrastructure projects (which are most likely to trigger safeguards) are 
undertaken with Chinese and CAF resources, while the IADB’s Ecuador portfolio is more 
in social areas and the World Bank is not currently lending at all.  
 
At least two other factors not analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5 also arise as potentially 
important, and should be considered in future analysis of MDB lending. The first is the 
technical assistance and knowledge component of lending, which for Colombia was 
considered a top priority in defining the source of an MDB loan, with World Bank 
considered at a slight advantage over the IADB and the CAF essentially unable to 
provide these services at all. In the case of Ecuador, however, technical assistance was 
considered of minor importance because of past negative experience with multilaterals 
and also the strong nationalistic stance of the current administration in defining its own 
development strategy. Second, some countries—in this chapter, Ecuador—may find it 
politically useful to be seen as refusing to work with the World Bank because of its 
reputation as a purveyor of “neo-liberal” recipes for development, or conversely they 
might pay a political price for being seen working too closely with the World Bank. 
 
202 
Because of its lower profile and regional character, this seems to be less of an issue with 
the IADB, and does not arise at all for the CAF.  
 
Another noteworthy finding is the relevance of the relationship between the borrowing 
country and the United States as an influence on the supply of lending. This arose for 
both countries analyzed here, with opposite outcomes. For Colombia, high-ranking 
officials explained their ability to access much higher levels of non-earmarked budget 
support from both the World Bank and IADB than those MDBs normally provide 
specifically as a result of the influence of the U.S. administration, with which Colombia 
has been closely allied for several years. By contrast, the bad relations between Ecuador 
and the U.S. appear to have led to the IADB shutting off budget support lending to the 
country and reducing the overall lending envelope available. While this does provide 
some qualitative support to other studies investigating the role of the U.S. in multilateral 
lending (for example Harrigan et al., 2006, Dreher et al., 2009, and Kilby, 2006), a note 
of caution is required, for two reasons. First, in the case of Ecuador this has had at least as 
much a demand effect as a supply effect (considering Ecuador’s refusal to borrow from 
the World Bank for the past five years, despite the MDB’s efforts)—hence the direction 
of causality cannot be assumed. Second, it is far from clear in these two examples how 
much the U.S. influence achieved, and it would appear to be only marginal (mainly on 
the modality of lending). Hence, the evidence here suggests that the U.S. role should not 
be over-stated. 
 
Lastly, in the context of two countries with increasing options in terms of supply of 
sovereign lending and much improved fiscal situations, it is interesting to see the degree 
to which all three MDBs engage in considerable competitive activity to maintain their 
loan portfolio. Officials in both countries offered many examples of the MDBs working 
very hard to place loans, which is a far cry from the official line—at least at the IADB 
and World Bank—that they are simply providing help when needed, and are not in any 
way “crowding out” other potential private sources of financing. Easing off on policy 
conditionality, changing staff to suit government needs, developing more innovative 
financial products, using investment loans as de facto budget support when requested and 
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developing technical assistance specifically as an entrée to sealing project deals are 
among the many strategies employed by each of the MDBs to continue placing loans. 
What exactly is driving this competition is an open question—is it a financial need for 
income generation from loans or secure better access to markets for MDB bonds? Or a 
bureaucratic drive to expand operations? Or simply a professional desire to remain 
relevant and “at the table” to influence policy? These are questions worth further 
investigation, but it is clear that MDBs are in fact acting very much as competitors to 
hold onto increasingly picky clients.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
 
The overarching motivation for this thesis has been to better understand how a changing 
world economy, and in particular the economic rise of many developing countries, is 
reshaping the operating environment and activities of multilateral development banks 
(MDBs). In academia and general popular perception, MDBs—and especially the World 
Bank—are frequently viewed as all-powerful organizations able to impose their will upon 
helpless developing countries. But in a world where many developing countries no longer 
need MDB loans as much as they did in previous years, this presumed power dynamic 
does not hold. China, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa and other middle-income countries 
have high international reserves, stable fiscal accounts, low debt and access to a variety 
of sources of finance, including domestic capital markets.  
 
In such a context, many countries only work with MDBs when it suits their own priorities 
and needs. That is, demand-side factors are much more important in development lending 
than in the past. This dynamic, in turn, is likely to be having differing effects on the 20-
odd MDBs in existence, because of their different operating characteristics and hence 
attractiveness as a source of loans for borrowing countries. The research has considered 
these issues by examining three MDBs operating in Latin America: the World Bank, the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Andean Development Corporation 
(CAF). Specifically, the thesis has sought to analyze how three separate aspects of 
multilateral development lending are inter-acting: i) the varying interests and relative 
power of different MDB shareholding countries; ii) the growing economic strength of 
many middle-income countries, reshaping their demand for MDB loans; and iii) the 
pressures faced by MDBs themselves as a result of their financial model.  
 
To establish a basis for formulating testable hypotheses, Chapter 1 reviewed the extent 
academic literature on international organizations in general and MDBs in particular. 
With very few exceptions, the literature has up to now focused overwhelmingly on the 
“supply” side of MDB activity. That is, whether an MDB makes a loan or not is 
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considered almost entirely through the lens of what the MDB itself wants to do, while 
recipient countries are (explicitly or implicitly) assumed to have a constant demand 
function for MDB loans. Various hypotheses have been put forth and tested about what 
motivates the MDB’s “supply”, including the geopolitical interests of one or two 
powerful shareholders (mainly the U.S.), changing ideas and norms about how MDBs 
should promote development, tensions between shareholders and MDB staff or 
bureaucratic pathologies within the MDB itself. Hence, this thesis’ focus on demand-side 
factors is a potentially valuable contribution to the literature in the interest of building a 
more comprehensive, realistic explanatory model for MDB activity, especially in the 
current global economic context.  
 
Despite its predominant supply-side focus, existing IO literature provides two useful 
theoretical tools to bring to bear in the current research project. The first is a way to help 
understand how, in a more demand-oriented marketplace for development lending, 
MDBs might systematically differ from one another in ways that makes them more or 
less attractive to borrowing countries as a source of lending. Building on the work of a 
number of scholars using a principal-agent framework for understanding MDBs, I 
propose a schema that takes the split between borrowing and non-borrowing country 
shareholders as a critical variable that helps explain numerous operational characteristics 
for different MDBs. These two groups of countries, I suggest, will tend to have similar 
interests within their group and divergent interests between the groups, and the relative 
balance of shareholder voting power between them defines many key aspects of 
operational policy and activity. Borrowing governments will want MDBs to supply loans 
and advisory services at as low a cost as possible, with minimum bureaucratic hassles and 
conditions. Non-borrowing countries, by contrast, will seek to impose their own ideas 
about development on borrowers, implement strict control on how resources are spent, 
and reduce the risk of MDB financial difficulties that they would have to pay for out of 
their guaranteed capital. The relative power of those two groups is a critical variable 
shaping the competitive advantages of different MDBs from the point of view of 
borrowing countries 
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The second theoretical building block comes from organizational sociology, and attempts 
to understand a fundamental aspect of the MDB organizational model frequently 
overlooked in the current literature: its character as a financial institution. MDBs are 
many things, but at bottom their financial model serves as a very specialized sort of bank, 
one that is largely self-sustaining and requires minimal fiscal contributions from 
shareholders, and at the same time is capable of providing a variety of what are generally 
considered to be global public goods. The basic mechanics of this model—borrowing 
capital at very low rates, lending to developing countries at slightly higher rates and 
covering operating costs with the margin—embeds certain financial pressures into their 
organizational model. The two specific needs each MDB faces are i) access to sources of 
capital at low prices; and ii) a steady stream of borrowers to generate sufficient loan 
income to pay administrative costs. Combined with the specific interests and balance of 
power of shareholders within each MDB and the evolving world context, these financial 
pressures can push MDBs into acting in ways that are not necessarily in accord with their 
development mandate in order to ensure organizational survival.  
 
As a result of these theoretical considerations, this thesis formulated and set out to test the 
three hypotheses, the first of which focuses on the internal dynamics of MDBs while the 
second two address how MDBs relate to borrower countries and the wider external 
environment in which it operates. The two sets of hypotheses are linked, in that the causal 
relationships defining the internal dynamics of each MDB in turn condition its relations 
to borrowers and the external environment. 
 
I. Shareholders and internal MDB dynamics 
 I. Shareholders and internal MDB dynamics 
 H1: The balance of power between borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders 
causally defines key MDB operational characteristics that impact borrower demand, 
including loan cost and approval requirements, such that: 
- The more non-borrowing countries have control over an MDB, the lower will 
be loan prices, but the more intrusive will be its loan approval requirements 
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- The more borrower countries have control over an MDB, the higher will be 
loan prices, but the less intrusive will be its loan approval requirements 
II. MDBs, borrowers and the external environment 
 H2: As a function of a borrowing country’s reduced need for MDB loans and 
greater access to alternative sources of capital, these MDB operational characteristics will 
become increasingly important in explaining their demand for MDB loans, as opposed to 
supply factors. 
 H3: The imperative of securing resources required for MDB organizational 
survival (i. sources of capital and ii. borrowing country clients) will lead MDBs to 
modify their operational strategies, organizational structure and even membership to 
ensure survival. 
 
Section 1 below reviews the results of evidence collection and analysis undertaken in 
each of the main chapters of the thesis as they related to each of the three hypotheses, and 
discusses the implications of the study for research on MDBs and IOs more generally. 
Section 2 concludes by considering implications for MDB policy and reform, and 
suggests ideas for future research directions.  
7.1 Review of Research Findings and Extensions 
 
The qualitative and quantitative evidence accumulated over the course of this research 
project provides generally strong support for the initial research hypotheses, as reviewed 
in sub-sections 7.1.1-7.1.3.  
7.1.1 Hypothesis 1—Shareholder Balance of Power 
 
Categorizing country shareholder groups appears to be a useful methodological tool for 
analyzing characteristics and activities of MDBs. Evidence—mainly from interviews 
undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5—indicates that broad opposition between borrowers and 
non-borrowers on numerous issues is a critical fault line in the governance of MDBs that 
shapes both their operational attributes and actions throughout their realm of action and 
within individual countries. The analysis of these chapters clearly shows that key factors 
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driving operational characteristics of the three MDBs—loan prices, loan processing 
times, environmental and social safeguards and procurement procedures—fall along a 
continuum with the CAF at one end, the World Bank at the other, and the IADB in 
between. Critically, this positioning is shown to be a direct result of the relative interests 
and balance of power between borrower and non-borrower shareholders, wherein the 
three MDBs also fall in the same positions along a continuum.  
 
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the “middle ground” position of the IADB 
does appear more difficult to categorize than the two extremes of the CAF and World 
Bank. The marginally larger voting share of borrowers in regular loan decisions, coupled 
with the veto power of the U.S. over major policy changes, make the IADB more 
problematic to analyze. Evidence from the two case studies in Chapter 6 suggests that the 
U.S. can leverage the threat of withholding capital increases to gain power on decisions 
of interest to it. Evidence from Chapters 4 and 5 also indicate that borrowers are able to 
use their greater voice and voting power to shape policies, for example safeguards and net 
income allocation. The particular characteristics of the IADB seem to position it as the 
“best of both worlds” in relation to the other two MDBs: it has many of the advantages 
that come with non-borrower shareholders (most notably excellent access to capital 
markets and hence attractive financial terms) as well as some that come with a borrowing 
shareholder majority (slightly less onerous non-financial hassle factors and greater 
flexibility than the World Bank, less negative political visibility and a better image with 
client countries).  
 
To better substantiate the importance of shareholder structure and to address the more 
methodologically troublesome “middle ground” position of the IADB, it would be 
necessary to expand the analysis to other MDBs. This would also mitigate the problem of 
just including a single case for each of the three governance structures. The credibility of 
the causal link suggested in theoretical argument and empirical research would thus be 
greatly enhanced if similar relationships could be shown for additional MDBs. If other 
MDBs were shown to follow the same patterns, this would also exclude that the 
relationships observed are merely driven by particularities of the Latin American region. 
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Table 7.1. MDBs by Type of Shareholder Arrangements 
Type MDB Votes by non-
borrowing 
shareholders (in %) 
Non-concessional 
loans (2008) 
(in US$ billion)  
World Bank 65.7 13.5 Non-borrower 
dominant Asian Development Bank 65.2   8.4 
IADB 49.9 11.1 
African Development 
Bank 
39.7   2.8 
Banco Centroamericáno 
de Integración Económica  
41.0   1.4 
Non-borrower 
predominant 
Caribbean Development 
Bank 
35.9   0.3 
CAF   3.1   7.9 
Islamic Development 
Bank 
  0.0   7.2 
Borrower 
dominant 
East Africa Development 
Bank 
14.1   0.03 
Sources: World Bank 2009a, Asian Development Bank 2009, IADB 2009, African Development 
Bank 2009, Banco Centroamericáno de Integración Económica 2009, Caribbean Development 
Bank 2009, CAF 2009a, Islamic Development Bank 2009, and East Africa Development Bank 
2009. 
Note: This table does not include MDBs that lend primarily to the private sector, such as the 
EBRD and EIB.  
 
While this extension would require a substantial expansion of data collection and analysis 
that is beyond the scope of this thesis, a classification of other major MDBs further 
research might want to take into account is provided in Table 7.1. The table considers 
MDBs that (i) have at least some borrowing countries as shareholders and (ii) lend 
primarily to sovereign governments as opposed to the private sector. The distinction 
between different types of governance is based on the share of votes by non-borrowing 
shareholders. As can be seen, other MDBs with similar distributions of votes as in the 
three MDBs considered here are available for further research. Moreover, the lending 
volumes of some of these MDBs are considerable. Nevertheless, the coexistence of 
similarly large banks with different governance structures within a given region appears 
to be relatively unique for Latin America. This may restrict the choice of borrower 
countries in other world regions—an issue one would need to take into account in 
possible comparisons.  
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The findings of this thesis also shed further light on principal-agent models that may be 
of use to future research. From the evidence uncovered here, it appears that principal-
agent dynamics vary dramatically in part as a function of how closely aligned are the 
interests of principals. Divergent interests among principals open a larger “space” for the 
agent to both develop and pursue its own agenda. This is evident in both the World Bank 
and IADB, where staff pursue strategies to make their organization more competitive in a 
changing marketplace. Some of the formal policy changes proposed by staff—such as 
greater use of country systems, for example—may get shot down by non-borrowing 
shareholders, but other, less formal tactics such as relaxed implementation of policies or 
more “friendly” loan negotiations are much more difficult to control by shareholders. 
This in part explain the many layers of bureaucratic oversight in those two MDBs—these 
mechanisms are how the shareholding principals attempt to ensure that the staff agents do 
their bidding. In the CAF, by contrast, the close alignment of shareholders on exactly 
what the organization is meant to do leads to staff and shareholder interests being much 
more closely aligned, and as a result the MDB’s organization and procedures are 
considerably less bureaucratic and formalistic than the World Bank or IADB—there is 
less need for shareholder principal oversight.   
 
7.1.2 Hypothesis 2—Borrower Demand 
 
Evidence considered in Chapters 3-6 supports the hypothesis that shifting the analytical 
focus more in the direction of borrower demand is necessary to understand the 
functioning of MDBs in the current global economic context. An exclusive supply side 
focus may have been a methodologically useful approach to understand MDBs during 
earlier times, but it is certainly no longer sufficient now. The global economy has 
changed radically in the past 30 years, and while it remains an open question as to 
whether current trends continue, it is evident that the world will never return to the 
situation of the 1980s. Many of the largest MDB clients are in a position of considerable 
economic strength and the reality of global capital movements mean that vastly larger 
amounts of finance are now available for development lending. The demands of large 
middle-income developing countries like China, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa and 
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Indonesia on MDBs matter a great deal, and ignoring that reality clearly misses a major 
and perhaps fundamental aspect of MDB activities in the present day. 
  
This is not to say that supply side issues are now irrelevant—far from it. Financial issues 
are unquestionably important, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4. As well, the role of the 
U.S. in both the World Bank and IADB—much analyzed in the extant literature on 
MDBs (for example, Harrigan et al., 2006; Dreher et al., 2009a and 2009b; Kilby, 
2006and 2011; and Lim and Vreeland, 2011)—is certainly still relevant, considering that 
country’s veto power over major aspects of policy and organizational structure. This was 
shown to be the case in the current thesis, statistically in Chapter 3 and through the 
interviews undertaken in both Colombia and Ecuador. However, this and other studies 
find a relatively marginal significance for U.S. influence. The U.S. is evidently not shy 
about exercising both formal and informal power when it sees fit. At the same time, the 
U.S. government obviously has neither the ability nor inclination to micro-manage 
thousands of development operations of many types undertaken by the World Bank and 
IADB each year. The vast majority of these operations, one must assume, are driven by 
other concerns.   
 
One also cannot discount supply-side views of MDBs derived from a more constructivist 
perspective. The internal intellectual and professional culture of different MDBs, the self-
image of the staff and evolving norms and ideas on what “development” means and how 
best to pursue it are likely to play a role in shaping MDB actions. These topics were not a 
focus of this thesis, but did come up in the case study discussion of the varying 
interaction styles of mission teams from the three MDBs with government officials as 
well as the move toward country systems as part of the Paris Declaration agenda, despite 
resistance from major non-borrowing shareholders. Another example not discussed in the 
thesis is how development “fads” shape lending trends (decentralization in the 1990s, 
conditional cash transfers in the early 2000s, performance-based budgeting in the mid-
2000s).  
 
 
212 
However, this thesis shows that supply considerations must be complemented with the 
perspective of the borrower. The case studies of Colombia and Ecuador make it evident 
that government officials can and do compare MDBs to one another and to other potential 
sources of sovereign borrowing, using a number of criteria depending on their political 
and economic circumstances. Loan price and bureaucratic requirements that come along 
with the loans—as analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5—are major considerations, as are other 
attributes such as the quality of an MDB’s technical assistance and political/ideological 
considerations. It is abundantly clear that trying to understand development lending in the 
early 21st century without considering the views of borrowing countries is not possible.  
 
The case studies illustrate that the priority placed on MDB characteristics appears to vary 
from country to country, and even over time within a single country, making broad 
generalizations difficult. As with Hypothesis 1 above, this leads one to consider 
broadening the scope of countries considered, both as case studies as well as in aggregate 
statistical analysis. The countries examined in the preceding chapters are largely fast-
growing middle-income countries. Do these same patterns hold true, for example, in 
smaller, less developed regions of the world? What about Central America, where three 
MDBs also operate (World Bank, IADB, and the Banco Centroamericano de Integración 
Económica)? Do countries with lower levels of economic development, such as parts of 
south Asia or sub-Saharan Africa, face different dynamics because of their dependence 
on highly-concessional lending windows such as IDA, or is the rise in alternate sources of 
capital (for example, Chinese investment) impacting borrower demand there also?  
7.1.3 Hypothesis 3—Financial Pressures  
 
The thesis uncovered convincing evidence in support of the importance of financial 
considerations in driving MDB activities. This was particularly apparent in Chapter 2, 
which showed how the need to access capital markets shifted each of the three MDBs to 
some degree away from original conception of their founders. As a number of European 
countries have recently been made aware, international bond buyers are a rather 
unsentimental bunch, easily swayed to put their money elsewhere if they sense danger. 
The World Bank, IADB and CAF all learned this lesson the hard way. In the interests of 
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keeping bond buyers satisfied, they reshaped their lending strategies and even—in the 
case of the IADB and CAF—their very shareholding structure. In light of the 
unwillingness of shareholders to contribute larger sums of capital for on-lending directly 
out of their budgets, there was simply no alternative if these MDBs wanted to continue as 
viable developmental organizations.  
 
While this need to placate the capital markets may have come at some cost to their 
developmental mission, it also is a source of considerable strength and autonomy. 
MDBs—unlike many other international organizations such as the United Nations—do 
not depend on budgetary handouts.64 As country shareholders do not have the “power of 
the purse” in an absolute sense, MDBs have more room to maneuver on their own terms, 
opening the door perhaps wider to principal-agent dynamics and more constructivist-
oriented bureaucratic self-motivation than in other organizations controlled more directly 
through annual budget allocations like, for example, the United Nations. This also 
explains why the intermittent capital increases and tri-annual IDA replenishments are 
such lengthy and fraught affairs—these are the opportunities for major shareholders to 
further their interests. In the words of Kapur, IDA replenishments have become “the tail 
that wags the dog” (2000, p. 34), exactly because it is the best opportunity for the U.S. 
and other major shareholders to force through policy changes at the relatively 
autonomous IBRD.  
 
The pressure faced by MDBs in securing the resources they need to operate from 
international capital markets is a little-explored facet of their organizational model. While 
this thesis looked into the impacts of this relationship historically (in Chapter 2) and as a 
factor influencing loan pricing (Chapter 4), considerable research could still be 
undertaken in this direction. The interaction between MDBs, bond rating agencies and 
                                                
64 This has an interesting—and perhaps related—parallel with the story told about New York City builder 
extraordinaire, Robert Moses, in Caro’s 1974 masterpiece, The Power Broker. By designing the Triborough 
Authority in such a way that it could issue its own bonds, payable with toll revenues, Moses made himself 
independent from city, state and even national authorities for decades, with immense consequences for New 
York City’s infrastructure. Moses’ Triborough bonds were a favorite of Wall Street bankers in the 1930s 
and 1940s, and one can imagine that the World Bank’s initial designers and the Wall Street crowd who first 
led the World Bank (see Chapter 2) may have been well aware of the financial and other benefits of 
establishing good relations with bond markets.  
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international capital markets is complex and has a major impact on financial and even 
developmental policies at MDBs. According to interviews with World Bank EDs, they 
face regular pressure by the World Bank Treasury to comply with its requests, “so we 
keep the bond markets happy,” said one (World Bank ED interview, January 25, 2012). 
“And we don’t know enough about it to question Treasury, so we just agree.” Further, 
more detailed statistical analysis could be done with the performance of MDB bonds in 
different market conditions and the link with loan prices, thus more exactly pinpointing 
divergences that might be caused by non-financial factors. 
 
The other critical financial resource built into the MDB organizational model is, of 
course, the interest earned on making loans. MDBs are banks, and banks earn their 
revenues (mainly) through loans. As such, it should come as no surprise that the case 
studies of Colombia and Ecuador revealed considerable evidence of competitive behavior 
on the part of MDBs. Backing off on policy conditionality, offering new, more flexible 
types of financial instruments, using technical assistance as a carrot to launch loan 
projects and adopting more diplomatic interactions with country governments are just 
some of the strategies MDBs are using in Colombia and Ecuador. This pressure to make 
loans—built into their organizational model—makes MDBs far more entrepreneurial than 
other types of public bureaucracies, with many characteristics closer to a private business.  
 
While the thesis has considered some of the competitive behaviors undertaken by MDBs 
to make loans in the context of the two case study countries, this is another area with 
considerable potential for further research. The competitive strategies discussed in the 
context of Colombia and Ecuador are unlikely to be an exhaustive account. Research 
could explore how MDBs are competing in different country contexts, by undertaking a 
more detailed review of country portfolios and interviewing government officials and 
MDB staff on this specific issue. How does this play out in different country contexts and 
among different MDBs? A game-theoretical framework—like, for example, the 
bargaining framework utilized by Mosley et al. (1995) in their path-breaking study on 
World Bank conditionality—could be useful in this context. 
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7.2 Policy Implications 
 
The findings of this thesis related to borrower demand, shareholding structure and MDB 
finances have a number of implications for the future of the global development lending 
architecture.  
 
The fundamental importance of shareholding structure in shaping MDB characteristics 
defines lending demand from different MDBs. These trends appear to be notably negative 
in the case of the World Bank. It seems that the interests and power of non-borrower 
countries in the governance of the World Bank, and the organizational characteristics that 
derive from them, are leading to a long-term decline in lending demand from that MDB. 
While World Bank loans are extremely well-priced, due in large part to the backing of 
wealthy industrialized countries, the bureaucratic hassles and policy prescriptions that 
those same countries impose are unattractive to borrowers. As developing countries find 
themselves in stronger fiscal positions and with expanding opportunities for financing, 
these hassle factors assume a greater importance in the calculus of borrowers. Temporary 
crisis, such as the 2008-09 global financial crisis, may drive up lending in the short term, 
but long-term trends remain unchanged, as the World Bank itself acknowledges in a 2010 
strategy paper (2010f).  
 
This, in turn, could have important implications for the World Bank’s role in 
development promotion. It could be that the World Bank becomes primarily a source of 
lending only for poorer IDA-eligible countries, and to more developed countries only in 
the case of a temporary crisis. Under such circumstances, it is not at all clear that it would 
be sustainable under its current financial model. As well, this might impact its ability to 
both amass and propagate its development expertise, and play a role as a global 
coordinator in many development issues. The repeated efforts in the past decade driven 
by the World Bank staff to reform and simplify lending procedures—for example, the 
Middle-Income Strategy (World Bank, 2001a, 2004a and 2007a), Investment Lending 
Reform (World Bank, 2009a), Country Systems (World Bank, 2010e) and the P4R 
lending instrument (2011a)—shows that they are well aware of this problem. These 
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efforts have been whole-heartedly supported by borrower shareholders, but as shown in 
Chapter 5, non-borrowers have resisted.  
 
Faced with this reality of declining—or at any rate much more selective—borrower 
demand, non-borrower shareholders face a decision of either reconsidering their stance 
on non-financial characteristics of the World Bank highlighted in Chapters 5 and 6, to 
ensure it remains the pre-eminent MDB, or instead reducing its size or reorienting its 
mission in light of the changing global economic context. A third option would be to 
build a new type of financial model that does not depend on loan income to sustain the 
organization and pay for the many global public goods that the World Bank is expected to 
provide. A tentative move in this direction was launched in 2009 with the creation of the 
Long-Term Income Portfolio (World Bank, 2011e), which is essentially a pool of income 
to be invested by the World Bank Treasury in more risky and profitable investments than 
the normal investment portfolio, and hence generate a more steady stream of net income. 
While this holds out the possibility of generating sufficient non-loan income to cover 
administrative costs, and even sufficient net income to suit the purposes described in 
Chapter 4, it remains to be seen whether shareholders will be willing to allow the World 
Bank Treasury to act essentially as investment bankers, gambling with a substantial 
chunk of liquidity to generate income.  
 
Another possibility is to develop new revenue-generating business lines, for example by 
ramping up the nascent “fee-for-services” pilot, in which the World Bank charges 
countries to act essentially as a public sector management consultancy (World Bank, 
2008b). Currently this operates on a small scale, and the fees charged are (according to 
World Bank staff interviewed) heavily subsidized below their true cost. Whether this 
could turn into a viable, stand-alone business line remains to be seen, particularly as 
much of the World Bank’s vaunted “knowledge” comes in fact from its engagement with 
country lending operations. Other business lines include the explosive growth of trust 
funds administered (for a fee) by the World Bank (World Bank, 2012g), its involvement 
in climate financial mechanisms such as CDM (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011) and 
the newly-proposed climate funds and a little-publicized asset management business 
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started by the World Bank Treasury to help manage developing country assets such as 
pension funds and central bank reserves (World Bank, 2012h). Whether these business 
lines are a distraction from the core mission that shareholders envision for the World 
Bank is an open question. But in the absence of strong and decided action by 
shareholders to address the themes examined in this thesis and their financial 
implications, the entrepreneurial staff of the World Bank is understandably—and perhaps 
commendably—taking whatever action they can to square the circle of their 
organization’s structure and policies with global economic realities and evolving 
borrower demand.  
 
Within the rules and policies set by shareholders, the World Bank staff themselves have 
been engaged in very creative entrepreneurial behavior to maintain relevance and 
continue generating income to ensure organizational survival. In part this has manifested 
itself in the competitive behavior to make loans discussed in the previous section. The 
implications of this competition for the development impacts of World Bank operations, 
and on potentially crowding out private activity, needs to be examined closely. One might 
be tempted to assume that this competition is somehow inherently detrimental to 
development goals, but that is an empirical question. Is it necessarily bad, for example, 
that the World Bank is becoming less dictatorial with its policy conditionality to middle-
income countries? After all, this puts the country much more in the driver’s seat of its 
own development. Further, does this activity reduce the flow of private capital to 
developing countries? Again, this is an empirical question—perhaps the World Bank and 
other MDBs are funding projects that private capital would view as too risky, or perhaps 
these loans actually attracts private investors (“crowding in”) due to the perception of 
reduced risk.  
 
While the World Bank struggles with the issues described above, regional and sub-
regional MDBs around the world may become the preferred source of development 
lending by many countries. Smaller MDBs such as the CAF are very “client-friendly”, 
with flexible and easy procedures and no attempt to impose policy prescriptions on 
borrowers, but the downside is the cost of their loans is relatively higher (sometimes, as 
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in the case of Colombia, even higher than the country can access itself), lending volumes 
are more restricted and technical assistance is minimal. Larger regional MDBs, such as 
the IADB, have many of the positive attributes of the World Bank—notably the ability to 
provide large volumes of low-priced loans, with some level of technical assistance along 
with them—while avoiding some of the worst excesses of the World Bank in terms of 
bureaucratic hassle factor and policy impositions.  
 
Recognizing this reality, some observers of MDB activities have already suggested 
(notably IDS, 2000, Griffith-Jones et al., 2008, and Grabel, 2012) that the development 
aid architecture should move more in the direction of regional and sub-regional MDBs, 
which can bring to bear their more localized expertise and good country relations to 
promote better developmental outcomes. The World Bank could then move into a more 
coordinating and knowledge role, linking formally with other MDBs, while reducing its 
direct financing role. This would still leave problems to resolve for the World Bank’s 
financial model discussed above, but has the potential to move toward a more coherent 
aid system better attuned to the needs of individual regions and countries.  
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9 ANNEXES 
9.1 Annex 1: Alternative Regression Specifications65 
 
In the context of the research question for Chapter 3, the choice of the correct 
econometric model is not obvious. Since lending is a censored variable (no values below 
zero), as opposed to the linear model presented in the main body of the text, a tobit model 
might have been a natural choice. Since the tobit model may not be valid if there is a 
large jump between zero and the smallest positive values, a per capita specification (USD 
per capita) of the dependent variable is used, as opposed to absolute volume. Regression 
(1) in Table A2.1 below presents the standard panel tobit model. Unfortunately, this 
specification uses random rather (RE) than fixed effects (FE), because the fixed effects in 
non-linear panel models tend to generate bias (incidental parameters problem). Greene 
(2004), however, shows that in the case of tobit (rather than probit), the bias mainly 
affects the variance (and terms that are calculated using the variance, such as the marginal 
effects on expected lending), but not the coefficient estimates themselves. He further 
argues that omitting the FE may lead to much greater bias. In this case, the Hausman test 
on the linear specification indicates that the inclusion of country specific effects (here: 
country×bank specific effects, i.e., country FE that may also vary between the three 
banks) is indeed highly relevant to avoid bias. Thus a tobit regression with FE 
(Regression 2) is added. The coefficient estimates, i.e. the marginal effects on the latent 
variable rather than the marginal effects on expected lending, are presented for both tobit 
regressions. This avoids bias in Regression 2 and makes the results comparable between 
regressions. In addition, it facilitates the interpretation of the interaction terms. In any 
case, the latent variable in these models, interpreted as the willingness to borrow, is a 
rather meaningful concept. 
 
The problem remains that in Regression 2 variances, and thus standard errors and p-
values, are biased downward. However, only about 7% of the observations (22 out of 
300) are effectively censored (i.e., =0), so that, first, the tobit FE-model should not be too 
                                                
65 This annex was written by Dr. Katharina Michaelowa. 
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different from a linear FE-model (so that the bias should not be very strong), and second, 
directly going for a linear RE-model may be a good alternative.  
 
Regression 3 thus presents a simple panel FE-model corresponding largely to the model 
presented in Chapter 3. The difference is that in this annex, the dependent variable is 
always specified in per capita terms, and the three banks are taken together in a single 
lending regression identifying the differences between banks through interaction effects 
rather than through Wald tests across SURE regressions. Regression 4 further varies the 
specification of the model by using logs rather than the direct value of the variables (for 
all variables except the linear trend (year) and the global crisis dummy). 
 
The presentation of the regressions in Table A2.1 should be read as follows. The upper 
part of all regressions show coefficient estimates for the World Bank (comparable to 
column 1 in Table 3.3, Chapter 3). The second part of the regressions includes all 
variables again, but interacted with a dummy variable for the IADB. The resulting 
coefficient estimates correspond to the additional effect for the IADB and shows whether 
this additional effect is significant (corresponding to column 4 in Table 3.3, Chapter 3). 
Finally, the third part of the regressions includes coefficients for the interaction terms of 
all variables with a dummy for the CAF and can be interpreted in analogy to the 
interaction effects with the IADB dummy. (The last part corresponds to column 5 in 
Table 3.3, Chapter 3.) 
 
The comparison between Regressions 1 and 2 shows considerable differences in 
coefficient estimates notably with respect to the effects of the time trend and the 
economic variables – effects that seem to be reversed. As discussed above, while p-values 
may be questionable, the coefficient estimates should be unbiased in Regression 2. This 
confirms the importance of the FE and suggests that Regression 1 is severely biased. 
While the coefficient for GDP per capita in Regression 1 points in the expected direction, 
this is an artifact of omitted country specific effects, and cannot be reproduced in the 
other (more reliable) specifications. 
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Annex Table A1.1. Four Alternative Regression Specifications (All MDBs 
Combined) 
Specification 
 
(1) Tobit², RE (2) Tobit², FE (3) Linear FE 
regression 
(4) Linear FE, 
variables in logs2 
Dependent variable 
 
Lending per 
capita  
Lending per 
capita 
Lending per 
capita 
Lending per 
capita 
Year 0.295 -1.534** -1.382** 0.167 
 (0.196) (0.031) (0.044) (0.424) 
Investor ranking -0.221 -0.687** -0.629** -1.855** 
 (0.304) (0.026) (0.037) (0.027) 
Reserves (% ext. debt) 0.064 0.120 0.171 0.252 
 (0.873) (0.783) (0.674) (0.280) 
GDP per capita -0.002** 0.010*** 0.007** 3.285 
 (0.028) (0.003) (0.012) (0.177) 
Global crisis -5.464 -5.276 -3.596 -0.242 
 (0.147) (0.135) (0.307) (0.367) 
UN voting with US (share) 51.623*** 26.685* 16.264 1.663 
 (0.000) (0.063) (0.221) (0.108) 
Inflation (%) -0.005 -0.006* -0.003** -0.443*** 
 (0.124) (0.058) (0.041) (0.005) 
IMF lending (mio USD) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.053 
 (0.818) (0.613) (0.747) (0.283) 
Population (mio) 0.520*** 2.099* 2.458** -14.427 
 (0.004) (0.079) (0.039) (0.210) 
Year × IADB 0.012** 0.265 0.082 -0.118 
 (0.030) (0.785) (0.932) (0.689) 
Investor ranking × IADB 0.052 0.197 0.136 0.278 
 (0.853) (0.642) (0.748) (0.814) 
Reserves × IADB -0.113 -0.179 -0.229 -0.054 
 (0.834) (0.761) (0.690) (0.871) 
GDP per capita × IADB 0.001 -0.002 0.001 1.252 
 (0.160) (0.649) (0.754) (0.715) 
Global crisis × IADB 9.947* 10.237** 8.519* 0.609 
 (0.054) (0.037) (0.088) (0.110) 
UN voting with US×IADB -40.829*** -38.442** -28.840 -3.003** 
 (0.001) (0.046) (0.125) (0.040) 
Inflation × IADB 0.008** 0.008** 0.006** 0.237 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.279) 
IMF lending × IADB -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.048 
 (0.893) (0.781) (0.878) (0.492) 
Population × IADB -0.406* -0.706 -1.032 6.384 
 (0.098) (0.670) (0.537) (0.694) 
Year × CAF 0.026*** 3.699*** 3.456*** -0.211 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.475) 
Investor ranking × CAF 0.767*** 1.141*** 1.086** 3.546*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.003) 
Reserves × CAF -0.448 -0.327 -0.378 -0.496 
 (0.408) (0.578) (0.511) (0.133) 
GDP per capita × CAF 0.001 -0.014*** -0.010*** -4.889 
 (0.439) (0.002) (0.010) (0.155) 
Global crisis × CAF 1.571 -1.457 -3.185 -0.219 
 (0.761) (0.767) (0.522) (0.565) 
UN voting with US × CAF -81.973*** -27.423 -17.852 -1.223 
 (0.000) (0.155) (0.342) (0.402) 
Inflation × CAF 0.006 0.008** 0.005** 0.699*** 
 (0.101) (0.025) (0.026) (0.002) 
IMF lending × CAF -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.114 
 (0.312) (0.286) (0.599) (0.103) 
Population × CAF -1.476*** -4.758*** -5.000*** 22.318 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.170) 
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Table A1.1 continued     
     
Observations 300 300 300 300 
Number of groups 15 15 15 15 
R² (within)   0.283 0.303 
Left censored observations 22 22   
Wald test  chi²(27)=143 chi²(41)=220   
 0.00 0.00   
1 P-values in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). FE (or constant) not shown. IADB and CAF are indicator 
variables for the respective banks. All fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) are at the bank × country level. All 
variables except year are included with a one-year lag. 
2 For tobit regressions the coefficients rather than the marginal effects on E(y) are shown. They represent the marginal 
effect for the latent variable and are generally consistent in tobit FE-regressions (specification 2), despite the incidential 
parameter problem. However, the standard errors may be biased downward in this case (Greene 2004). 
3 All variables are in logs except the global crisis dummy and the linear trend variable (year). For variables (x) with 
values of zero, ln(1+x) was taken. For inflation 1.2 was added to compensate for a slightly negative value.  
 
Regressions 2 and 3 generally confirm the results from the SURE regressions. While 
coefficients appear considerably smaller, this is due to the specification of the dependent 
variable in per capita terms. As before, the linear trend and improvements in the 
investors’ ranking are associated with a significant reduction in World Bank lending. The 
situation is not significantly different for World Bank lending, while it is (and strongly 
significantly so) for the CAF. The global crisis variable is not significant for the World 
Bank and the CAF, but the effect on the IADB is significantly different and points in the 
opposite direction. Results for control variables also look quite similar (with the 
exception of the population, which, of course, has a different meaning here, since the 
dependent variable is itself measured per capita). Only the UN voting variable loses its 
significance in Regression 3.  
 
Regression 4 shows coefficients that reflect elasticities. Regarding the control variable for 
UN voting, at least the difference to the IADB again becomes significant (as compared to 
Regression 3). However, one of the key explanatory variables, namely the trend variable, 
loses significance. This might simply indicate that the trend observed is indeed best 
approximated by a linear relationship, rather than by a relationship between years and log 
lending. Otherwise, the results are similar to those in Regressions 2 and 3, i.e., they are 
also broadly in line with the SURE regressions presented in Chapter 3. 
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9.2 Annex 2: Comparing the Pricing of MDB Loans 
 
Comparing loan costs among MDBs would be a useful variable, both in statistical models 
and more broadly, to better understand differences among them and borrower demand. 
However, this is no simple task. The first complicating issue for cost comparison is that 
MDB loan products and terms have varied considerably over time, and most MDBs 
currently offer a menu of options to borrowers. For much of their history, both the World 
Bank and the IADB offered a single type of loan for non-concessional borrowers: a loan 
with a fixed (as opposed to floating) interest rate markup over the MDB’s own cost of 
borrowing, a single maturity, disbursement and repayment schedule, and always in U.S. 
dollars. Both MDBs added a mark-up over the cost of borrowing to cover administrative 
costs and generate a certain level of net income. Because loans were disbursed and repaid 
over many years, this led to both MDBs being exposed to a certain degree of interest rate 
risk—if their own cost of borrowing were to increase, but the contractual interest rate to 
borrowers did not adjust, it would result in a smaller spread or even a loss for the MDB.  
 
When interest rates began rising sharply in the early 1980s, the World Bank began to face 
severe financial difficulties because of this dynamic. As a result, the World Bank 
modified the fees it charged on loans and changed to a variable spread lending rate 
system, in which rates were adjusted semi-annually to reflect the World Bank’s evolving 
cost of borrowing. This placed the risk of interest rate fluctuations on the borrower, rather 
than the World Bank. In response to requests from borrowers, a fixed-spread loan product 
was reintroduced in 1995, now including a risk premium that made the loan considerably 
more expensive than variable rates, to compensate for the World Bank’s potential interest 
rate risk. With some modifications, this basic two-option system continues today. 
Borrowers can chose from either a fixed or variable spread over the London Inter-bank 
Offer Rate (Libor), the former with an added risk premium charge.66 The IADB has 
generally followed the World Bank’s lead in this regard, although with somewhat of a 
                                                
66 Historical information on World Bank loan terms comes from World Bank 2007b, Annex 1; current 
terms are detailed on the World Bank’s webpage at 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/pdf/Pricing_Basics.pdf. 
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time lag. Currently it also offers a fixed-spread and a variable spread loan instrument. 67 
The CAF, by contrast, has always worked with variable spread loans, and only recently 
instituted a fixed spread option for borrowers.68 Apart from these changes in interest 
rates, all three MDBs have at different times offered options regarding maturities, 
disbursement and repayments, currencies, and interest rate and/or foreign exchange rate 
hedging instruments. The intricacies of these differences need not concern us overly here. 
 
The main point to take away is that one cannot simply compare the interest rate on 
different MDB loans over time, since the World Bank and IADB offer more than one 
type of loan, and loan types have varied within the same MDB over the years. Comparing 
the interest rate on a variable spread loan based on Libor with a fixed spread loan based 
on an MDB’s cost of funding is to compare apples and oranges. To deal with this, I 
compare two main lending instruments: (i) Libor-based variable spread loans and (ii) 
adjustable spread loans based over MDB cost of funding, rather than over Libor. The 
Libor loans began in 1995 for the World Bank and 2003 for the IADB, and are available 
from 1996 to 2009 for the CAF.69 The adjustable spread loans began in 1996 for the 
World Bank and 1997 for the IADB. They were discontinued by the World Bank in 2009, 
and were never offered by the CAF. While these two series are far from ideal, they do 
offer a reasonable basis of comparison for similar loan instruments across the MDBs for a 
number of years, to give at least an approximation of different costs faced by borrowers.  
 
A second major complication in comparing the loan costs of MDBs is the use of fees, 
which are added on to the interest rate of the loan. Fees for all three MDBs come in two 
varieties: a front-end fee and a commitment fee. A front-end fee is simply a one-time 
charge intended to cover the costs of preparing and administering the loan, and is similar 
to fees used by private banks. The commitment fee is a charge on all undisbursed loan 
amounts, and is unique to MDBs, since of course private lending institutions disburse 
                                                
67 Current IADB loan terms can be viewed at http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/idb-financing/financial-
terms-of-loans,6037.html; historical interest rates and fees are available at http://www.iadb.org/en/about-
us/idb-financing/interest-rates,6050.html and http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/idb-financing/ordinary-
capital-loan-charges,6052.html, respectively. 
68 Information on CAF loan terms (both historical and current) was made available to the author by CAF 
Treasury officials (CAF 2009a).  
69 CAF used Libor-based loans earlier, but only made data available to the author from 1996.  
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loans immediately in their entirety. The commitment fee is intended to cover the MDB’s 
carrying cost of holding in liquid assets to cover the undisbursed loan amount (instead of 
putting it to another, more profitable use), and serves to encourage borrowers to disburse 
their loans in a timely manner. This is a particular problem for MDBs in long-term 
investment projects that are delayed for various reasons, such as lack of country 
counterpart funding. Fees have varied widely between each MDB and over time (Figures 
A2.1 and A2.2). Because of the considerable additional cost they imply for borrowers, all 
fees must be taken into account to give a realistic comparison of borrowing costs from 
each MDB.  
 
Figure A2.1: MDB Commitment Fees 
  
Figure A2.2: MDB Front-end Fees 
 
Source: World Bank 2011c; IADB 2011b, using the average of semester rates for each year; CAF 2009b.  
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To incorporate loan fees into the annual interest rate and arrive at a single comparable 
annual “all-in” cost for each MDB, I utilize a methodology employed by the World Bank 
Treasury for generating comparisons between the cost of World Bank loans and other 
MDBs in a given year. This involves generating an annualized value for each of the fees, 
over the entire life of a loan, and adding that on to the annual interest rate charge. It is 
important to note that the methodology is of necessity not exact. To make an exact 
comparison would require including the maturity and disbursement/repayment profile for 
each loan undertaken by an MDB—obviously a monumental task even for a single year, 
much less over several years. Instead, the World Bank Treasury methodology assumes an 
average loan maturity of 17 years and a standardized disbursement/repayment profile. 
While these assumptions do not hold in reality, they do allow for a useful and relatively 
accurate comparison between the total cost borrowers face from each MDB. Using this 
methodology, I compare all-in loan costs (interest rate and annualized fees) for the two 
types of loans mentioned above for the MDBs in question.70 
 
                                                
70 An Excel spreadsheet with the formulas used by the World Bank was provided to the author by World 
Bank Treasury staff in November 2010.  
